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Chapter I
Introductory
Section 1.— Aim and Scope of the Essay
It is the aim of this essay to examine and present in as concise a form as
possible the principles and rules which guided and regulated men in
their economic and social relations during the period known as the Middle
Ages. The failure of the teaching of the so-called orthodox or classical
political economists to bring peace and security to society has caused
those interested in social and economic problems to inquire with ever-
increasing anxiety into the economic teaching which the orthodox
economy replaced; and this inquiry has revealed that each system of
economic thought that has from time to time been accepted can be prop-
erly understood only by a knowledge of the earlier system out of which
it grew. A process of historical inquiry of this kind leads one ultimately
to the Middle Ages, and it is certainly not too much to say that no study
of modern European economic thought can be complete or satisfactory
unless it is based upon a knowledge of the economic teaching which was
accepted in mediaeval Europe. Therefore, while many will deny that the
economic teaching of that period is deserving of approval, or that it is
capable of being applied to the conditions of the present day, none will
deny that it is worthy of careful and impartial investigation.6/George O’Brien
There is thus a demand for information upon the subject dealt with
in this essay. On the other hand, the supply of such information in the
English language is extremely limited. The books, such as Ingram’s
History of Political Economy and Haney’s History of Economic Thought,
which deal with the whole of economic history, necessarily devote but a
few pages to the Middle Ages. Ashley’s Economic History contains two
excellent chapters dealing with the Canonist teaching; but, while these
chapters contain a mass of most valuable information on particular
branches of the mediaeval doctrines, they do not perhaps sufficiently
indicate the relation between them, nor do they lay sufficient emphasis
upon the fundamental philosophical principles out of which the whole
system sprang. One can- not sufficiently acknowledge the debt which
English students are under to Sir William Ashley for his examination of
mediaeval opinion on economic matters; his book is frequently and grate-
fully cited as an authority in the following pages; but it is undeniable
that his treatment of the subject suffers somewhat on account of its
being introduced but incidentally into a work dealing mainly with En-
glish economic practice. Dr. Cunningham has also made many valuable
contributions to particular aspects of the subject; and there have also
been published, principally in Catholic periodicals, many important
monographs on special points; but so far there has not appeared in En-
glish any treatise, which is devoted exclusively to mediaeval economic
opinion and attempts to treat the whole subject completely. It is this
want in our economic literature that has tempted the author to publish
the present essay, although he is fully aware of its many defects.
It is necessary, in the first place, to indicate precisely the extent of
the subject with which we propose to deal; and with this end in view to
give a definition of the three words, ‘mediaeval, economic, teaching.’
Section 2.— Explanation of the Title
§1. Mediaeval
Ingram, in his well-known book on economic history, following the opin-
ion of Comte, refuses to consider the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries
as part of the Middle Ages.1 We intend, however, to treat of economic
teaching up to the end of the fifteenth century. The best modern judges
are agreed that the term Middle Ages must not be given a hard-and-fast
meaning, but that it is capable of bearing a very elastic interpretation.
The definition given in the Catholic Encyclopaedia is: ‘a term com-
monly used to designate that period of European history between theAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/7
Fall of the Roman Empire and about the middle of the fifteenth century.
The precise dates of the beginning, culmination, and end of the Middle
Ages are more or less arbitrarily assumed according to the point of view
adopted.’ The eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica con-
tains a similar opinion : ‘This name is commonly given to that period of
European history which lies between what are known as ancient and
modern times, and which has generally been considered as extending
from about the middle of the fifth to about the middle of the fifteenth
centuries. The two dates adopted in old text-books were 476 and 1453,
from the setting aside of the last emperor of the west until the fall of
Constantinople. In reality it is impossible to fix any exact dates for the
opening and close of such a period.’
We are therefore justified in considering the fifteenth century as
comprised in the Middle Ages. This is especially so in the domain of
economic theory. In actual practice the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries may have presented the appearance rather of the first stage of a new
than of the last stage of an old era. This is Ingram’s view. However true
this may be of practice, it is not at all true of theory, which, as we shall
see, continued to be entirely based on the writings of an author of the
thirteenth century. Ingram admits this incidentally: ‘During the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries the Catholic-feudal system was breaking
down by the mutual conflicts of its own official members, while the
constituent elements of a new order were rising beneath it. The move-
ments of this phase can scarcely be said to find an echo in any contem-
porary economic literature.’2 We need not therefore apologise further
for including a consideration of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in
our investigations as to the economic teaching of the Middle Ages. We
are supported in doing so by such excellent authorities as Jourdain,3
Roscher,4 and Cossa.5 Haney, in his History of Economic Thought,6
says: ‘It seems more nearly true to regard the years about 1500 as mark-
ing the end of mediaeval times... On large lines, and from the viewpoint
of systems of thought rather than systems of industry, the Middle Ages
may with profit be divided into two periods. From 400 down to 1200, or
shortly thereafter, constitutes the first. During these years Christian the-
ology opposed Roman institutions, and Germanic customs were super-
posed, until through action and reaction all were blended. This was the
reconstruction; it was the “stormy struggle” to found a new ecclesiasti-
cal and civil system. From 1200 on to 1500 the world of thought settled
to its level. Feudalism and scholasticism, the corner-stones of medieval-8/George O’Brien
ism, emerged and were dominant.’
We shall not continue the study further than the beginning of the
sixteenth century. It is true that, if we were to refer to several sixteenth-
century authors, we should be in possession of a very highly developed
and detailed mass of teaching on many points which earlier authors left
to some extent obscure. We deliberately refrain nevertheless from doing
so, because the whole nature of the sixteenth-century literature was dif-
ferent from that of the fourteenth and fifteenth; the early years of the
sixteenth century witnessed the abrogation of the central authority which
was a basic condition of the success of the mediaeval system; and the
same period also witnessed ‘ radical economic changes, reacting more
and more on the scholastic doctrines, which found fewer and fewer de-
fenders in their original form.’7
§2. Economic
It must be clearly understood that the political economy of the mediaevals
was not a science, like modern political economy, but an art. ‘It is a
branch of the virtue of prudence; it is half-way between morality, which
regulates the conduct of the individual, and politics, which regulates the
conduct of the sovereign. It is the morality of the family or of the head of
the family, from the point of view of the good administration of the
patrimony, just as politics is the morality of the sovereign, from the
point of view of the good government of the State. There is as yet no
question of economic laws in the sense of historical and descriptive laws;
and political.economy, not yet existing in the form of a science, is not
more than a branch of that great tree which is called ethics, or the art of
living well.’8 ‘The doctrine of the canon law,’ says Sir William Ashley,
‘differed from modern economics in being an art rather than a science. It
was a body of rules and prescriptions as to conduct, rather than of con-
clusions as to fact. All art indeed in this sense rests on science; but the
science on which the canonist doctrine rested was theology. Theology,
or rather that branch of it which we may call Christian ethics, laid down
certain principles of right and wrong in the economic sphere; and it was
the work of the canonists to apply them to specific transactions and to
pronounce judgment as to their permissibility.’9 The conception of eco-
nomic laws, in the modern sense, was quite foreign to the mediaeval
treatment of the subject. It was only in the middle of the fourteenth
century that anything approaching a scientific examination of the phe-
nomena of economic life appeared, and that was only in relation to aAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/9
particular subject, namely, the doctrine of money.10
To say that the mediaeval method of approaching economic prob-
lems was fundamentally different from the modern, is not in any sense
to be taken as indicating disapproval of the former. On the contrary, it is
the general opinion to-day that the so-called classical treatment of eco-
nomics has proved disastrous in its application to real life, and that
future generations will witness a retreat to the earlier position. The clas-
sical economists committed the cardinal error of subordinating man to
wealth, and consumption to production. In their attempt to preserve sym-
metry and order in their generalisations they constructed a weird crea-
ture, the economic man, who never existed, and never could exist. The
mediaevals made no such mistake. They insisted that all production and
gain which did not lead to the good of man was not alone wasteful, but
positively evil; and that man was infinitely more important than wealth.
When he exclaims that ‘Production is on account of man, not man of
production,’ Antoninus of Florence sums up in a few words the whole
view-point of his age.11 ‘Consumption,’ according to Dr. Cunningham,
‘was the aspect of human nature which attracted most attention.... Regu-
lating consumption wisely was the chief practical problem in mediaeval
economics.’12 The great practical benefits of such a treatment of the
problems relating to the acquisition and enjoyment of material wealth
must be obvious to every one who is familiar with the condition of the
world after a century of classical political economy. ‘To subordinate the
economic order to the social order, to submit the industrial activity of
man to the consideration of the final and general end of his whole being,
is a principle which must exert on every department of the science of
wealth, an influence easy to understand. Economic laws are the codifi-
cation of the material activity of a sort of homo economicus; of a being,
who, having no end in view but wealth, produces all he can, distributes
his produce in the way that suits him best, and consumes as much as he
can. Self interest alone dictates his conduct.’13 Economics, far from
being a science whose highest aim was to evolve a series of abstrac-
tions, was a practical guide to the conduct of everyday affairs.14 ‘The
pre-eminence of morality in the domain of economics constitutes at the
same time the distinctive feature, the particular merit, and the great
teaching of the economic lessons of this period.’15
Dr. Cunningham draws attention to the fact that the existence of
such a universally received code of economic morality was largely due
to the comparative simplicity of the mediaeval social structure, where10/George O’Brien
the relations of persons were all important, in comparison with the
modern order, where the exchange of things is the dominant factor. He
further draws attention to the changes which affected the whole consti-
tution of society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and pro-
ceeds: ‘These changes had a very important bearing on all questions of
commercial morality; so long as economic dealings were based on a
system of personal relationships they all bore an implied moral charac-
ter. To supply a bad article was morally wrong, to demand excessive
payment for goods or for labour was extortion, and the right or wrong
of every transaction was easily understood.’16 The application of ethics
to economic transactions was rendered possible by the existence of one
universally recognised code of morality, and the presence of one univer-
sally accepted moral teacher. ‘In the thirteenth century, the ecclesiasti-
cal organisation gave a unity to the social structure throughout the whole
of Western Europe; over the area in which the Pope was recognised as
the spiritual and the Emperor as the temporal vicar of God, political and
racial differences were relatively unimportant. For economic purposes
it is scarcely necessary to distinguish different countries from one an-
other in the thirteenth century, for there were fewer barriers to social
intercourse within the limits of Christendom than there are to-day....
Similar ecclesiastical canons, and similar laws prevailed over large ar-
eas, where very different admixtures of civil and barbaric laws were in
vogue. Christendom, though broken into so many fragments politically,
was one organised society for all the purposes of economic life, because
there was such free intercommunication between its parts.’17 ‘There were
three great threads,’ we read later in the same book, ‘which ran through
the whole social system of Christendom. First of all there was a com-
mon religious life, with the powerful weapons of spiritual censure and
excommunication which it placed in the hands of the clergy, so that they
were able to enforce the line of policy which Rome approved. Then
there was the great judicial system of canon law, a common code with
similar tribunals for the whole of Western Christendom, dealing not
merely with strictly ecclesiastical affairs, but with many matters that we
should regard as economic, such as questions of commercial morality,
and also with social welfare as affected by the law of marriage and the
disposition of property by will....’18 To the influence of Christianity as a
moral doctrine,’ says Dr. Ingram, ‘was added that of the Church as an
organisation, charged with the application of the doctrine to men’s daily
transactions. Besides the teaching of the sacred books there was a massAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/11
of ecclesiastical legislation providing specific prescriptions for the con-
duct of the faithful. And this legislation dealt with the economic as well
as with other provinces of social activity.’19
The teaching of the mediaeval Church, therefore, on economic af-
fairs was but the application to particular facts and cases of its general
moral teaching. The suggestion, so often put forward by so-called Chris-
tian socialists, that Christianity was the exponent of a special social
theory of its own, is unfounded. The direct opposite would be nearer the
truth. Far from concerning itself with the outward forms of the political
or economic structure, Christianity concentrated its attention on the con-
duct of the individual. If Christianity can be said to have possessed any
distinctive social theory, it was intense individualism. ‘Christianity
brought, from the point of view of morals, an altogether new force by
the distinctly individual and personal character of its precepts. Duty,
vice or virtue, eternal punishment—all are marked with the most indi-
vidualist imprint that can be imagined. ‘No social or political theory
appeared, because it was through the individual that society was to be
regenerated.... We can say with truth that there is not any Christian
political economy—in the sense in which there is a Christian morality
or a Christian dogma—any more than there is a Christian physic or a
Christian medicine.’20 In seeking to learn Christian teaching of the Middle
Ages on economic matters, we must therefore not look for special eco-
nomic treatises in the modern sense, but seek our principles in the works
dealing with general morality, in the Canon Law, and in the commentar-
ies on the Civil Law. ‘We find the first worked out economic theory for
the whole Catholic world in the Corpus Juris Canonici, that product of
mediaeval science in which for so many centuries theology, jurispru-
dence, philosophy, and politics were treated....’21
There is not to be found in the writers of the early Middle Ages, that
is to say from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries, a trace of any atten-
tion given to what we at the present day would designate economic ques-
tions. Usury was condemned by the decrees of several councils, but the
reasons of this prohibition were not given, nor was the question made
the subject of any dialectical controversy; commerce was so undevel-
oped as to escape the attention of those who sought to guide the people
in their daily life; and money was accepted as the inevitable instrument
of exchange, without any discussion of its origin or the laws which
regulated it.
The writings of this period therefore betray no sign of any interest12/George O’Brien
in economic affairs. Jourdain says that he carefully examined the works
of Alcuin, Rabanas Mauras, Scotus Erigenus, Hincmar, Gerbert, St.
Anselm, and Abelard—the greatest lights of theology and philosophy in
the early Middle Ages—without finding a single passage to suggest that
any of these authors suspected that the pursuit of riches, which they
despised, occupied a sufficiently large place in national as well as in
individual life, to offer to the philosopher a subject fruitful in reflections
and results. The only work which might be adduced as a partial excep-
tion to this rule is the Polycraticus of John of Salisbury; but even this
treatise contained only some scattered moral reflections on luxury and
on zeal for the interest of the public treasury.22
Two causes contributed to produce this almost total lack of interest
in economic subjects. One was the miserable condition of society, still
only partially rescued from the ravages of the barbarians, and half
organised, almost without industry and commerce; the other was the
absence of all economic tradition. The existence of the Categories and
Hermenia of Aristotle ensured that the chain of logical study was not
broken; the works of Donatus and Priscian sustained some glimmer of
interest in grammatical theory; certain rude notions of physics and as-
tronomy were kept alive by the preservation of such ancient elementary
treatises as those of Marcian Capella; but economics had no share in the
heritage of the past. Not only had the writings of the ancients, who dealt
to some extent with the theory of wealth, been destroyed, but the very
traces of their teaching had been long forgotten. A good example of the
state of thought in economic matters is furnished by the treatment which
money receives in the Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, which was re-
garded in the early Middle Ages as a reliable encyclopaedia. ‘Money,’
according to Isidore, ‘is so called because it warns, monet, lest any
fraud should enter into its composition or its weight. The piece of money
is the coin of gold, silver, or bronze, which is called nomisma, because
it bears the imprint of the name and likeness of the prince.... The pieces
of money nummi have been so called from the King of Rome, Numa,
who was the first among the Latins to mark them with the imprint of his
image and name.’23 Is it any wonder that the early Middle Ages were
barren of economic doctrines, when this was the best instruction to which
they had access?
In the course of the thirteenth century a great change occurred. The
advance of civilisation, the increased organisation of feudalism, the de-
velopment of industry, and the extension of commerce, largely under theAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/13
influence of the Crusades, all created a condition of affairs in which
economic questions could no longer be overlooked or neglected. At the
same time the renewed study of the writings of Aristotle served to throw
a flood of new light on the nature of wealth.
The Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, although they are not princi-
pally devoted to a treatment of the theory of wealth, do in fact deal with
that subject incidentally. Two points in particular are touched on, the
utility of money and the injustice of usury. The passages of the philoso-
pher dealing with these subjects are of particular interest, as they may
be said, with a good deal of truth, to be the true starting point of medi-
aeval economics.24 The writings of Aristotle arrested the attention, and
aroused the admiration of the theologians of the thirteenth century; and
it would be quite impossible to exaggerate the influence which they ex-
ercised on the later development of mediaeval thought. Albertus Magnus
digested, interpreted, and systematised the whole of the works of the
Stagyrite; and was so steeped in the lessons of his philosophic master as
to be dubbed by some ‘ the ape of Aristotle.’ Aquinas, who was a pupil
of Albertus, also studied and commented on Aristotle, whose aid he was
always ready to invoke in the solution of all his difficulties. With the
single and strange exception of Vincent de Beauvais, Aristotle’s teach-
ing on money was accepted by all the writers of the thirteenth century,
and was followed by later generations.25 The influence of Aristotle is
apparent in every article of the Summa, which was itself the starting
point from which all discussion sprang for the following two centuries;
and it is not too much to say that the Stagyrite had a decisive influence
on the introduction of economic notions into the controversies of the
Schools. ‘We find in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,’ says Ingram,
‘the economic doctrines of Aristotle reproduced with a partial infusion
of Christian elements.’26 In support of the account we have given of the
development of economic thought in the thirteenth century, we may quote
Cossa: ‘The revival of economic studies in the Middle Ages only dates
from the thirteenth century. It was due in a great measure to a study of
the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle, whose theories on wealth were para-
phrased by a considerable number of commentators. Before that period
we can only find moral and religious dissertations on such topics as the
proper use of material goods, the dangers of luxury, and undue desire
for wealth. This is easily explained when we take into consideration (1)
the prevalent influence of religious ideas at the time, (2) the strong reac-
tion against the materialism of pagan antiquity, (3) the predominance of14/George O’Brien
natural economy, (4) the small importance of international trade, and
(5) the decay of the profane sciences, and the metaphysical tendencies
of the more solid thinkers of the Middle Ages.’27
The teaching of Aquinas upon economic affairs remained the ground-
work of all the later writers until the end of the fifteenth century. His
opinions on various points were amplified and explained by later au-
thors in more detail than he himself employed; monographs of consider-
able length were devoted to the treatment of questions which he dis-
missed in a single article; but the development which took place was
essentially one of amplification rather than opposition. The
monographists of the later fifteenth century treat usury and sale in con-
siderable detail; many refinements are indicated which are not to be
found in the Summa; but it is quite safe to say that none of these later
writers ever pretended to supersede the teaching of Aquinas, who was
always admitted to be the ultimate authority. ‘During the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, the general political doctrine of Aquinas was main-
tained with merely subordinate modifications.’28 ‘The canonist doctrine
of the fifteenth century,’ according to Sir William Ashley, ‘was but a
development of the principles to which the Church had already given its
sanction in earlier centuries. It was the outcome of these same principles
working in a modified environment. But it may more fairly be said to
present a system of economic thought, because it was no longer a collec-
tion of unrelated opinions, but a connected whole. The tendency to-
wards a separate department of study is shown by the ever-increasing
space devoted to the discussion of general economic topics in general
theological treatises, and more notably still in the manuals of casuistry
for the use of the confessional, and handbooks of canon law for the use
of ecclesiastical lawyers. It was shown even more distinctly by the ap-
pearance of a shoal of special treatises on such subjects as contracts,
exchange, and money, not to mention those on usury.’29 In all this devel-
opment, however, the principles enunciated by Aquinas, and through
him, by Aristotle, though they may have been illustrated and applied to
new instances, were never rejected. The study of the writers of this pe-
riod is therefore the study of an organic whole, the germ of which is to
be found in the writings of Aquinas.30
§3. Teaching
We shall confine our attention in this essay to the economic teaching of
the Middle Ages, and shall not deal with the actual practice of the pe-An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/15
riod. It may be objected that a study of the former without a study of the
latter is futile and useless; that the economic teaching of a period can
only be satisfactorily learnt from a study of its actual economic institu-
tions and customs; and that the scholastic teaching was nothing but a
casuistical attempt to reconcile the early Christian dogmas with the ever-
widening exigencies of real life. Endemann, for instance, devotes a great
part of his invaluable books on the subject to demonstrating how im-
practicable the canonist teaching was when it was applied to real life,
and recounting the casuistical devices that were resorted to in order to
reconcile the teaching of the Church with the accepted mercantile cus-
toms of the time. Endemann, however, in spite of his colossal research
and unrivalled acquaintance with original authorities, was essentially
hostile to  the system which he undertook to explain, and thus lacked the
most essential quality of a satisfactory expositor, namely, sympathy with
his subject. He does not appear to have realised that development and
adaptability to new situations, far from being marks of impracticability,
are rather the signs of vitality and of elasticity. This is not the place to
discuss how far the doctrine of the late fifteenth differed from that of the
early thirteenth century; that is a matter which will appear below when
each of the leading principles of scholastic economic teaching is sepa-
rately considered; it is sufficient to say here that we agree entirely with
Brants, in opposition to Endemann, that the change which took place in
the interval was one of development, and not of opposition. ‘The law,’
says Brants, ‘remained identical and unchanged; justice and charity—
nobody can justly enrich himself at the expense of his neighbour or of
the State, but the reasons justifying gain are multiplied according as
riches are developed.’31 ‘The canonist doctrine of the fifteenth century
was but a development of the principles to which the Church had al-
ready given its sanction in earlier centuries. It was the outcome of these
same principles working in a modified environment.’32 With these con-
clusions of Brants and Ashley we are in entire agreement.
Let us say in passing that the assumption that the mediaeval teach-
ing grew out of contemporary practice, rather than that the latter grew
out of the former, is one which does not find acceptance among the
majority of the students of the subject. The problem whether a correct
understanding of mediaeval economic life can be best attained by first
studying the teaching or the practice is possibly no more soluble than
the old riddle of the hen and the egg; but it may at least be argued that
there is a good deal to be said on both sides. The supporters of the view16/George O’Brien
that practice moulded theory are by no means unopposed, there is no
doubt that in many respects the exigencies of everyday commercial con-
cerns came into conflict with the tenets of canon law and scholastic
opinion; but the admission of this fact does not at all prove that the
former was the element which modified the latter, rather than the latter
the former. In so far as the expansion of commerce and the increasing
complexity of intercourse raised questions which seemed to indicate that
mercantile convenience conflicted with received teaching, it is probable
that the difficulty was not so much caused by a contradiction between
the former and the latter, as by the fact that an interpretation of the
doctrine as applied to the facts of the new situation was not available
before the new situation had actually arisen. This is a phenomenon fre-
quently met with at the present day in legal practice; but no lawyer
would dream of asserting that, because there had arisen an unprecedented
state of facts, to which the application of the law was a matter of doubt
or difficulty, therefore the law itself was obsolete or incomplete. Ex-
amples of such a conflict are familiar to any one who has ever studied
the case law on any particular subject, either in a country such as En-
gland, where the law is unwritten, or in continental countries, where the
most exhaustive and complete codes have been framed. Nevertheless, in
spite of the occurrence of such difficulties, it would be foolish to con-
tend that the laws in force for the time being have not a greater influence
on the practice of mercantile transactions than the convenience of mer-
chants has upon the law. How much more potent must this influence
have been when the law did not apply simply to outward observances,
but to the inmost recesses of the consciences of believing Christians!
The opinion that mediaeval teaching exercised a profound effect on
mediaeval practice is supported by authorities of the weight of Ashley,
Ingram, and Cunningham,33 the last of whom was in some respects un-
sympathetic to the teaching the influence of which he rates so highly. ‘It
has indeed,’ writes Sir William Ashley, ‘not infrequently been hinted
that all the elaborate argumentation of canonists and theologians was “a
cobweb of the brain,” with no vital relation to real life. Certain German
writers have, for instance, maintained that, alongside of the canonist
doctrine with regard to trade, there existed in mediaeval Europe a com-
mercial law, recognised in the secular courts, and altogether opposed to
the peculiar doctrines of the canonists. It is true that parts of mercantile
jurisprudence, such as the law of partnership, had to a large extent origi-
nated in the social conditions of the time, and would have probablyAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/17
made their appearance even if there had been no canon law or theology.
But though there were branches of commercial law which were, in the
main, independent of the canonist doctrine, there were none that were
opposed to it. On the fundamental points of usury and just price, com-
mercial law in the later Middle Ages adopted completely the principles
of the canonists. How entirely these principles were recognised in the
practice of the courts which had most to do with commercial suits, viz.
those of the towns, is sufficiently shown by the frequent enactments as
to usury and as to reasonable price which are found in the town ordi-
nances of the Middle Ages; in England as well as in the rest of Western
Europe.... Whatever may have been the effect, direct or indirect, of the
canonist doctrine on legislation, it is certain that on its other side, as
entering into the moral teaching of the Church through the pulpit and
the confessional, its influence was general and persistent, even if it were
not always completely successful.’34 ‘Every great change of opinion on
the destinies of man,’ says Ingram, ‘and the guiding principles of con-
duct must react in the sphere of material interests; and the Catholic
religion had a profound influence on the economic life of the Middle
Ages.... The constant presentations to the general mind and conscience
of Christian ideas, the dogmatic bases of which were as yet scarcely
assailed by scepticism, must have had a powerful effect in moralising
life.’35 According to Dr. Cunningham: ‘The medieval doctrine of price
was not a theory intended to explain the phenomena of society, but it
was laid down as the basis of rules which should control the conduct of
society and of individuals. At the same time current opinion seems to
have been so fully formed in accordance with it that a brief enumeration
of the doctrine of a just price will serve to set the practice of the day in
clearer light. In regard to other matters, it is difficult to determine how
far public opinion was swayed by practical experience, and how far it
was really moulded by Christian teaching—this is the case in regard to
usury. But there can be little doubt about the doctrine of price—which
really underlies a great deal of commercial and gild regulations, and is
constantly implied in the early legislation on mercantile affairs.’36 The
same author expresses the same opinion in another work: ‘The Chris-
tian doctrine of price, and Christian condemnation of gain at the ex-
pense of another man, affected all the mediaeval organisation of munici-
pal life and regulation of inter-municipal commerce, and introduced
marked contrasts to the conditions of business in ancient cities. The
Christian appreciation of the duty of work rendered the lot of the medi-18/George O’Brien
aeval villain a very different thing from that of the slave of the ancient
empire. The responsibility of proprietors, like the responsibility of prices,
was so far insisted on as to place substantial checks on tyranny of every
kind. For these principles were not mere pious opinions, but effective
maxims in practical life. Owing to the circumstances in which the ves-
tiges of Roman civilisation were locally maintained, and the founda-
tions of the new society were laid, there was ample opportunity for
Christian teaching and example to have a marked influence on its devel-
opment.’37 In Dr. Cunningham’s book entitled Politics and Economics
the same opinion is expressed:38 ‘Religious and industrial life were closely
interconnected, and there were countless points at which the principles
of divine law must have been brought to bear on the transaction of busi-
ness, altogether apart from any formal tribunal. Nor must we forget the
opportunities which directors had for influencing the conduct of peni-
tents.... Partly through the operation of the royal power, partly through
the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities, but more generally through
the influence of a Christian public opinion which had been gradually
created, the whole industrial organism took its shape, and the acknowl-
edged economic principles were framed.’ We have quoted these pas-
sages from Dr. Cunningham’s works at length because they are of great
value in helping us to estimate the rival parts played by theory and
practice in mediaeval economic teaching; in the first place, because the
author was by no means prepossessed in favour of the teaching of the
canonists, but rather unsympathetic to it; in the second place, because,
although his work was concerned primarily with practice, he found him-
self obliged to make a study of theory before he could properly under-
stand the practice; and lastly, because they point particularly to the ef-
fect of the teaching on just price. When we come to speak of this part of
the subject we shall find that Dr. Cunningham failed to appreciate the
true significance of the canonist doctrine. If an eminent author, who
does not quite appreciate the full import of this doctrine, and who is to
some extent contemptuous of its practical value, nevertheless asserts
that it exercised an all-powerful influence on the practice of the age in
which it was preached, we are surely justified in asserting that the study
of theory may be profitably pursued without a preliminary history of
the contemporary practice.
But we must not be taken to suggest that there were no conflicts
between the teaching and the practice of the Middle Ages. As we have
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absurd to assert that every man who lived in the Middle Ages lived up to
the high standard of ethical conduct which was proposed by the Church.39
One might as well say that stealing was an unknown crime in England
since the passing of the Larceny Act. All we do suggest is that the theory
had such an important and incalculable influence upon practice that the
study of it is not rendered futile or useless because of occasional or even
frequent departures from it in real life. Even Endemann says: ‘The teach-
ing of the canon law presents a noble edifice not less splendid in its
methods than in its results. It embraces the whole material and spiritual
natures of human society with such power and completeness that verily
no room is left for any other life than that decreed by its dogmas.’40 ‘The
aim of the Church,’ says Janssen, ‘in view of the tremendous agencies
through which it worked, in view of the dominion which it really exer-
cised, cannot have the impression of its greatness effaced by the unfor-
tunate fact that all was not accomplished that had been planned.’41 The
fact that tyranny may have been exercised by some provincial governor
in an outlying island of the Roman Empire cannot close our eyes to the
benefits to be derived from a study of the code of Justinian; nor can a
remembrance of the manner in which English law is administered in
Ireland in times of excitement, blind us to the political lessons to be
learned from an examination of the British constitution.
Section 3.— Value of the Study of the Subject.
The question may be asked whether the study of a system of economic
teaching, which, even if it ever did receive anything approaching uni-
versal assent, has long since ceased to do so, is not a waste of labour.
We can answer that question in the negative, for two reasons. In the first
place, as we said above, a proper understanding of the earlier periods of
the development of a body of knowledge is indispensable for a full ap-
preciation of the later. Even if the canonist system were not worth studying
for its own sake, it would be deserving of attention on account of the
light it throws on the development of later economic doctrine. ‘However
the canonist theory may contrast with or resemble modern economics, it
is too important a part of the history of human thought to be disre-
garded,’ says Sir William Ashley. ‘As we cannot fully understand the
work of Adam Smith without giving some attention to the physiocrats,
nor the physiocrats without looking at the mercantilists: so the begin-
nings of mercantile theory are hardly intelligible without a knowledge of
the canonist doctrine towards which that theory stands in the relation20/George O’Brien
partly of a continuation, partly of a protest.’42
But we venture to assert that the study of canonist economics, far
from being useful simply as an introduction to later theories, is of great
value in furnishing us with assistance in the solution of the economic
and social problems of the present day. The last fifty years have wit-
nessed a reaction against the scientific abstractions of the classical econo-
mists, and modern thinkers are growing more and more dissatisfied with
an economic science which leaves ethics out of account.43 Professor
Sidgwick. in his Principles of Political Economy, published in 1883,
devotes a separate section to ‘The Art of Political Economy,’ in which
he remarks that ‘The principles of Political Economy are still most com-
monly understood even in England, and in spite of many protests to the
contrary, to be practical principles —rules of conduct, public or pri-
vate.’44 The many indications in recent literature and practice that the
regulation of prices should be controlled by principles of ‘fairness’ would
take too long to recite. It is sufficient to refer to the conclusion of Devas
on this point: ‘The notion of just price, worked out in detail by the
theologians, and in later days rejected as absurd by the classical econo-
mists, has been rightly revived by modern economists.’45 Not alone in
the sphere of price, but in that of every other department of economics,
the impossibility of treating the subject as an abstract science without
regard to ethics is being rapidly abandoned. ‘The best usage of the present
time,’ according to the Catholic Encyclopaedia, ‘is to make political
economy an ethical science—that is, to make it include a discussion of
what ought to be in the economic world as well as what is.’46 We read in
the 1917 edition of Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, that
‘The growing importance of distribution as a practical problem has led
to an increasing mutual interpenetration of economic and ethical ideas,
which in the development of economic doctrine during the last century
and a half has taken various forms,’47 The need for some principle by
which just distribution can be attained has been rendered pressing by
the terrible effects of a period of unrestricted competition. ‘It has been
widely maintained that a strictly competitive exchange does not tend to
be really fair—some say cannot be really fair—when one of the parties
is under pressure of urgent need; and further, that the inequality of op-
portunity which private property involves cannot be fully justified on
the principle of maintaining equal freedom, and leads, in fact, to grave
social injustice.’48 In other words, the present condition of affairs is
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some alternative. The day when economics can be divorced from ethics
has passed away; there is a world-wide endeavour to establish in the
place of the old, a new society founded on an ethical basis.49 There are
two, and only two, possible ways to the attainment of this ideal— the
way of socialism and the way of Christianity. There can be no doubt the
socialist movement derives a great part of its popularity from its prom-
ise of a new order, based, not on the unregulated pursuit of selfish de-
sires, but on justice. ‘To this view of justice or equity,’ writes Dr.
Sidgwick, ‘the socialistic contention that labour can only receive its due
reward if land and other instruments of production are taken into public
ownership, and education of all kinds gratuitously provided by Govern-
ment—has powerfully appealed; and many who are not socialists, nor
ignorant of economic science, have been led by it to give welcome to the
notion that the ideally “fair” price of a productive service is a price at
least rendering possible the maintenance of the producers and their fami-
lies in a condition of health and industrial efficiency.’ This is not the
place to enter into a discussion as to the merits or practicability of any
of the numerous schemes put forward by socialists; it is sufficient to say
that socialism is essentially unhistorical, and that in our opinion any
practical benefits which it might bestow on society would be more than
counterbalanced by the innumerable evils which would be certain to
emerge in a system based on unsatisfactory foundations.
The other road to the establishment of a society based on justice is
the way of Christianity, and, if we wish to attempt this path, it becomes
vitally important to understand what was the economic teaching of the
Church in the period when the Christian ethic was universally recognised.
During the whole Middle Ages, as we have said above, the Canon Law
was the test of right and wrong in the domain of economic activity;
production, consumption, distribution, and exchange were all regulated
by the universal system of law; once before economic life was consid-
ered within the scope of moral regulation. It cannot be denied that a
study of the principles which were accepted during that period may be
of great value to a generation which is striving to place its economic life
once more upon an ethical foundation.
One error in particular we must be on our guard to avoid. We said
above that both the socialists and the Christian economists are agreed in
their desire to reintroduce justice into economic life. We must not con-
clude, however, that the aims of these two schools are identical. One
very frequently meets with the statement that the teachings of socialism22/George O’Brien
are nothing more or less than the teachings of Christianity. This conten-
tion is discussed in the following pages, where the conclusion will be
reached that, far from being in agreement, socialism and Christian eco-
nomics contradict each other on many fundamental points. It is, how-
ever, not the aim of the discussion to appraise the relative merits of
either system, or to applaud one and disparage the other. All that it is
sought to do is to distinguish between them; and to demonstrate that,
whatever be the merits or demerits of the two philosophies, they are
two, and not one.
Section 4.— Division of the Subject
The opinion is general that the distinctive doctrine of the mediaeval
Church which permeated the whole of its economic thought was the
doctrine of usury. The holders of this view may lay claim to very influ-
ential supporters among the students of the subject. Ashley says that the
prohibition of usury was clearly the centre of the canonist doctrine.’50
Roscher expresses the same opinion in practically the same words;51
and Endemann sees the whole economic development of the Middle Ages
and the Renaissance as the victorious destruction of the usury law by
the exigencies of real life.52 However impressed we may be by the opin-
ions of such eminent authorities, we, nevertheless, cannot help feeling
that on this point they are under a misconception. There is no doubt that
the doctrine of the canonists which impresses the modern mind most
deeply is the usury prohibition, partly because it is not generally realised
that the usury doctrine would not have forbidden the receipt of any of
the commonest kinds of unearned revenue of the present day, and partly
because the discussion of usury occupies such a very large part of the
writings of the canonists. It may be quite true to say that the doctrine of
usury was that which gave the greatest trouble to the mediaeval writers,
on account of the nicety of the distinctions with which it abounded, and
on account of the ingenuity of avaricious merchants, who continually
sought to evade the usury laws by disguising illegal under the guise of
legal transactions. In practice, therefore, the usury doctrine was un-
doubtedly the most prominent part of the canonist teaching, because it
was the part which most tempted evasion; but to admit that is not to
agree with the proposition that it was the centre of the canonist doctrine.
Our view is that the teaching on usury was simply one of the appli-
cations of the doctrine that all voluntary exchanges of property must be
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be said to be a corollary of the doctrine of just price. This is apparently
the suggestion of Dr. Cleary in his excellent book on usury: ‘It seems to
me that the so-called loan of money is really a sale, and that a loan of
meal, wine, oil, gunpowder, and similar commodities— that is to say,
commodities which are consumed in use—is also a sale. If this is so, as
I believe it is, then loans of all these consumptible goods should be
regulated by the principles which regulate sale contracts. A just price
only may be taken, and the return must be truly equivalent.’53 This state-
ment of Dr. deary’s seems well warranted, and finds support in the anal-
ogy which was drawn between the legitimacy of interest—in the techni-
cal sense—and the legitimacy of a vendor’s increasing the price of an
article by reason of some special inconvenience which he would suffer
by parting with it. Both these titles were justified on the same ground,
namely, that they were in the nature of compensations, and arose inde-
pendently of the main contract of loan or sale as the case might be. ‘Le
vendeur est en présence de l’acheteur. L’objet a pour lui une valeur
particulière: c’est un souvenir, par exemple. A-t-il le droit de majorer le
prix de vente? de dépasser le juste prix convenu?... Avec l’unanimité
des docteurs on peut trouver légitime la majoration du prix. L’évaluation
commune distingue un double élément dans l’objet: sa valeur ordinaire
à laquelle répond le juste prix, et cette valeur extraordinaire qui appartient
au vendeur, dont il se prive et qui mérite une compensation: il le fait
pour ainsi dire l’objet d’un second contrat qui se superpose au premier.
Cela est si vrai que le supplément de prix n’est pas du au même titre que
le juste prix.’54 The importance of this analogy will appear when we
come to treat just price and usury in detail; it is simply referred to here
in support of the proposition that, far from being a special doctrine sui
generis, the usury doctrine of the Church was simply an application to
the sale of consumptible things of the universal rules which applied to
all sales. In other words, the doctrines of the just price and of usury
were founded on the same fundamental precept of justice in exchange. If
we indicate what this precept was, we can claim to have indicated what
was the true centre of the canonist doctrine.
The scholastic teaching on the subject of the rules of justice in ex-
change was founded on the famous fifth book of Aristotle’s Ethics, and
is very clearly set forth by Aquinas. In the article of the Summa, where
the question is discussed,
Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive
as in commutative justice?’ we find a clear exposition: ‘In commuta-24/George O’Brien
tions something is delivered to an individual on account of something of
his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying,
where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is neces-
sary to equalise thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back
to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which
belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the
arithmetical mean, which is gauged according to equal excess in quan-
tity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter, and
is exceeded by the former by 1. Accordingly, if at the start both persons
have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other’s belongings, the one
that is the receiver will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so
there will be justice if both are brought back to the mean, 1 being taken
from him that has 6 and given to him that has 4, for then both will have
5, which is the mean.’55 In the following article the matter of each kind
of justice is discussed. We are told that: ‘Justice is about certain exter-
nal operations, namely, distribution and commutation. These consist in
the use of certain externals, whether things, persons, or even works : of
things as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is
his: of persons as when a man does an injury to the very person of
another... : and of works as when a man justly enacts a work of another
or does a work for him.... Commutative justice directs commutations
that can take place between two persons. Of these some are involuntary,
some voluntary.... Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily
transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so
that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act not of
justice, but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far
as it includes the notion of debt.’ Aquinas then goes on to distinguish
between the different kinds of contract, sale, usufruct, loan, letting and
hiring, and deposit, and concludes, ‘In all these actions the mean is
taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all
these actions belong to the one species of justice, namely, commutative
justice.’56
This is not the place to discuss the precise meaning of the equality
upon which Aquinas insists, which will be more properly considered
when we come to deal with the just price. What is to be noticed at
present is that all the transactions which are properly comprised in a
discussion of economic theory—sales, loans, etc.—are grouped together
as being subject to the same regulative principle. It therefore appears
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by following that principle into its various applications, than by making
one particular application of the principle the starting-point of the dis-
cussion.
It will be noticed, however, ihat the principles of commutative jus-
tice all treat of the commutations of external goods—in other words,
they assume the existence of property of external goods in individuals.
Commutations are but a result of private property; in a state of commu-
nism there could be no commutation. This is well pointed out by Gerson57
and by Nider.58 It consequently is important, before discussing exchange
of ownership, to discuss the principle of ownership itself; or, in other
words, to study the static before the dynamic state.59
We shall therefore deal in the first place with the right of private
property, which we shall show to have been fully recognised by the
mediaeval writers. We shall then point out the duties which this right
entailed, and shall establish the position that the scholastic teaching was
directed equally against modern socialistic principles and modern un-
regulated individualism. The next point with which we shall deal is the
exchange of property between individuals, which is a necessary corol-
lary of the right of property. We shall show that such exchanges were
regulated by welldefined principles of commutative justice, which ap-
plied equally in the case of the sale of goods and in the case of the sale
of the use of money. The last matter with which we shall deal is the
machinery by which exchanges are conducted, namely, money. Many
other subjects, such as slavery and the legitimacy of commerce, will be
treated as they arise in the course of our treatment of these principal
divisions.
In its ultimate analysis, the whole subject may be reduced to a clas-
sification of the various duties which attached to the right of private
property. The owner of property, as we shall see, was bound to observe
certain duties in respect of its acquisition and its consumption, and cer-
tain other duties in respect of its exchange, whether it consisted of goods
or of money. The whole fabric of mediaeval economics was based on
the foundation of private property; and the elaborate and logical system
of regulations to ensure justice in economic life would have had no pur-
pose or no use if the subject matter of that justice were abolished.
It must not be understood that the mediaeval writers treated eco-
nomic subjects in this order, or in any order at all. As we have already
said, economic matters are simply referred to in connection with ethics,
and were not detached and treated as making up a distinct body of teach-26/George O’Brien
ing. Ashley says: ‘The reader will guard himself against supposing that
any mediaeval writer ever detached these ideas from the body of his
teaching, and put them together as a modern text-book writer might do;
or that they were ever presented in this particular order, and with the
connecting argument definitely stated.’60
Chapter II.
Property.
Section 1.— The Right to Procure and Dispense
Property.
The teaching of the mediaeval Church on the subject of property was
perfectly simple and clear. Aquinas devoted a section of the Summa to
it, and his opinion was accepted as final by all the later writers of the
period, who usually repeat his very words. However, before coming to
quote and explain Aquinas, it is necessary to deal with a difficulty that
has occurred to several students of Christian economics, namely, that
the teaching of the scholastics on the subject of property was in some
way opposed to the teaching of the early Church and of Christ Himself.
Thus Haney says: ‘It is necessary to keep the ideas of Christianity and
the Church separate, for few will deny that Christianity as a religion is
quite distinct from the various institutions or Churches which profess
it...’ And he goes on to point out that, whereas Christianity recommended
community of property, the Church permitted private property and in-
equality.61 Strictly speaking, the reconciliation of the mediaeval teach-
ing with that of the primitive Church might be said to be outside the
scope of the present essay. In our opinion, however, it is important to
insist upon the fundamental harmony of the teaching of the Church in
the two periods, in the first place, because it is impossible to understand
the later without an understanding of the earlier doctrine from which it
developed, and secondly, because of the widespread prevalence, even
among Catholics, of the erroneous idea that the scholastic teaching was
opposed to the ethical principle laid down by the Founder of Christian-
ity.
Amongst the arguments which are advanced by socialists none is
more often met than the alleged socialist teaching and practice of the
early Christians. For instance, Cabet’s Voyage en Icarie contains the
following passage: ‘Mais quand on s’enfonce sérieusement et ardemment
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Démocratie, c’est-àdire sur les bases de l’Egalité et de la Fraternité, on
arrive à reconnaître que cette organisation exige et entraîne
nécessairement la communauté de biens. Et nous hâtons d’ajouter que
cette communauté était également proclamée par Jésus Christ, par tous
ses apôtres et ses disciples, par tous les pères de l’Église et tous les
Chrétiens des premiers siècles.’ The fact that St. Thomas Aquinas, the
great exponent of Catholic teaching in the Middle Ages, defends in un-
ambiguous language the institution of private property offers no diffi-
culties to the socialist historian of Christianity. He replies simply that
St. Thomas wrote in an age when the Church was the Church of the rich
as well as of the poor; that it had to modify its doctrines to ease the
consciences of its rich members; and that, ever since the conversion of
Constantine, the primitive Christian teaching on property had been pro-
gressively corrupted by motives of expediency, until the time of the
Summa, when it had ceased to resemble in any way the teaching of the
Apostles.62 We must therefore first of all demonstrate that there is no
such contradiction between the teaching of the Apostles and that of the
mediaeval Church on the subject of private property, but that, on the
contrary, the necessity of private property was at all times recognised
and insisted on by the Catholic Church. As it is put in an anonymous
article in the Dublin Review: ‘Among Christian nations we discover at a
very early period a strong tendency towards a general and equitable
distribution of wealth and property among the whole body politic.
Grounded on an ever-increasing historical evidence, we might possibly
affirm that the mediaeval Church brought her whole weight to bear in-
cessantly upon this one singular and single point.’63 The alleged com-
munism of the first Christians is based on a few verses of the Acts of the
Apostles describing the condition of the Church of Jerusalem. ‘And they
that believed were together and had all things common; And sold their
possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had
need.’64 ‘And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and
of one soul: neither said any of them that aught of the things which he
possessed was his own; but they had all things common. Neither was
there any amongst them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of
land or houses sold them, and brought the price of the things that were
sold, And laid them down at the apostles’ feet: and distribution was
made unto every man according as he had need.’65
It is by no means clear whether the state of things here depicted
really amounted to communism in the strict sense. Several of the most28/George O’Brien
enlightened students of the Bible have come to the conclusion that the
verses quoted simply express in a striking way the great liberality and
benevolence which prevailed among the Christian fraternity at Jerusa-
lem. This view was strongly asserted by Mosheim,66 and is held by Dr.
Carlyle. ‘A more careful examination of the passages in the Acts,’ says
the latter,67 ‘show clearly enough that this was no systematic division of
property, but that the charitable instinct of the infant Church was so
great that those who were in want were completely supported by those
who were more prosperous.... Still there was no systematic commu-
nism, no theory of the necessity of it.’ Colour is lent to this interpreta-
tion by the fact that similar words and phrases were used to emphasise
the prevalence of charity and benevolence in later communities of Chris-
tians, amongst whom, as we know from other sources, the right of pri-
vate property was fully admitted. Thus Tertullian wrote:68 ‘One in mind
and soul, we do not hesitate to share our earthly goods with one another.
All things are common among us but our wives.’ This passage, if it
were taken alone, would be quite as strong and unambiguous as those
from the Acts; but fortunately, a few lines higher up, Tertullian had
described how the Church was supported, wherein he showed most clearly
that private property was still recognised and practised: ‘Though we
have our treasurechest, it is not made up of purchase-money, as of a
religion that has its price. On the monthly collection day, if he likes,
each puts in a small donation; but only if he has pleasure, and only if he
be able; all is voluntary.’ This point is well put by Bergier:69 ‘Towards
the end of the first century St. Barnabas; in the second, St. Justin and St.
Lucian; in the third, St. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, St.
Cyprian; in the fourth, Arnobius and Lactantius, say that among the
Christians all goods are common; there was then certainly no question
of a communism of goods taken in the strict sense.’
It is therefore doubtful if the Church at Jerusalem, as described in
the Acts, practised communism at all, as apart from great liberality and
benevolence. Assuming, however, that the Acts should be interpreted in
their strict literal sense, let us see to what the so-called communism
amounted.
In the first place, it is plain from Acts iv. 32 that the communism
was one of use, not of ownership. It was not until the individual owner
had sold his goods and placed the proceeds in the common fund that any
question of communism arose. ‘Whiles it remained was it not thine own,’
said St. Peter, rebuking Ananias, ‘and after it was sold was it not inAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/29
thine own power?’70 This distinction is particularly important in view of
the fact that it is precisely that insisted on by St. Thomas Aquinas.
There is no reason to suppose that the community of use practised at
Jerusalem was in any way different from that advocated by Aquinas—
namely, ‘the possession by a man of external things, not as his own, but
in common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in
their need.’
In the next place, we must observe that the communism described in
the Acts was purely voluntary. This is quite obvious from the relation in
the fifth chapter of the incident of Ananias and Sapphira. There is no
indication that the abandonment of one’s possessory rights was preached
by the Apostles. Indeed, it would be difficult to understand why they
should have done so, when Christ Himself had remained silent on the
subject. Far from advocating communism, the Founder of Christianity
had urged the practice of many virtues for which the possession of pri-
vate property was essential. ‘What Christ recommended,’ says Sudre,71
‘was voluntary abnegation or alms-giving. But the giving of goods with-
out any hope of compensation, the spontaneous deprivation of oneself,
could not exist except under a system of private property... they were
one of the ways of exercising such rights.’ Moreover, as the same au-
thor points out, private property was fully recognised under the Jewish
dispensation, and Christ would therefore have made use of explicit lan-
guage if he had intended to alter the old law in this fundamental respect.
‘Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets : I am not
come to destroy, but to fulfil.’72 At the time of Christ’s preaching, a
Jewish sect, the Essenes, were endeavouring to put into practice the
ideals of communism, but there is not a word in the Gospels to suggest
that He ever held them up as an example to His followers. ‘Communism
was never preached by Christ, although it was practised under His very
eyes by the Essenes. This absolute silence is equivalent to an implicit
condemnation.’73
Nor was communism preached as part of Christ’s doctrine as taught
by the Apostles. In Paul’s epistles there is no direction to the congrega-
tions addressed that they should abandon their private property; on the
contrary, the continued existence of such rights is expressly recognised
and approved in his appeals for funds for the Church at Jerusalem.74
Can it be that, as Roscher says,75 the experiment in communism had
produced a chronic state of poverty in the Church at Jerusalem? Certain
it is the experiment was never repeated in any of the other apostolic30/George O’Brien
congregations. The communism at Jerusalem, if it ever existed at all,
not only failed to spread to other Churches, but failed to continue at
Jerusalem itself. It is universally admitted by competent students of the
question that the phenomenon was but temporary and transitory.76
The utterances of the Fathers of the Church on property are scat-
tered and disconnected. Nevertheless, there is sufficient cohesion in them
to enable us to form an opinion of their teaching on the subject. It has,
as we have said, frequently been asserted that they favoured a system of
communism, and disapproved of private ownership. The supporters of
this view base their arguments on a number of isolated texts, taken out
of their context, and not interpreted with any regard to the circumstances
in which they were written.
‘The mistake,’ as Devas says,77 ‘of representing the early Christian
Fathers of the Church as rank socialists is frequently made by those
who are friendly to modern socialism; the reason for it is that either they
have taken passages of orthodox writers apart from their context, and
without due regard to the circumstances in which they were written, and
the meaning they would have conveyed to their hearers; or else, by a
grosser blunder, the perversions of heretics are set forth as the doctrine
of the Church, and a sad case arises of mistaken identity.’ A careful
study of the patristic texts bearing on the subject leads one to the con-
clusion that Mr. Devas’s view is without doubt the correct one.78
The passages from the writings of the Fathers which are cited by
socialists who are anxious to support the proposition that socialism
formed part of the early Christian teaching may be roughly divided into
four groups : first, passages where the abandonment of earthly posses-
sions is held up as a work of more than ordinary devotion —in other
words, a counsel of perfection; second, those where the practice of
almsgiving is recommended in the rhetorical and persuasive language of
the missioner—where the faithful are exhorted to exercise their charity
to such a degree that it may be said that the rich and the poor have all
things in common; third, passages directed against avarice and the wrong-
ful acquisition or abuse of riches; and fourth, passages where the dis-
tinction between the natural and positive law on the matter is explained.
The following passage from Cyprian is a good example of an utter-
ance which was clearly meant as a counsel of perfection. Isolated sen-
tences from this passage have frequently been quoted to prove that
Cyprian was an advocate of communism; but there can be no doubt
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vate in his followers a high detachment from earthly wealth, and that, in
so far as complete abandonment of one’s property is recommended, it is
simply indicated as a work of quite unusual devotion. It is noteworthy
that this passage occurs in a treatise on almsgiving, a practice which
presupposes a system of individual ownership:79 ‘Let us consider what
the congregation of believers did in the time of the Apostles, when at the
first beginnings the mind flourished with greater virtues, when the faith
of believers burned with a warmth of faith yet new. Thus they sold
houses and farms, and gladly and liberally presented to the Apostles the
proceeds to be dispersed to the poor; selling and alienating their earthly
estate, they transferred their lands thither where they might receive the
fruits of art eternal possession, and there prepared houses where they
might begin an eternal habitation. Such, then, was the abundance in
labours as was the agreement in love, as we read in the Acts—“Neither
said any of them that aught of the things which he possessed was his
own; but they had all things common.” This is truly to become son of
God by spiritual birth; this is to imitate by the heavenly law the equity
of God the Father. For whatever is of God is common in our use; nor is
any one excluded from His benefits and His gifts so as to prevent the
whole human race from enjoying equally the divine goodness and liber-
ality. Thus the day equally enlightens, the sun gives radiance, the rain
moistens, the wind blows, and the sleep is one to those who sleep, and
the splendour of Stars and of the Moon is common. In which examples
of equality he who as a possessor in the earth shares his returns and his
fruits with the fraternity, while he is common and just in his gratuitous
bounties, is an imitator of God the Father.’
There is a much-quoted passage of St. John Chrysostom which is
capable of the same interpretation. In his commentary on the alleged
communistic existence of the Apostles at Jerusalem the Saint emphasises
the fact that their communism was voluntary: ‘That this was in conse-
quence not merely of the miraculous signs, but of their own purpose, is
manifest from the case of Ananias and Sapphira.’ He further insists on
the fact that the members of this community were animated by unusual
fervour: ‘From the exceeding ardour of the givers none was in want.’
Further down, in the same homily, St. John Chrysostom urges the adop-
tion of a communistic system of housekeeping, but purely on the grounds
of domestic economy and saving of labour. There is not a word to sug-
gest that a communistic system was morally preferable to a proprietary
one.8032/George O’Brien
The second class of patristic texts which are relied on by socialists
are, as we have said, those ‘ where the practice of almsgiving is recom-
mended in the rhetorical and persuasive language of the missioner—
where the faithful are exhorted to exercise their charity to such a degree
that it may be said that the rich and poor have all things in common.’
Such passages are very frequent throughout the writings of the Fathers,
but we may give as examples two, which are most frequently relied on
by socialists. One of these is from St. Ambrose:81 ‘Mercy is a part of
justice; and if you wish to give to the poor, this mercy is justice. “He
hath dispersed, he hath given to the poor; his righteousness endureth for
ever.”82 It is therefore unjust that one should not be helped by his
neighbour; when God hath wished the possession of the earth to be com-
mon to all men, and its fruits to minister to all; but avarice established
possessory rights. It is therefore just that if you lay claim to anything as
your private property, which is really conferred in common to the whole
human race, that you should dispense something to the poor, so that you
may not deny nourishment to those who have the right to share with
you.’ The following passage from Gregory the Great83 is another ex-
ample of this kind of passage: ‘Those who rather desire what is another’s,
nor bestow that is their own, are to be admonished to consider carefully
that the earth out of which they are taken is common to all men, and
therefore brings forth nourishment for all in common. Vainly, then, do
they suppose themselves innocent who claim to their own private use
the common gift of God; those who in not imparting what they have
received walk in the midst of the slaughter of their neighbours; since
they almost daily slay so many persons as there are dying poor whose
subsidies they keep close in their own possession.’
The third class of passages to which reference must be made is
composed of the numerous attacks which the Fathers levelled against
the abuse or wrongful acquisition of riches. These passages do not indi-
cate that the Fathers favoured a system of communism, but point in
precisely the contrary direction. If property were an evil thing in itself,
they would not have wasted so time in emphasising the evil uses to
which it was sometimes put. The insistence on the abuses of an institu-
tion is an implicit admission that it has its uses. Thus Clement of Alex-
andria devotes a whole treatise to answering the question ‘Who is the
rich man who can be saved?’ in which it appears quite plainly that it is
the possible abuse of wealth, and the possible too great attachment to
worldly goods, that are the principal dangers in the way of a rich man’sAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/33
salvation. The suggestion that in order to be saved a man must abandon
all his property is strongly controverted. The following passage from
St. Gregory Nazianzen84 breathes the same spirit: ‘One of us has op-
pressed the poor, and wrested from him his portion of land, and wrongly
encroached upon his landmarks by fraud or violence, and joined house
to house, and field to field, to rob his neighbour of something, and has
been eager to have no neighbour, so as to dwell alone on the earth.
Another has defiled the land with usury and interest, both gathering
where he has not sowed and reaping where he has not strewn, farming
not the land but the necessity of the needy.... Another has had no pity on
the widow and orphans, and not imparted his bread and meagre nour-
ishment to the needy;... a man perhaps of much property unexpectedly
gained, for this is the most unjust of all, who finds his very barns too
narrow for him, filling some and emptying others to build greater ones
for future crops.’ Similarly Clement of Rome advocates frugality in the
enjoyment of wealth;85 and Salvian has a long passage on the dangers of
the abuse of riches.86
The fourth group of passages is that in which the distinction be-
tween the natural and positive law on the matter is explained. It is here
that the greatest confusion has been created by socialist writers, who
conclude, because they read in the works of some of the Fathers that
private property did not exist by natural law, that it was therefore con-
demned by them as an illegitimate institution. Nothing could be more
erroneous. All that the Fathers meant in these passages was that in the
state of nature—the idealised Golden Age of the pagans, or the Garden
of Eden of the Christians—there was no individual ownership of goods.
The very moment, however, that man fell from that ideal state, commu-
nism became impossible, simply on account of the change that had taken
place in man’s own nature. To this extent it is true to say that the Fathers
regarded property with disapproval; it was one of the institutions ren-
dered necessary by the fall of man. Of course it would have been prefer-
able that man should not have fallen from his natural innocence, in which
case he could have lived a life of communism; but, as he had fallen, and
communism had from that moment become impossible, property must
be respected as the one institution which could put a curb on his avarice,
and preserve a society of fallen men from chaos and general rapine.
That this is the correct interpretation of the patristic utterances re-
garding property and natural law appears from the following passage of
The Divine Institution of Lactantius—‘the most explicit statement bear-34/George O’Brien
ing on the Christian idea of property in the first four centuries’:87 ‘“They
preferred to live content with a simple mode of life,” as Cicero relates in
his poems; and this is peculiar to our religion. “It was not even allowed
to mark out or to divide the plain with a boundary : men sought all
things in common,”88 since God had given the earth in common to all,
that they might pass their life in common, not that mad and raging ava-
rice might claim all things for itself, and that riches produced for all
might not be wanting to any. And this saying of the poet ought so to be
taken, not as suggesting the idea that individuals at that time had no
private property, but it must be regarded as a poetical figure, that we
may understand that men were so liberal, that they did not shut up the
fruits of the earth produced for them, nor did they in solitude brood over
the things stored up, but admitted the poor to share the fruits of their
labour: “Now streams of milk, now streams of nectar flowed.”89
And no wonder, since the storehouses of the good literally lay open
to all. Nor did avarice intercept the divine bounty, and thus cause hun-
ger and thirst in common; but all alike had abundance, since they who
had possessions gave liberally and bountifully to those who had not.
But after Saturnus had been banished from heaven, and had arrived in
Latium... not only did the people who had a superfluity fail to bestow a
share upon others, but they even seized the property of others, drawing
everything to their private gain; and the things which formerly even
individuals laboured to obtain for the common use of all were now con-
veyed to the powers of a few. For that they might subdue others by
slavery, they began to withdraw and collect together the necessaries of
life, and to keep them firmly shut up, that they might make the bounties
of heaven their own; not on account of kindness (humanitas), a feeling
which had no existence for them, but that they might sweep together all
the instruments of lust and avarice.’90
It appears from the above passage that Lactantius regarded the era
in which a system of communism existed as long since vanished, if in-
deed it ever had existed. The same idea emerges from the writings of St.
Augustine, who drew a distinction between divine and human right. ‘By
what right does every man possess what he possesses?’ he asks.91 ‘Is it
not by human right? For by divine right “the earth is the Lord’s, and the
fullness thereof.” The poor and the rich God made of one clay; the same
earth supports alike the poor and the rich. By human right, however,
one says, This estate is mine, this servant is mine, this house is mine. By
human right, therefore, is by right of the Emperor. Why so? BecauseAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/35
God has distributed to mankind these very human rights through the
emperors and kings of the world.’
The socialist commentators of St. Augustine have strained this, and
similar passages, to mean that because property rests on human, and
not on divine, right, therefore it should not exist at all. It is, of course
true that what human right has created human right can repeal; and it is
therefore quite fair to argue that all the citizens of a community might
agree to live a life of communism. That is simply an argument to prove
that there is nothing immoral in communism, and does not prove in the
very slightest degree that there is anything immoral in property. On the
contrary, so long as ‘the emperors and kings of the world’ ordain that
private property shall continue, it would be, according to St. Augustine,
immoral for any individual to maintain that such ordinances were wrong-
ful.
The correct meaning of the patristic distinction between natural and
positive law with regard to property is excellently summarised in Dr.
Carlyle’s essay on Property in Mediaeval Theology: 92 ‘What do the
expressions of the Fathers mean? At first sight they might seem to be an
assertion of communism, or denunciation of private property as a thing
which is sinful or unlawful. But this is not what the Fathers mean. There
can be little doubt that we find the sources of these words in such a
phrase as that of Cicero—”Sunt autem privata nulla natura”93 —and in
the Stoic tradition which is represented in one of Seneca’s letters, when
he describes the primitive life in which men lived together in peace and
happiness, when there was no system of coercive government and no
private property, and says that man passed out of this primitive condi-
tion as their first innocence disappeared, as they became avaricious and
dissatisfied with the common enjoyment of the good things of the world,
and desired to hold them as their private possession.94 Here we have the
quasi-philosophical theory, from which the patristic conception is de-
rived. When men were innocent there was no. need for private property,
or the other great conventional institutions of society, but as this inno-
cence passed away, they found themselves compelled to organise soci-
ety and to devise institutions which should regulate the ownership and
use of the good things which men had once held in common. The institu-
tion of property thus represents the fall of man from his primitive inno-
cence, through greed and avarice, which refused to recognise the com-
mon ownership of things, and also the method by which the blind greed
of human nature might be controlled and regulated. It is this ambiguous36/George O’Brien
origin of the institution which explains how the Fathers could hold that
private property was not natural, that it grew out of men’s vicious and
sinful desires, and at the same time that it was a legitimate institution.’
Janet takes the same view of the patristic utterances on this sub-
ject:95 ‘What do the Fathers say? It is that in Jesus Christ there is no
mine and thine. Nothing is more true, without doubt; in the divine order,
in the order of absolute charity, where men are wholly wrapt up in God,
distinction and inequality of goods would be impossible. But the Fa-
thers saw clearly that such a state of things was not realisable here
below. What did they do? They established property on human law,
positive law, imperial law. Communism is either a Utopia or a barbar-
ism; a Utopia if one imagine it founded on universal devotion; a barbar-
ism if one imposes it by force.’96
It must not be concluded that the evidence of the approbation by the
Fathers of private property is purely negative or solely derived from the
interpretation of possibly ambiguous texts. On the contrary, the lawful-
ness of property is emphatically asserted on more than one occasion.
‘To possess riches,’ says Hilary of Poictiers,97 ‘is not wrongful, but
rather the manner in which possession is used.... It is a crime to possess
wrongfully rather than simply to possess.’ ‘Who does not understand,’
asks St. Augustine,98 ‘that it is not sinful to possess riches, but to love
and place hope in them, and to prefer them to truth or justice?’ Again,
‘Why do you reproach us by saying that men renewed in baptism ought
no longer to beget children or to possess fields and houses and money?
Paul allows it.’99 According to Ambrose,100 ‘Riches themselves are not
wrongful. Indeed, “redemptio animae viri divitiae ejus,” because he who
gives to the poor saves his soul. There is therefore a place for goodness
in these material riches. You are as steersmen in a great sea. He who
steers his ship well, quickly crosses the waves, and comes to port; but
he who does not know how to control his ship is sunk by his own weight.
Wherefore it is written, “Possessio divitum civitas firmissima.”’ A Coun-
cil in A.D. 415 condemned the proposition held by Pelagius that ‘the rich
cannot be saved unless they renounced their goods.’ 101
The more one studies the ‘Fathers the more one becomes convinced
that property was regarded by them as one of the normal and legitimate
institutions of human society. Benigni’s conclusion, as the result of his
exceptionally thorough researches, is that according to the early Fa-
thers, ‘property is lawful and ought scrupulously to be respected. But
property is subject to the high duties of human fellowship which sprangAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/37
from the equality and brotherhood of man. Collectivism is absurd and
immoral.’102 Janet arrived at the same conclusion : ‘In spite of the words
of the Fathers, in spite of the advice given by Christ to the rich man to
sell all his goods and give to the poor, in spite of the communism of the
Apostles, can one say that Christianity condemned property? Certainly
not. Christianity considered it a counsel of perfection for a man to de-
prive himself of his goods; it did not abrogate the right of anybody.’103
The same conclusion is reached by the Abbé Calippe in an excellent
article published in La Semaine Sociale de France, 1909. ‘The right of
property and of the property owner are assumed.’104
‘It is only prejudiced or superficial minds which could make the
writers of the fourth century the precursors of modern communists or
collectivists.’105 When we turn to St. Thomas Aquinas, we find that his
teaching on the subject of property is not at all out of harmony with that
of the earlier Fathers of the Church, but, on the contrary, summarises
and consolidates it. ‘It remained to elaborate, to constitute a definite
theory of the right of property. It sufficed to harmonise, to collaborate,
and to relate one to the other these elements furnished by the Christian
doctors of the first four or five centuries; and this was precisely the
work of the great theologians of the Middle Ages, especially of St. Tho-
mas Aquinas.... In establishing his thesis St. Thomas did not borrow
from the Roman jurisconsults through the medium of St. Isidore more
than their vocabulary, their formulas, their juridical distinctions; he also
borrowed from Aristotle the arguments upon which the philosopher based
his right of property. But the ground of his doctrine is undoubtedly of
Christian origin. There is, between the Fathers and him, a perfect conti-
nuity.’106 ‘Community of goods,’ he writes, ‘is ascribed to the natural
law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed
in common, and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own; but
because the division of possession is not according to the natural law,
but rather arose from human agreement, which belongs to positive law.
Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law,
but an addition thereto devised by human reason.’ This is simply an-
other way of stating St. Augustine’s distinction between natural and
positive law. If it speaks with more respect of positive law than St.
Augustine had done, it is because Aquinas was influenced by the Aris-
totelian conception of the State being itself a natural institution, owing
to man being a social animal.107 The explanation which St. Thomas
gives of the necessity for property also shows how clearly he agreed38/George O’Brien
with the Fathers’ teaching on natural communism: ‘Two things are com-
petent to man in respect of external things. One is the power to procure
and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for a man to possess
property. Moreover, this is necessary to human life for three reasons.
First, because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself
alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would
shirk the labour, and would leave to another that which concerns the
community, as happens when there is a great number of servants. Sec-
ondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if
each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself,
whereas there would be confusion if everybody had to look after any
one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is en-
sured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be
observed that quarrels more frequently occur when there is no division
of the things possessed.’108 It is quite clear from this passage that Aquinas
regarded property as something essential to the existence of society in
the natural condition of human nature—that is to say, the condition that
it had acquired at the fall. It is precisely the greed and avarice of fallen
man that renders property an indispensable institution. There was an-
other sense in which property was said to be according to human law, in
distinction to the natural law, namely, in the sense that, whereas the
general principle that men should own things might be said to be natu-
ral, the particular proprietary rights of each individual were determined
by positive law. In other words, the fundamentum of property rights
was natural, whereas the titulus of particular property rights was ac-
cording to positive law. This distinction is stated clearly by Aquinas:109
‘The natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to
or commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two
ways; first, according as it is considered absolutely; thus the male by its
very nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her,
and a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly,
a thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not according as
it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from
it—for instance, the possession of property. For if a particular piece of
land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should be-
long to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect
of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it
has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of an-
other man, as the Philosopher shows.’ Cajetan’s commentary on thisAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/39
article clearly emphasises the distinction between fundamentum and
titulus: ‘In the ownership of goods two things are to be discussed. The
first is why one thing should belong to one man and another thing to
another. The second is why this particular field should belong to this
man, that field to that man. With regard to the former inquiry, it may be
said that the ownership of things is according to the law of nations, but
with regard to the second, it may be said to result from the positive law,
because in former times one thing was appropriated by one man and
another thing by another.’ It must not be supposed, however, from what
we have just said, that there are no natural titles to property. Labour, for
instance, is a title flowing from the natural law, as also is occupancy,
and in certain circumstances, prescription. All that is meant by the dis-
tinction between fundamentum and titulus is that, whereas it can be
clearly demonstrated by natural law that the goods of the earth, which
are given by God for the benefit of the whole of mankind, cannot be
made use of to their full advantage unless they are made the subject of
private ownership, particular goods cannot be demonstrated to be the
lawful property of this or that person unless some human act has inter-
vened. This human act need not necessarily be an act of agreement; it
may equally be an act of some other kind—for instance, a decree of the
law-giver, or the exercise of labour upon one’s own goods. In the latter
case, the additional value of the goods becomes the lawful property of
the person who has exerted the labour. Aquinas therefore pronounced
unmistakably in favour of the legitimacy of private property, and in
doing so was in full agreement with the Fathers of the Church. He was
followed without hesitation by all the later theologians, and it is abun-
dantly evident from their writings that the right of private property was
the keystone of their whole economic system.110
Communism therefore was no part of the scholastic teaching, but it
must not be concluded from this that the mediaevals approved of the
unregulated individualism which modern opinion allows to the owners
of property. The very strength of the right to own property entailed as a
consequence the duty of making good use of it; and a clear distinction
was drawn between the power ‘of procuring and dispensing’ property
and the power of using it. We have dealt with the former power in the
present section, and we shall pass to the consideration of the latter in the
next. In a later chapter we shall proceed to discuss the duties which
attached to the owners of property in regard to its exchange.40/George O’Brien
Section 2. — Duties Regarding the Acquisition and Use
of Property.
We referred at the end of the last section to the very important distinc-
tion which Aquinas draws between the power of procuring and dispens-
ing111 exterior things and the power of using them. ‘The second thing
that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In
this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as
common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in
their need.’112 These words wherein St. Thomas lays down the doctrine
of community of user of property were considered as authoritative by
all later writers on the subject, and were universally quoted with ap-
proval by them,113 and may therefore be taken as expressing the gener-
ally held view of the Middle Ages. They require careful explanation in
order that their meaning be accurately understood.114 Cajetan’s gloss on
this section of the Summa enables us to understand its significance in a
broad sense, but fuller information must be derived from a study of
other parts of the Summa itself. ‘Note,’ says Cajetan, ‘that the words
that community of goods in respect of use arises from the law of nature
may be understood in two ways, one positively, the other negatively.
And if they are understood in their positive sense they mean that the law
of nature dictates that all things are common to all men; if in their nega-
tive sense, that the law of nature did not establish private ownership of
possessions. And in either sense the proposition is true if correctly un-
derstood. In the first place, if they are taken in their positive sense, a
man who is in a position of extreme necessity may take whatever he can
find to succour himself or another in the same condition, nor is he bound
in such a case to restitution, because by natural law he has but made use
of his own. And in the negative sense they are equally true, because the
law of nature did not institute one thing the property of one person, and
another thing of another person.’ The principle of community of user
flows logically from the very nature of property itself as defined by
Aquinas, who taught that the supreme justification of private property
was that it was the most advantageous method of securing for the com-
munity the ‘benefits of material riches. While the owner of property has
therefore an absolute right to the goods he possesses, he must at the
same time remember that this right is established primarily on his power
to benefit his neighbour by his proper use of it. The best evidence of the
correctness of this statement is the fact that the scholastics admitted
that, if the owner of property was withholding it from the community, orAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/41
from any member of the community who had a real need of it, he could
be forced to apply it to its proper end. If the community could pay for it,
it was bound to do so; but if the necessitous person could not pay for it,
he was none the less entitled to take it. The former of these cases was
illustrated by the principle of the dominium eminens of the State; and
the latter by the principle that the giving of alms to a person in real need
was a duty not of charity, but of justice.115 We shall see in a moment that
the most usual application of the principle enunciated by Aquinas was
in the case of one person’s extreme necessity which required almsgiving
from another’s superfluity, but, even short of such cases, there were
rules of conduct in respect of the user of property on all occasions which
were of extreme importance in the economic life of the time.
These principles for the guidance of the owner of property are not
collected under any single heading in the Summa, but must be gathered
from the various sections dealing with man’s duty to his fellow-men and
to himself. One leading virtue which was inculcated with great empha-
sis by Aquinas was that of temperance. ‘All pleasurable things which
come within the use of man,’ we read in the section dealing with this
subject, ‘are ordered to some necessity of this life as an end. And there-
fore temperance accepts the necessity of this life as a rule or measure of
the things one uses, so that, to wit, they should be used according as the
necessity of this life requires.’116 St. Thomas explains, moreover, that
‘necessary’ must be taken in the broad sense of suitable to one’s condi-
tion of life, and not merely necessary to maintain existence.117 The prin-
ciples of temperance did not apply in any special way to the user of
property more than to the enjoyment of any other good;118 but they are
relevant as laying down the broad test of right and wrong in the user of
one’s goods.
More particularly relevant to the subject before us is the teaching of
Aquinas on liberality, which is a virtue directly connected with the user
of property. Aquinas defines liberality as ‘a virtue by which men use
well all those exterior things which are given to us for sustenance.’119
The limitations within which liberality should be practised are stated in
the same article: ‘As St. Basil and St. Ambrose say, God has given to
many a superabundance of riches, in order that they might gain merit by
their dispensing them well. Few things, however, suffice for one man;
and therefore the liberal man will advantageously expend more on oth-
ers than on himself. In the spiritual sphere a man must always care for
himself before his neighbours; and also in temporal things liberality42/George O’Brien
does not demand that a man should think of others to the exclusion of
himself and those dependent on him.’120
‘It is not necessary for liberality that one should give away so much
of one’s riches that not enough remains to sustain himself and to enable
him to perform works of virtue. This complete giving away without
reserve belongs to the state of the perfection of spiritual life, of which
we shall treat lower down; but it must be known that to give one’s goods
liberally is an act of virtue which itself produces happiness.’121 The
author proceeds to discuss whether making use of money might be an
act of liberality, and replies that ‘as money is by its very nature to be
classed among useful goods, because all exterior things are destined for
the use of man, therefore the proper act of liberality is the good use of
money and other riches.’122 Moreover, ‘it belongs to a virtuous man not
simply to use well the goods which form the matter of his actions, but
also to prepare the means and the occasions to use them well; thus the
brave soldier sharpens his blade and keeps it in the scabbard, as well as
exercising it on the enemy; in like manner, the liberal man should pre-
pare and reserve his riches for a suitable use.’123 It appears from this
that to save part of one’s annual income to provide against emergencies
in the future, either by means of insurance or by investing in productive
enterprises, is an act of liberality.
The question is then discussed whether liberality is a part of justice.
Aquinas concludes ‘ that liberality is not a species of justice, because
justice renders to another what is his, but liberality gives him what is the
giver’s own. Still, it has a certain agreement with justice in two points;
first that it is to another, as justice also is; secondly, that it is about
exterior things like justice, though in another way. And therefore liber-
ality is laid down by some to be a part of justice as a virtue annexed to
justice as an accessory to a principal.’124 Again, ‘although liberality
supposes not any legal debt as justice does, still it supposes a certain
moral debt considering what is becoming in the person himself who
practises the virtue, not as though he had any obligation to the other
party; and therefore there is about it very little of the character of a
debt.’125
It is important to draw attention to the fact that liberalitas consists
in making a good use of property, and not merely in distributing it to
others, as a confusion with the English word ‘liberality’ might lead us to
believe. It is, as we said above, therefore certain that a wise and prudent
saving of money for investment would be considered a course of con-An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/43
duct within the meaning of the word liberalitas, especially if the enter-
prise in which the money were invested were one which would benefit
the community as a whole. ‘Modern industrial conditions demand that a
man of wealth should distribute a part of his goods indirectly — that is,
by investing them in productive and labour-employing enterprises.’126
The nature of the virtue of liberalitas may be more clearly under-
stood by an explanation of the vices which stand opposed to it. The first
of these treated by Aquinas is avarice, which he defines as ‘superfluus
amor habendi divitias.’ Avarice might be committed in two ways—by
harbouring an undue desire of acquiring wealth, or by an undue reluc-
tance to part with it—’primo autem superabundant in retinendo... secundo
ad avaritiam pertinet superabundare in accipiendo.’127 These definitions
are amplified in another part of the same section. ‘For in every action
that is directed to the attainment of some end goodness consists in the
observance of a certain measure. The means to the end must be com-
mensurate with the end, as medicine with health. But exterior goods
have the character of things needful to an end. Hence human goodness
in the matter of these goods must consist in the observance of a certain
measure, as is done by a man seeking to have exterior riches in so far as
they are necessary to his life according to his rank and condition. And
therefore sin consists in exceeding this measure and trying to acquire or
retain riches beyond the due limit; and this is the proper nature of ava-
rice, which is defined to be an immoderate love of having.’128 ‘Avarice
may involve immoderation regarding exterior things in two ways; in one
way immediately as to the receiving or keeping of them when one ac-
quires or keeps beyond the due amount; and in this respect it is directly
a sin against one’s neighbour, because in exterior things one man cannot
have superabundance without another being in want, since temporal
goods cannot be simultaneously possessed by many. The other way in
which avarice may involve immoderation is in interior affection....’ These
words must not be taken to condemn the acquisition of large fortunes by
capitalists, which is very often necessary in order that the natural re-
sources of a country may be properly exploited. One man’s possession
of great wealth is at the present day frequently the means of opening up
new sources of wealth and revenue to the entire community. In other
words, superabundance is a relative term. This, like many other pas-
sages of St. Thomas, must be given a contemporanea expositio. ‘There
were no capitalists in the thirteenth century, but only hoarders.’129
It must also be remembered that what would be considered avarice44/George O’Brien
in a man in one station of life would not be considered such in a man in
another. So long as one did not attempt to acquire an amount of wealth
disproportionate to the needs of one’s station of life, one could not be
considered avaricious. Thus a common soldier would be avaricious if
he strove to obtain a uniform of the quality worn by an officer, and a
simple cleric if he attempted to clothe himself in a style only befitting a
bishop.130
The avaricious man offended against liberality by caring too much
about riches; the prodigal, on the other hand, cared too little about them,
and did not attach to them their proper value. ‘In affection while the
prodigal falls short, not taking due care of them, in exterior behaviour it
belongs to the prodigal to exceed in giving, but to fail in keeping or
acquiring, while it belongs to the miser to come short in giving, but to
superabound in getting and in keeping. Therefore it is clear that prodi-
gality is the opposite of covetousness.’131 A man, however, might com-
mit both sins at the same time, by being unduly anxious to acquire wealth
which he distributed prodigally.132 Prodigality could always be distin-
guished from extreme liberality by a consideration of the circumstances
of the particular case; a truly liberal man might give away more than a
prodigal in case of necessity.133 Prodigality, though a sin, was a sin of a
less grievous kind than avarice.134
In addition to the duties which were imposed on the owners of prop-
erty in all circumstances there was a further duty which only arose on
special occasions, namely, magnificentia, or munificence. This virtue is
discussed by Aquinas,135 but we shall quote the passages of Buridan
which explain it, not because they depart in any way from the teaching
of Aquinas, but because they are clearer and more scientific. ‘By mu-
nificence, we understand a habit inclining one to the performance of
great works, or to the incurring of great expenses, when, where, and in
the manner in which they are called for (fuerit opportunum), for ex-
ample, building a church, assembling great armies for a threatened war,
and giving splendid marriage feasts.’ He explains that ‘munificence stands
in the same relation to liberality as bravery acquired by its exercise in
danger of death in battle does to bravery simply and commonly under-
stood.’ Two vices stand opposed to munificentia: (1) parvificentia, ‘a
habit inclining one not to undertake great works, when circumstances
call for them, or to undertaking less, or at less expense, than the needs of
the situation demand,’ and (2) banousa, ‘a habit inclining one to un-
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undertaking them on a greater scale or at a greater expense than is nec-
essary.’136
Both in the case of avarice and prodigality the offending state of
mind consisted in attaching a wrong value to wealth, and the inculcation
of the virtue of liberality must have been attended with good results not
alone to the souls of individuals, but to the economic condition of the
community. The avaricious man not only imperilled his own soul by
attaching too much importance to temporal gain, but he also injured the
community by monopolising too large a share of its wealth; the prodigal
man, in addition to incurring the occasion of various sins of intemper-
ance, also impoverished the community by wasting in reckless consump-
tion wealth which might have been devoted to productive or charitable
purposes. He who neglected the duty of munificence, either by refusing
to make a great expenditure when it was called for (parvificentia) or by
making one when it was unnecessary (banousa) was also deemed to
have done wrong, because in the one case he valued his money too highly,
and in the other not highly enough. In other words, he attached a wrong
value to wealth. Nothing could be further from the truth than the sug-
gestion that the schoolmen despised or belittled temporal riches. Quite
on the contrary, they esteemed it a sin to conduct oneself in a manner
which showed a defective appreciation of their value.137 Riches may
have been the occasion of sin; but so was poverty. ‘The occasions of sin
are to be avoided,’ says Aquinas, ‘but poverty is an occasion of evil,
because theft, perjury, and flattery are frequently brought about by it.
Therefore poverty should not be voluntarily undertaken, but rather
avoided.’138 Buridan says: ‘There is no doubt that it is much more diffi-
cult to be virtuous in a state of poverty than in one of moderate afflu-
ence;’139 and Antoninus of Florence expresses the opinion that poverty
is in itself an evil thing, although out of it good may come.140 Even the
ambition to rise in the world was laudable, because every one may right-
fully desire to place himself and his dependants in a participation of the
fullest human felicity of which man is capable, and to rid himself of the
necessity of corporal labour.141 Avarice and prodigality alike offended
against liberality, because they tended to deprive the community of the
maximum benefit which it should derive from the wealth with which it
was endowed. Dr. Cunningham may be quoted in support of this view.
‘One of the gravest defects of the Roman Empire lay in the fact that its
system left little scope for individual aims, and tended to check the en-
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up an unending prospect before the individual personally, and encour-
aged him to activity and diligence by an eternal hope. Nor did such
concentration of thought on a life beyond the grave necessarily divert
attention from secular duties; Christianity did not disparage them, but
set them in a new light, and brought out new motives for taking them
seriously.... The acceptance of this higher view of the dignity of human
life as immortal was followed by a fuller recognition of personal re-
sponsibility. Ancient philosophy had seen that man is the master of
material things; but Christianity introduced a new sense of duty in re-
gard to the manner of using them.... Christian teachers were forced to
protest against any employment of wealth that disregarded the glory of
God and the good of man.’142 It was the opinion of Knies that the pecu-
liarly Christian virtues were of profound economic value. ‘Temperance,
thrift, and industry—that is to say, the sun and rain of economic activ-
ity—were recommended by the Church and inculcated as Christian vir-
tues; idleness as the mother of theft, gambling as the occasion of fraud,
were forbidden; and gain for its own sake was classed as a kind of
robbery.’143
The great rule, then, with regard to the user of property was liberal-
ity. Closely allied with the duty of liberality was the duty of almsgiving—
‘an act of charity through the medium of money.’144 Almsgiving is not
itself a part of liberality except in so far as liberality removes an ob-
stacle to such acts, which may arise from excessive love of riches, the
result of which is that one clings to them more than one ought.145 Aquinas
divides alms-deeds into two kinds, spiritual and corporal, the latter alone
of which concern us here. ‘Corporal need arises either during this life or
afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in
respect of things needed by all, or is a special need occurring through
some accident supervening. In the first case the need is either internal or
external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid food,
viz. hunger, in respect of which we have to feed the hungry; while the
other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, in respect of which we have
to give drink to the thirsty. The common need with regard to external
help is twofold: one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have to
clothe the naked; while the other is in respect of a dwellingplace, and as
to this we have to harbour the harbourless. Again, if the need be spe-
cial, it is either the result of an internal cause like sickness, and then we
have to visit the sick, or it results from an external cause, and then we
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Aquinas then proceeds to explain in what circumstances the duty of
almsgiving arises. ‘Almsgiving is a matter of precept. Since, however,
precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be
a matter of precept in so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far
as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we
should take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and
something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver it must be
noted that he must give of his surplus according to Luke xi. 4, “That
which remaineth give alms.” This surplus is to be taken in reference not
only to the giver, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge
(in which case we have the expression necessary to the person, taking
the word person as expressive of dignity).... On the part of the recipient
it is necessary that he should be in need, else there would be no reason
for giving him alms; yet since it is not possible for one individual to
relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need,
but only those who could not be succoured if we did not succour them.
For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, “Feed him that is dying
of hunger; if thou hast not fed him thou hast slain him.” Accordingly we
are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose
need is extreme; otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a
matter of counsel.’147 In replying to the objection that it is lawful for
every one to keep what is his own, St. Thomas restates with emphasis
the principle of community of user: ‘The temporal goods which are given
us by God are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them they
belong not to us alone, but also to such others as we are able to succour
out of what we have over and above our needs.148 Albertus Magnus
states this in very strong words: ‘For a man to give out of his superflu-
ities is a mere act of justice, because he is rather then steward of them
for the poor than the owner;’149 and at an earlier date St. Peter Damian
had affirmed that ‘he who gives to the poor returns what he does not
himself own, and does not dispose of his own goods.’ He insists in the
same passage that almsgiving is not an act of mercy, but of strict jus-
tice.150 In the reply to another objection the duty of almsgiving is stated
by Aquinas with additional vigour. ‘ There is a time when we sin mor-
tally if we omit to give alms—on the part of the recipient when we see
that his need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succoured
otherwise—on the part of the giver when he has superfluous goods,
which he does not need for the time being, so far as he can judge with
probability.’15148/George O’Brien
The next question which St. Thomas discusses is whether one ought
to give alms out of what one needs. He distinguishes between two kinds
of ‘necessaries.’ The first is that without which existence is impossible,
out of which kind of necessary things one is not bound to give alms save
in exceptional cases, when, by doing so, one would be helping a great
personage or supporting the Church or the State, since ‘the common
good is to be preferred to one’s own.’ The second kind of necessaries are
those things without which a man cannot live in keeping with his social
station. St. Thomas recommends the giving of alms out of this part of
one’s estate, but points out that it is only a matter of counsel, and not of
precept, and one must not give alms to such an extent as to impoverish
oneself permanently. To this last provision, however, there are three
exceptions: one, when a man is entering religion and giving away all his
goods; two, when he can easily replace what he gives away; and, three,
when he is in presence of great indigence on the part of an individual, or
great need on the part of the common weal. In these three cases it is
praiseworthy for a man to forgo the requisites of his station in order to
provide for a greater need.152
The mediaeval teaching on almsgiving is very well summarised by
Fr. Jarrett,153 as follows: ‘(1) A man is obliged to help another in his
extreme need even at the risk of grave inconvenience to himself; (2) a
man is obliged to help another who, though not in extreme need, is yet in
considerable distress, but not at the risk of grave inconvenience to him-
self; (3) a man is not obliged to help another when necessity is slight,
even though the risk to himself should be quite trifling.’
The importance of the duty of almsgiving further appears from the
section where Aquinas lays down that the person to whom alms should
have been given may, if the owner of the goods neglects his duty, repair
the omission himself. ‘All things are common property in a case of ex-
treme necessity. Hence one who is in dire straits may take another’s
goods in order to succour himself if he can find no one who is willing to
give him something.’154 The duty of using one’s goods for the benefit of
one’s neighbours was a fit matter for enforcement by the State, provided
that the burdens imposed by legislation were equitable. ‘Laws are said
to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the
common good—and from their author, that is to say, when the law that
is made does not exceed the power of the law-giver—and from their
form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects according to an
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every man is part of the community, each man in all that he is and has
belongs to the community: just as a part in all that it is belongs to the
whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part in order to save the
whole; so that on. this account such laws, which impose proportionate
burdens, are just and binding in conscience.’155
There can be no doubt that the practice of the scholastic teaching of
community of user, in its proper sense, made for social stability. The
following passage from Trithemius, written at the end of the fifteenth
century, is interesting as showing how consistently the doctrine of St.
Thomas was adhered to two hundred years after his death, and also that
the failure of the rich to put into practice the moderate communism of
St. Thomas was the cause of the rise of the heretical communists, who
attacked the very foundations of property itself: ‘Let the rich remember
that their possessions have not been entrusted to them in order that they
may have the sole enjoyment of them, but that they may use and manage
them as property belonging to mankind at large. Let them remember
that when they give to the needy they only give them what belongs to
them. If the duty of right use and management of property, whether
worldly or spiritual, is neglected, if the rich think that they are the sole
lords and masters of that which they possess, and do not treat the needy
as their brethren, there must of necessity arise an inner shattering of the
commonwealth. False teachers and deceivers of the people will then
gain influence, as has happened in Bohemia, by preaching to the people
that earthly property should be equally distributed among all, and that
the rich must be forcibly condemned to the division of their wealth.
Then follow lamentable conditions and civil wars; no property is spared;
no right of ownership is any longer recognised; and the wealthy may
then with justice complain of the loss of possessions which have been
unrighteously taken from them; but they should also seriously ask them-
selves the question whether in the days of peace and order they recognised
in the administration of these goods the right of their superior lord and
owner, namely, the God of all the earth.’156
It must not, however, be imagined for a moment that the community
of user advocated by the scholastics had anything in common with the
communism recommended by modern Socialists. As we have seen above,
the scholastic communism did not at all apply to the procuring and dis-
pensing of material things, but only to the mode of using them. It is not
even correct to say that the property of an individual was limited by the
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de charité, d’équité naturelle, et de simple convenance sociale peuvent
affecter, ou mieux encore, commander un certain usage de la richesse,
mais ce n’est pas le même chose que limiter la propriété.’157 The com-
munity of user of the scholastics was distinguished from that of modern
Socialists not less strongly by the motives which inspired it than by the
effect it produced. The former was dictated by high spiritual aims, and
the contempt of material goods; the latter is the fruit of over-attachment
to material goods, and the envy of their possessors.158
The large estates which the Church itself owned have frequently
been pointed to as evidence of hypocrisy in its attitude towards the com-
mon user of property. This is not the place to inquire into the condition
of ecclesiastical estates in the Middle Ages, but it is sufficient to say
that they were usually the centres of charity, and that in the opinion of
so impartial a writer as Roscher, they rather tended to make the rules of
using goods for the common use practicable than the contrary.159
Section 3.— Property in Human Beings
Before we pass from the subject of property, we must deal with a par-
ticular kind of property right, namely, that of one human being over
another. At the present day the idea of one man being owned by another
is repugnant to all enlightened public opinion, but this general repug-
nance is of very recent growth, and did not exist in mediaeval Europe. In
dealing with the scholastic attitude towards slavery, we shall indicate,
as we did with regard to its attitude towards property in general, the
fundamental harmony between the teaching of the primitive and the
mediaeval Church on the subject. No apology is needed for this appar-
ent digression, as a comparison of the teaching of the Church at the two
periods of its development helps us to understand precisely what the
later doctrine was; and, moreover, the close analogy which, as we shall
see, existed between the Church’s view of property and slavery, throws
much light on the true nature of both institutions.
Although in practice Christianity had done a very great deal to miti-
gate the hardships of the slavery of ancient times, and had in a large
degree abolished slavery by its encouragement of emancipation,160 it did
not, in theory, object to the institution itself. There is no necessity to
labour a point so universally admitted by all students of the Gospels as
that Christ and His Apostles did not set out to abolish the slavery which
they found everywhere around them, but rather aimed, by preaching
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the burden of servitude, and to render its acceptance a merit rather than
a disgrace. ‘What, in fact,’ says Janet, ‘is the teaching of St. Peter, St.
Paul, and the Apostles in general? It is, in the first place, that in Christ
there are no slaves, and that all men are free and equal; and, in the
second place, that the slave must obey his master, and the master must
be gentle to his slave.161 Thus, although there are no slaves in Christ, St.
Paul and the Apostles do not deny that there may be on earth. I am far
from reproaching the Apostles for not having proclaimed the immediate
necessity of the emancipation of slaves. But I say that the question was
discussed in precisely the same terms by the ancient philosophers of the
same period. Seneca, it is true, proclaimed not the civil, but the moral
equality of men; but St. Paul does not speak of anything more than their
equality in Christ. Seneca instructs the master to treat the slave as he
would like to be treated himself.162 Is not this what St. Peter and St. Paul
say when they recommended the master to be gentle and good? The
superiority of Christianity over Stoicism in this question arises alto-
gether from the very superiority of the Christian spirit....’163 The article
on ‘Slavery’ in the Catholic Encyclopaedia expresses the same opin-
ion: ‘Christian teachers, following the example of St. Paul, implicitly
accept slavery as not in itself incompatible with the Christian law. The
Apostle counsels slaves to obey their masters, and to bear with their
condition patiently. This estimate of slavery continued to prevail until it
became fixed in the systematised ethical teaching of the schools; and so
it remained without any conspicuous modification until the end of the
eighteenth century.’ The same interpretation of early Christian teaching
is accepted by the Protestant scholar, Dr. Bartlett: ‘The practical atti-
tude of Seneca and the early Christians to slavery was much the same.
They bade the individual rise to a sense of spiritual freedom in spite of
outward bondage, rather than denounce the institution as an altogether
illegitimate form of property.’164
Several texts might be collected from the writings of the Fathers
which would seem to show that according to patristic teaching the insti-
tution of slavery was unjustifiable. We do not propose to cite or to ex-
plain these texts one by one, in view of the quite clear and unambiguous
exposition of the subject given by St. Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching
is the more immediate subject of this essay; we shall content ourselves
by reminding the reader of the precisely similar texts relating to the
institution of property which we have examined above, and by stating
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exactly similar interpretation. ‘The teaching of the Apostle,’ says Janet,
‘and of the Fathers on slavery is the same as their teaching on prop-
erty.’165 The author from whom we are quoting, and on whose judgment
too much reliance cannot be placed, then proceeds to cite many of the
patristic texts on property, which we quoted in the section dealing with
that subject, and asks: ‘What conclusion should one draw from these
different passages? It is that in Christ there are no rich and no poor, no
mine and no thine; that in Christian perfection all things are common to
all men, but that nevertheless property is legitimate and derived from
human law. Is it not in the same sense that the Fathers condemned sla-
very as contrary to divine law, while respecting it as comformable to
human law? The Fathers abound in texts contrary to slavery, but have
we not seen a great number of texts contrary to property?’166 The close-
ness of the analogy between the patristic treatment of slavery and of
property appears forcibly in the following passage of Lactantius: ‘God
who created man willed that all should be equal. He has imposed on all
the same condition of living; He has produced all in wisdom; He has
promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly ben-
efits. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if we have all
the same Father, by an equal right we are all His children; no one is poor
in the sight of God but he who is without justice, no one rich but he who
is full of virtue.... Some one will say, Are there not among you some
poor and others rich; some servants and others masters? Is there not
some difference between individuals? There is none, nor is there any
other cause why we mutually bestow on each other the name of brethren
except that we believe ourselves to be equal. For since we measure all
human things not by the body but by the spirit, although the condition of
bodies is different, yet we have no servants, but we both regard them,
and speak of them as brothers in spirit, in religion as fellowservants.’167
Slavery was declared to be a blessing, because, like poverty, it afforded
the opportunity of practising the virtues of humility and patience.168 The
treatment of the institution of slavery underwent a striking and impor-
tant development in the hands of St. Augustine, who justified it as one
of the penalties incurred by man as a result of the sin of Adam and Eve.
‘The first holy men,’ writes the Saint, ‘were rather shepherds than kings,
God showing herein what both the order of the creation desired, and
what the deserts of sin exacted. For justly was the burden of servitude
laid upon the back of transgression. And therefore in all the Scriptures
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offending son. So that it was guilt, and not nature, that gave origin to
that name.... Sin is the mother of servitude and the first cause of man’s
subjection to man.’169 St. Augustine also justifies the enslavement of
those conquered in war— ‘It is God’s decree to humble the conquered,
either reforming their sins herein or punishing them.’170
Janet ably analyses and expounds the advance which St. Augustine
made in the treatment of slavery: ‘In this theory we must note the fol-
lowing points: (1) Slavery is unjust according to the law of nature. This
is what is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle, but conformable to that
of the Stoics. (2) Slavery is just as a consequence of sin. This is the new
principle peculiar to St. Augustine. He has found a principle of slavery,
which is neither natural inequality, nor war, nor agreement, but sin.
Slavery is no more a transitory fact which we accept provisionally, so
as not to precipitate a social revolution : it is an institution which has
become natural as a result of the corruption of our nature. (3) It must
not be said that slavery, resulting from sin, is destroyed by Christ who
destroyed sin.... Slavery, according to St. Augustine, must last as long
as society.’171
Nowhere does St. Thomas Aquinas appear as clearly as the me-
dium of contact and reconciliation between the Fathers of the Church
and the ancient philosophers as in his treatment of the question of sla-
very. His utterances upon this subject are scattered through many por-
tions of his work, but, taken together, they show that he was quite pre-
pared to admit the legitimacy of the institution, not alone on the grounds
put forward by St. Augustine, but also on those suggested by Aristotle
and the Roman jurists.
He fully adopts the Augustinian argument in the Summa, where, in
answer to the query, whether in the state of innocence all men were
equal, he states that even in that state there would still have been in-
equalities of sex, knowledge, justice, etc. The only inequalities which
would not have been present were those arising from sin; but the only
inequality arising from sin was slavery.172 ‘By the words “So long as we
are without sin we are equal,” Gregory means to exclude such inequal-
ity as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are
placed in subjection to others as a penalty.’173 In the following article St.
Thomas distinguishes between political and despotic subordination, and
shows that the former might have existed in a state of innocence. ‘Mas-
tership has a twofold meaning; first as opposed to servitude, in which
case a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In an-54/George O’Brien
other sense mastership is commonly referred to any kind of subject; and
in that sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free
men can be called a master. In the first meaning of mastership man
would not have been ruled by man in the state of innocence; but in the
latter sense man would be ruled over by man in that state.’174 In De
Regimine Principum Aquinas also accepts what we may call the Au-
gustinian view of slavery. ‘But whether the dominion of man over man
is according to the law of nature, or is permitted or provided by God
may be certainly resolved. If we speak of dominion by means of servile
subjection, this was introduced because of sin. But if we speak of do-
minion in so far as it relates to the function of advising and directing, it
may in this sense be said to be natural.’175
St. Thomas was therefore willing to endorse the argument of St.
Augustine that slavery was a result of sin; but he also admits the justice
of Aristotle’s reasoning on the subject. In the section of the Summa
where the question is discussed, whether the law of nations is the same
as the natural law, one of the objections to be met is that ‘ Slavery
among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the
philosopher. Now “slavery belongs to the law of nations,” as Isidore
states. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.’176 In answer to
this objection St. Thomas draws the distinction between what is natural
absolutely, and what is natural secundum quid, the passage which we
have quoted in treating of property rights. He then goes on to apply this
distinction to the case of slavery. ‘Considered absolutely, the fact that
this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based,
not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to
this man to be ruled by a wise man, and to the latter to be helped by the
former, as the philosopher states. Wherefore slavery which belongs to
the law of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.’177 It
will be noted from this passage that St. Thomas partly admits, though
not entirely, the opinion of Aristotle. In the De Regimine Principum he
goes much further in the direction of adopting the full Aristotelian theory:
‘Nature decrees that there should be grades in men as in other things.
We see this in the elements, a superior and an inferior; we see in every
mixture that some one element predominates.... For we see this also in
the relation of the body and the mind, and in the powers of the mind
compared with one another; because some are ordained towards order-
ing and moving, such as the understanding and the will; others to serv-
ing. So should it be among men; and thus it is proved that some areAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/55
slaves according to nature. Some lack reason through some defect of
nature; and such ought to be subjected to servile works because they
cannot use their reason, and this is called the natural law.’178 In the same
chapter the right of conquerors to enslave their conquered is referred to
without comment, and therefore implicitly approved by the author.
‘Thus,’ according to Janet, ‘St. Thomas admits slavery as far as
one can admit it, and for all the reasons for which one can admit it. He
admits with Aristotle that there is a natural slavery; with St. Augustine
that slavery is the result of sin; with the jurisconsult that slavery is the
result of war and convention.’179 ‘The author justifies slavery,’ says
Franck, ‘in the name of St. Augustine, and in that of Aristotle; in the
name of the latter by showing that there are two races of men, one born
to command, and the other to obey; in the name of the former in affirm-
ing that slavery had its origin in original sin; that by sin man has for-
feited his right to liberty. Further, we must admit slavery as an institu-
tion not only of nature and one of the consequences of the fall, we must
admit a third principle of slavery which appears to St. Thomas as legiti-
mate as the other two. War is necessary; therefore it is just; and if it is
just we must accept its consequences. One of these consequences is the
absolute right of the conqueror over the life, person, and goods of the
conquered.’180
Aquinas returns to the question of slavery in another passage, which
is interesting as showing that he continued to make use of the analogy
between slavery and property which we have seen in the Fathers. ‘A
thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because
nature inclines thereto, e.g., that one should not do harm to another.
Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary; thus we might
say that for man to be naked is of the natural law because nature did not
give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense the possession of
all things in common and universal freedom is said to be of the natural
law, because, to wit, the distinction of possession and slavery were not
brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of
human life. Accordingly, the law of nature was not changed in this re-
spect, but by addition.’181
Ægidius Romanus closely follows the teaching of his master on the
subject of slavery. ‘What does Ægidius do? He unites Aristotle and St.
Augustine against human liberty. He declares with the latter that man
has lost the right of belonging to himself, since he has fallen from the
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Aristotle the existence of two races of men, the one designed for liberty,
the other for servitude.... This is not all—to this servitude which he calls
natural, the author joins another, purely legal, but which does not seem
to him less just, namely, that which is founded on the right of war, and
which obliges the conquered to become the slaves of the conquerors—to
give up their liberty in exchange for their lives. Our author admits it is
just in itself, because in his opinion it is useful to the defence of one’s
country; it excites warriors to courage by placing before their eyes the
terrible consequences of cowardice.’182 The teachings of St. Thomas
and Ægidius were accepted by all the later scholastics.183 Biel, whose
opinion is always very valuable as being that of the last of a long line,
says that there are three kinds of slaves— slaves of God, of sin, and of
man. The first kind of slavery is wholly good, the second wholly bad,
while the third, though not instituted by, is approved by the jus gentium.
He proceeds to state the four ways in which a man may become en-
slaved: namely, ex necessitate, or by being born of a slave mother; ex
bello, by being captured in war; ex delicto, or by sentence of the law in
the case of certain crimes committed by freedmen; and ex propria
voluntate, or by the sale of a man of himself into slavery.184
It must not be forgotten that we are dealing purely with theory. In
fact the Church did an inestimable amount of good to the servile classes,
and, at the time that Aquinas wrote, thanks to the operation of Chris-
tianity in this respect, the old Roman slavery had completely disap-
peared. The nearest approach to ancient slavery in the Middle Ages was
serfdom, which was simply a step in the transition from slavery to free
labour.185 Moreover, the rights of the master over the slave were strictly
confined to the disposal of his services; the ancient absolute right over
his body had completely disappeared. ‘In those things,’ says St. Tho-
mas, ‘which appertain to the disposition of human acts and things, the
subject is bound to obey his superior according to the reason of the
superiority; thus a soldier must obey his officer in those things which
appertain to war; a slave his master in those things which appertain to
the carrying out of his servile works.’186 ‘Slavery does not abolish the
natural equality of man,’ says a writer who is quoted by the Catholic
Encyclopedia as correctly stating the Catholic doctrine on the subject
prior to the eighteenth century, ‘hence by slavery one man is understood
to become subject to the dominion of another to the extent that the mas-
ter has a perfect right to the services which one man may justly perform
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ously, is no less clear in his statement of the limitations of the right. ‘The
body of the slave is not simply in the power of the master as the body of
an ox is; nor can the master kill or mutilate the slave, nor abuse him
contrary to the law of God. The temporal gains derived from the labour
of the slave belong to the master; but the master is bound to provide the
slave with the necessaries of life.’188 Rambaud very properly points out
that the reason that the scholastic writers did not fulminate in as strong
and as frequent language against the tyranny of masters, was not that
they felt less strongly on the subject, but that the abuses of the ancient
slave system had almost entirely disappeared under the influence of
Christian teaching.189
On the other hand, it must not be imagined, as has sometimes been
suggested, that the slavery defended by Aquinas was not real slavery,
but rather the ordinary modern relation between employer and employed.
Such an interpretation is definitely disproved by a passage of the article
on justice where Aquinas says that ‘inducing a slave to leave his master
is properly an injury against the person... and, since the slave is his
master’s chattel, it is referred to theft.’190
Chapter III
Duties Regarding the Exchange of Property
Section 1.— The Sale of Goods
§1. The Just Price
We dealt in the last chapter with the duties which attached to property in
respect of its acquisition and use, and we now pass to the duties which
attached to it in respect of its exchange. As we indicated above, the right
to exchange one’s goods for the goods or the money of another person
was, according to the scholastics, one of the necessary corollaries of the
right of private property. In order that such exchange might be justifi-
able, it must be conducted on a basis of commutative justice, which, as
we have seen, consisted in the observance of equality according to the
arithmetical mean. We further drew attention to the fact that exchanges
might be divided into sales of goods and sales of the use of money. In the
former case the regulating principle of the equality of justice was given
effect to by the observance of the just price; in the latter by that of the
prohibition of usury. We shall deal with the former in the present and
with the latter in the following section.
The mediaeval teaching on the just price, about which there has58/George O’Brien
been so much discussion and disagreement among modern writers, was
simply the application to the particular contract of sale of the principles
which regulated contracts in general. Exchange originally took the form
of barter; but, as it was found impossible accurately to measure the
values of the objects exchanged without the intervention of some com-
mon measure of value, money was invented to serve as such a measure.
We need not further refer to barter in this section, as the principles which
applied to it were those that applied to sale. Indeed all sales when analysed
are really barter through the medium of money. That Aquinas simply
regarded his article on just price191 as an explanation of the application of
his general teaching on justice to the particular case of the contract of sale
is quite clear from the article itself. ‘Apart from fraud, we may speak of
buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves; and
from this point of view buying and selling seem to be established for the
common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which be-
longs to the other, and vice versa. Now whatever is established for the
common, advantage should not be more of a burden to one part than to the
other, and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality
of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use
is measured by the price given for it, for which purpose money was in-
vented. Therefore, if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing’s worth,
or conversely the worth of the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the
equality of justice; and consequently to sell a thing for more than its worth,
or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.’192 When
two contracting parties make an exchange through the medium of money,
the price is the expression of the exchange value in money. ‘The just price
expresses the equivalence, which is the foundation of contractual justice.’193
The conception of the just price, though based on Aristotelian concep-
tions of justice, is essentially Christian. The Roman law had allowed the
utmost freedom of contract in sales; apart from fraud, the two contracting
parties were at complete liberty to fix a price at their own risk; and selfish-
ness was assumed and allowed to be the animating motive of every con-
tracting party. The one limitation to this sweeping rule was in favour of the
seller. By a rescript of Diocletian and Maximian it was enacted that, if a
thing were sold for less than half its value, the seller could recover the
property, unless the buyer chose to make up the price to the full amount.
Although this rescript was perfectly general in its terms, some authors con-
tended that it applied only to sales of land, because the example given was
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showing that even the Roman law considered that contracts might be ques-
tioned on equitable grounds in certain cases.195 The distinctively Christian
notion of just price seems to have its origin in a passage of St. Augustine;196
but the notion was not placed on a philosophical foundation until the thir-
teenth century. Even Aquinas, however, although he treats of the just price
at some length, and expresses clear and categorical opinions upon many
points connected with it, does not state the principles on which the just price
itself should be arrived at. This omission is due, not to the fact that Aquinas
was unfamiliar with these principles, but to the fact that he took them for
granted as they were not disputed or doubted.197 We have consequently to
look for enlightenment upon this point in writings other than those of Aquinas.
The subject can be most satisfactorily understood if we divide its treatment
into two parts: first, a consideration of what constituted the just price in the
sale of an article, the price of which was fixed by law; and second, a consid-
eration of what constituted the just price of an article, the price of which
was not so fixed.
§2. The Just Price when Price fixed by Law
Regarding the power of the State to fix prices, the theologians and ju-
rists were in complete agreement. According to Gerson: ‘The law may
justly fix the price of things which are sold, both movable and immov-
able, in the nature of rents and not in the nature of rents, and feudal and
non-feudal, below which price the seller must not give, or above which
the buyer must not demand, however they may desire to do so. As there-
fore the price is a kind of measure of the equality to be observed in
contracts, and as it is sometimes difficult to find that measure with ex-
actitude, on account of the varied and corrupt desires of man, it be-
comes expedient that the medium should be fixed according to the judg-
ment of some wise man.... In the civil state, however, nobody is to be
decreed wiser than the lawgiving authority. Therefore it behoves the
latter, whenever it is possible to do so, to fix the just price, which may
not be exceeded by private consent, and which must be enforced.’...198
Biel practically paraphrases this passage of Gerson, and contends that
it is the duty of the prince to fix prices, mainly on account of the diffi-
culty which private contractors find in doing so.199
The rules which we find laid down for the guidance of the prince in
fixing prices are very interesting, as they show that the mediaeval writ-
ers had a clear idea of the constituent elements of value. Langenstein,
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later writers, says that the prince should take account of the condition of
the place for which the price was to be fixed, the circumstances of the
time, the condition of the mass of the people. The different kinds of need
which may be felt for goods must also be considered, indigentice naturae,
status, voluptatis, and cupiditatis; and a distinction drawn between ex-
tensive and intensive need—the former is greater ‘quanto plures re aliqua
indigent,’ the latter ‘quanto minus de illa re habetur.’ The general rule is
that the prince must seek to find a medium between a price so low as to
render labourers, artisans, and merchants unable to maintain themselves
suitably, and one so high as to disable the poor from obtaining the nec-
essaries of life. When in doubt, Langenstein concludes, the price should
err on the low rather than the high side.200 Biel gives similar rules : The
legislator must regard the needs of man, the abundance or scarcity of
things, the difficulty, labour, and risks of production. When all these
things are carefully considered the legislator is in a position to fix a just
price.201 According to Endemann, the labour of production, the cost and
risk of transport, and the condition of the markets had all to be kept in
mind when a fair price was being fixed.202 We may mention in passing
that the power of fixing the just price might be delegated; prices were
frequently fixed by the town authorities, the guilds, and the Church.203
The passage from Gerson which we quoted above shows that, when
a just price had been fixed by the competent authority, the parties to a
contract were bound to keep to it. In other words, the pretium legitimum
was ipso facto the justum pretium. On this point there is complete agree-
ment among the writers of the period. Caepolla says, When the price is
fixed by law or statute, that is the just price, and nobody can receive
anything, however small, in excess of it, because the law must be ob-
served’;204 and Biel, ‘When a price has been fixed, the contracting par-
ties have sufficient certainty about the equality of value and the justice
of the price.’205 Cossa draws attention to the necessity of the fixed price
corresponding with the real price in order that it should maintain its
validity. ‘The schoolmen talk of the legitimate and irreducible price of a
thing which was fixed by authority, and was for obvious reasons of
special importance in the case of the necessaries of life.... The legiti-
mate price of a thing as fixed by authority had to be based upon the
natural price, and therefore lost its validity and became a dead letter the
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§3. The Just Price when Price not fixed by Law
When the just price was not fixed by any outside authority, the buyer
and seller had to arrive at it themselves. The problem before them was
to equalise their respective burdens, so that there would be equality of
burden between them, or, in other words, to reduce the value of the
article sold to terms of money. In order that we may understand how this
equality was arrived at, it is important to know the factors which were
held to enter into the determination of value.
The first thing upon which the mediaeval teachers insist is that value
is not determined by the intrinsic excellence of the thing itself, because,
if it were, a fly would be more valuable than a pearl, as being intrinsi-
cally more excellent.207 Nor is the value to be measured by the mere
utility of the object for satisfying the material needs of man, for in that
case, corn should be worth more than precious stones.208 The value of
an object is to be measured by its capacity for satisfying men’s wants.
‘Valor rerum aestimatur secundum humanam indigentiam.... Dicendum
est quod indigentia humana est mensura naturalis commutabilium; quod
probatur sic: bonitas sive valor rei attenditur ex fine propter quem
exhibetur: unde commentator secundo Metaphysicae nihil est bonum
nisi propter causas finales; sed finis naturalis ad quem justitia
commutativa ordinet exteriora commutabilia est supplementum
indigentiae humanae...; igitur supplementum indigentiae humanae est
vera mensura commutabilium. Sed supplementum videtur mensurari per
indigentiam; majoris enim valoris est supplementum quod majorem
supplet indigentiam.... Item hoc probatur signo, quia videmus quod illo
tempore quo vina deficiunt quia magis indigeremus eis ipsa fiunt
cariora...209
The capacity of an object for satisfying man’s needs could not be
measured by its capacity for satisfying the needs of this or that indi-
vidual, but by its capacity for satisfying the needs of the average mem-
ber of the community.210 The Abbé Desbuquois, in the article from which
we have already quoted, finds in this elevation of the common estima-
tion an illustration of the general principle of the mediaevals, which we
have seen at work in their teaching on the use of property, that the indi-
vidual benefit must always be subordinated to the general welfare. Ac-
cording to him, it is but one application of the duty of using one’s goods
for the common good. ‘In the same way, in allowing the right of ex-
change—a right, let us remark in passing, which is but an application of
the right of property—and in allowing it as a means of life necessary to62/George O’Brien
everybody, nature does not lose sight of the universal destination of
economic goods. One conceives then that the variations of exchange are
not permitted to be left to the arbitrary judgment of a single man, nor to
be affected by the whims and abuses of individuals; that value is defined
in view of the general good. The exchange value, as it is in the general
or social order, proceeds from the judgment of the social environment
(milieu social).’211 The writers of the Middle Ages show a very keen
perception of the elements which invest an object with the value which
is accorded to it by the general estimation. In Aquinas we find certain
elements recognised—‘diversitas loci vel temporis, labor, raritas’—but
it is not until the authors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that we
find a systematic treatment of value.212 First and foremost there is the
cost of production of the article, especially the wages of all those who
helped to produce it. Langenstein lays down that every one can deter-
mine for himself the just price of the wares he has to sell by reckoning
what he needs to support himself in the status which he occupies.213
According to the Catholic Encyclopaedia214 the just price of an article
included enough to pay fair wages to the worker—that is, enough to
enable him to maintain the standard of living of his class. This, though
not stated in so many words by Aquinas, was probably assumed by him
as too obvious to need repetition.215 ‘The cost of production of manu-
factured products,’ says Brants, ‘is a legitimate constituent element of
value; it is according to the cost that the producer can properly fix the
value of his product and of his work,’216
The cost of the labour of production was, however, by no means the
only factor which was admitted to enter into the determination of value.
The passage from Gerson dealing with the circumstances to which the
prince must have regard in fixing a price, which we quoted above, shows
quite clearly that many other factors were recognised as no less impor-
tant. This appears with special clearness in the treatise of Langenstein,
whose authority on this subject was always ranked very high. Bernardine
of Siena is careful to point out that the expense of production is only one
of the factors which influence the value of an object.217 Biel explains
that, when no price has been fixed by law, the just price may be arrived
at by a reference to the cost of the labour of production, and to the state
of the market, and the other circumstances which we have seen above
the prince was bound to have regard to in fixing a price. He also allows
the price to be raised on account of any anxiety which the production of
the goods occasioned him, or any danger he incurred.1218An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/63
It will be apparent from the whole trend of the above that, whereas
the remuneration of the labour of all those who were engaged in the
production of an article, was one of the elements to be taken into ac-
count in reckoning its value, and consequently its just price, it was by
no means the only element. Certain so-called Christian socialists have
endeavoured to find in the writings of the scholastics support for the
Marxian position that all value arises from labour.219 This endeavour is,
however, destined to failure; we shall see in a later chapter that many
forms of unearned income were tolerated and approved by the scholas-
tics; but all that is necessary here is to draw the attention of the reader to
the passages on value to which we have referred. One of the most promi-
nent exponents of the untenable view that the mediaevals traced all value
to labour is the Abbé Hohoff, whose argument that there was a divorce
between value and just price in the scholastic writings, is ably contro-
verted by Rambaud, who remarks that nobody would have been more
surprised than Aquinas himself at the suggestion that he was the fore-
runner of Karl Marx.220 The idea that the scholastics traced all value to
the labour expended on production is rejected by many of the most promi-
nent writers on mediaeval economic theory. Roscher draws particular
attention to the fact that the canonist teaching assigned the correct pro-
portions in production to land, capital, and labour, in contrast to all the
later schools of economists, who have exaggerated the importance of
one or the other of these factors.221 Even Knies, who was the first mod-
ern writer to insist on the importance of the cost of production as an
element of value, states that the Church sought to fix the price of goods
in accordance with the cost of production (Herstellungskosten) and the
consumption value (Gebrauchswerte).222 Brants takes the same view.
‘The expenses of production are in practice the norm of the fixing of the
sale price in the great majority of cases, above all in a very narrow
market, where competition is limited; moreover, they can, for reasons of
public order, form the basis of a fixing that will protect the producer
and the consumer against the disastrous consequences of constant oscil-
lations. The vendor can in principle be remunerated for his trouble. It is
well that he should be so remunerated; it is socially useful, and is used
as a basis for fixing price; but it cannot in any way be said that this
forms the objective measure of value, but that the work and expense are
a sufficient title of remuneration for the fixing of the just price of the
sale of a thing. Some writers have tried to conclude from this that the
authors of the Middle Ages saw in labour the measure of value. This64/George O’Brien
conclusion is exaggerated. We may fully admit that this element enters
into the sale price; but it is in no way the general measure of value....
The expenses of production constitute, then, one of the legitimate ele-
ments of just price; they are not the measure of value, but a factor often
influencing its determination.’223 ‘Labour,’ according to Dr. Cronin, ‘is
one of the most important of all the determinants of value, for labour is
the chief element in cost of production, and cost of production is one of
the chief elements in determining the level at which it is useful to buy or
sell. But labour is not the only determinant of value; there is, e.g., the
price of the raw materials, a price that is not wholly determined by the
labour of producing those materials.’224
The just price, then, in the absence of a legal fixing, was held to be
the price that was in accordance with the communis estimatio. Of course,
this did not mean that a plebiscite had to be taken before every sale, but
that any price that was in accordance with the general course of dealing
at the time and place of the sale was considered substantially fair. ‘A
thing is worth what it can generally be sold for—at the time of the
contract; this means what it can be sold for generally either on that day
or the preceding or following day. One must look to the price at which
similar things are generally sold in the open market.’225 ‘We must state
precisely,’ says the Abbé Desbuquois, ‘the character of this common
estimation; it did not mean the universal suffrage; although it expresses
the universal interest, it proceeds in practice from the evaluation of com-
petent men, taken in the social environment where the exchange value
operates. If one supposes a sovereign tribunal of arbitration where all
the rights of all the weak and all the strong economic factors are taken
into account, the just price appears as the sentence or decision of this
court.’226 ‘For the scholastics, the common estimation meant an ethical
judgment of at least the most influential members of the community,
anticipating the markets and fixing the rate of exchange.’227
It is quite incorrect to say, as has been sometimes said, that the
mediaeval just price was in no way different from the competition price
of to-day which is arrived at by the higgling of the market. Dr.
Cunningham is very explicit and clear on this point. ‘Common estima-
tion is thus the exponent of the natural or normal or just price according
to either the mediaeval or modern view; but, whereas we rely on the
higgling of the market as the means of bringing out what is the common
estimate of any object, mediaeval economists believed that it was pos-
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consultation of experts to calculate out what was the just price. If com-
mon estimation was thus organised, either by the town authorities or
guilds or parliament, it was possible to determine beforehand what the
price should be and to lay down a rule to this effect; in modern times we
can only look back on the competition prices and say by reflection what
the common estimation has been.’228 ‘The common estimation of which
the Canonists spoke,’ says Dr. Ryan, ‘was conscious social judgment
that fixed price beforehand, and was expressed chiefly in custom, while
the social estimate of to-day is in reality an unconscious resultant of the
higgling of the market, and finds its expression only in market price.’229
The phrase ‘res tanti valet quanti vendi potest,’ which is so often used to
prove that the medieval doctors permitted full competitive prices in the
modern sense, must be understood to mean that a thing could be sold at
any figure which was within the limits of the minimum and maximum
just price.230
The last sentence suggests that the just price was not a fixed and
unalterable standard, but was somewhat wide and elastic. On this all
writers are agreed. ‘The just price of things,’ says Aquinas, ‘is not fixed
with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that
a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality
of justice,’231 Caepolla repeats this dictum, with the reservation that,
when the just price is fixed by law, it must be rigorously observed.232
‘Note,’ says Gerson, ‘ that the equality of commutative justice is not
exact or unchangeable, but has a good deal of latitude, within the bounds
of which a greater or less price may be given without justice being in-
fringed;’233 and Biel insists on the same latitude, from which he draws
the conclusion that the just price is constantly varying from day to day
and from place to place.234 Generally it was said that there was a maxi-
mum, medium, and minimum just price; and that any price between the
maximum and minimum was valid, although the medium was to be aimed
at as far as possible.
The price fixed by common estimation was therefore the one to be
observed in most cases, and it was at all times a safe guide to follow. If,
however, the parties either knew or had good reason to believe that the
common estimation had fixed the price wrongly, they were not bound to
follow it, but should arrive at a just price themselves, having regard to
the various considerations given above.235
It did not make any difference whether the price was paid immedi-
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of credit was not allowed, as it was deemed usurious—as indeed it was.
It was held that the seller, in not taking his money immediately, was
simply making a loan of that amount to the buyer, and that to receive
anything more than the sum lent would be usury. Aquinas is quite clear
on this point. ‘If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that
which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a
case of usury; because this waiting for the payment of the price has the
character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the just price
in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to
usury. In like manner, if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price
than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they
can be delivered, it is likewise a sin of usury; because again this antici-
pated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price of which
is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand, if a
man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have
his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.’236 If, however, the
seller, by giving credit, suffered any damage, he was entitled to be rec-
ompensed; this, as we shall see, was an ordinary feature of usury law. It
could not be said that the price was raised. The price remained the same;
but the seller was entitled to something further than the price by way of
damages.237 It was by the application of this principle that a seller was
justified in demanding more than the current price for an article which
possessed some individual or sentimental value for him. ‘In such a case
the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss
which the sale brings on the seller.... No man should sell what is not his,
though he may charge for the loss he suffers.’238 On the other hand, it
was strictly forbidden to raise the price on account of the individual
need of the buyer.239
§4. The Just Price of Labour
Particular rules were laid down for determining the just price of certain
classes of goods. These need not be treated in detail, as they were merely
applications of the general principle to particular cases, and whatever
interest they possess is in the domain of practice rather than of theory.
In the sale of immovable property the rule was that the value should be
arrived at by a consideration of the annual fruits of the property.240 The
only one of the particular contracts which need detain us here is that of
a contract of service for wages (locatio operarum). Wages were consid-
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(merces) which is paid to any one as a recompense for his work and
labour. Therefore, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for a thing
taken from another person, so also to pay the wages of work and labour
is an act of justice.’241 Again, ‘Remuneration of service or work... can
be priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who
offer for hire the labour which they exercise by work or by tongue.’242
Biel insists that the value of labour is subject to the same influences as
the value of any other commodity which is offered for sale, and that
therefore a just price must be observed in buying it.243
This, according to Brants,244 is essentially a matter upon which more
enlightenment will be found in histories of the working classes245 than in
books dealing with the enunciation of abstract theories; nevertheless, it
is possible to state generally that it was regarded as the duty of employ-
ers to give such a wage as would support the worker in accordance with
the requirements of his class. In the great majority of cases the rate of
wages was fixed by some public—municipal or corporative —author-
ity, but Langenstein enunciates a rule which seems to approach the state-
ment of a general theory. According to him, when a man has something
to sell, and has no indication of the just price from its being fixed by any
outside authority, he must endeavour to get such a price as will reason-
ably recompense him for any outlay he may have incurred, and will
enable him to provide for his needs, spiritual and temporal.246 It was not
until the sixteenth century that the fixing of the just price of wages was
submitted to scientific discussion;247 in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies there is little to, be found bearing on this subject except the pas-
sage of Langenstein which we have quoted, and some strong exhorta-
tions by Antoninus of Florence to masters to pay good wages.248 The
reason for this paucity of authority upon a subject of so much impor-
tance is that in practice the machinery provided by the guilds had the
effect of preserving a substantially just remuneration to the artisan. When
a man is in perfect health he does not bother to read medical books. In
the same way, the proper remuneration of labour was so universally
recognised as a duty, and so satisfactorily enforced, that it seems to
have been taken for granted, and therefore passed over, by the writers of
the period. One may agree with Brants in concluding that, ‘ the prin-
ciple of just price in sales was applied to wages; fluctuations in wages
were not allowed; the just price, as in sales, rested on the approximate
equality of the services rendered; and that this equality was estimated
by common opinion.’249 Of course, in the case of slave labour it could68/George O’Brien
not be said that any wage was paid. The master was entitled to the
services of the slave, and in return was bound to furnish him with the
necessaries of life.250
§5. Value of the Conception of the Just Price
It is probably correct to say that the canonical teaching on just price
was negative rather than positive; in other words, that it did not so much
aim at positively fixing the price at which goods should be sold, as
negatively at indicating the practices in buying and selling which were
unjust. ‘The doctrine of just price,’ according to Dr. Ryan, ‘may some-
times have been associated with incorrect views of industrial life, but all
competent authorities agree that it was a fairly sound attempt to define
the equities of mediaeval exchanges, and that it was tolerably successful
in practice.’251 The condition of mediaeval markets was frequently such
that the competition was not really fair competition, and consequently
the price arrived at by competition would be unfair either to buyer or
seller. ‘This,’ according to Dr. Cunningham, ‘was the very thing which
mediaeval regulation had been intended to prevent, as any attempt to
make gain out of the necessities of others, or to reap profit from unlooked-
for occurrences would have been condemned as extortion. It is by tak-
ing advantage of such fluctuations that money is most frequently made
in modern times; but the whole scheme of commercial life in the Middle
Ages was supposed to allow of a regular profit on each transaction.’252
There might be some doubt as to the positive justice of this or that price;
but there could be no doubt as to the injustice of a price which was
enhanced by the necessities of the poor, or the engrossing of a vital
commodity.253 Merely to buy up the whole supply of a certain commod-
ity, even if it were bought up by a ‘ring’ of merchants, provided that the
commodity was resold within the limits of the just price, was not a sin
against justice, though it might be a sin against charity.254 If the authori-
ties granted a monopoly, they must at the same time fix a just price.255 A
monopoly which was not privileged by the State, and which had for its
aim the raising of the price of goods above the just price was regarded
with universal reprobation.256 ‘Whoever buys up corn, meat, and wine,’
says Trithemius, ‘in order to drive up their price and to amass money at
the cost of others is, according to the laws of the Church, no better than
a common criminal. In a wellgoverned community all arbitrary raising
of prices in the case of articles of food and clothing is peremptorily
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modities can be compelled to sell them at fair prices; for in every com-
munity care should be taken that all the members should be provided
for, and not only a small number be allowed to grow rich, and revel in
luxury to the hurt and prejudice of the many.257 Thus the doctrine of the
just price was a deadly weapon with which to fight the ‘profiteer.’ The
engrosser was looked upon as the natural enemy of the poor; and the
power of the trading class was justly reckoned so great, that in cases of
doubt prices were always fixed low rather than high. In other words, the
buyer—that is to say, the community—was the subject of protection
rather than the seller.258
It must at the same time be clearly kept in mind that the seller was
also protected. All the authorities are unanimous that it was as sinful for
the buyer to give too little as for the seller to demand too much, and it is
this aspect of the just price which appears most favourable in compari-
son with the theory of price of the classical economists. In the former
case prices were fixed having regard to the wages necessary for the
producer; in the latter the wages of the producer are determined by the
price at which he can sell his goods, exposed to the competition of ma-
chinery or foreign—possibly slave—labour.259 According to the Catho-
lic Encyclopaedia: ‘To the mediaeval theologian the just price of an
article included enough to pay fair wages to the worker—that is, enough
to enable him to maintain the standard of living of his class.’260 ‘The
difference,’ says Dr. Cunningham, ‘which emerges according as we start
from one principle or the other comes out most distinctly with reference
to wages. In the Middle Ages wages were taken as a first charge; in
modern times the reward of the labourer cannot but fluctuate in connec-
tion with fluctuations in the utility and market price of the things. There
must always be a connection between wages and prices, but in the olden
times wages were the first charge, and prices on the whole depended on
them, while in modern times wages are, on the other hand, directly af-
fected by prices.’261 Dr. Cunningham draws attention to the fact that the
labouring classes rejected the idea of the fixing of a just price for their
services when, from a variety of causes, a situation arose when they
were able to earn by open competition a reward higher than what was
necessary to support them according to their state in life.262 Nowadays
the reverse has taken place; unrestricted competition has in many cases
resulted in the reduction of wages to a level below the margin of subsis-
tence; and the general cry of the working classes is for the compulsory
fixing of minimum rates of wages which will ensure that their subsis-70/George O’Brien
tence will not be liable to be impaired by the fluctuations of the markets.
What the workers of the present day look to as a desirable, but almost
unattainable, ideal, was the universal practice in the ages when eco-
nomic relations were controlled by Christian principles.
§6. Was the Just Price Subjective or Objective?
The question whether the just price was essentially subjective or objec-
tive has recently formed the subject matter of an interesting and ably
conducted discussion, provoked by certain remarks in Dr. Cunningham’s
Western Civilisation.263 Dr. Cunningham, although admiring the ethical
spirit which animated the conception of the just price, thought at the
same time that the economic ideas underlying the conception were so
undeveloped and unsound that the theory could not be applied in prac-
tice at the present day. ‘Their economic analysis was very defective, and
the theory of price which they put forward was untenable; but the ethi-
cal standpoint which they took is well worth examination, and the prac-
tical measures which they recommended appear to have been highly
beneficial in the circumstances in which they had to deal. Their actions
were not unwise; their common-sense morality was sound; but the eco-
nomic theories by which they tried to give an intellectual justification
for their rules and their practice were quite erroneous...  The attempt to
determine an ideal price implies that there can and ought to be stability
in relative values and stability in the measure of values— which is ab-
surd. The mediaeval doctrine and its application rested upon another
assumption which we have outlived. Value is not a quality which in-
heres in an object so that it can have the same worth for everybody; it
arises from the personal preference and needs of different people, some
of whom desire a thing more and some less, some of whom want to use
it in one way and some in another. Value is not objective—intrinsic in
the object—but subjective, varying with the desire and intentions of the
possessors or would-be possessors; and, because it is thus subjective,
there cannot be a definite ideal value which every article ought to pos-
sess, and still more a just price cud the measure of that ideal value.’ In
these and similar observations to be found in the Growth of English
History and Commerce, Dr. Cunningham showed that he profoundly
misunderstood the doctrine of the just price; the objectivity which he
attributed to it was not the objectivity ascribed to it by the scholastics.
It was to correct this misunderstanding that Father Slater contributed an
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price was subjective rather than objective. This article, which was af-
terwards reprinted in Some Aspects of Moral Theology, and the conclu-
sions of which were embodied in the same writer’s work on Moral The-
ology, was controverted in a series of articles by Father Kelleher in the
Irish Theological Quarterly.265
Father Slater draws attention to the fact that Dr. Cunningham over-
looked to some extent the importance of common estimation in arriving
at the just price. He points out that, far from objects being invested with
some immutable objective value, their value was in fact determined by
the price which the community as a whole was willing to pay for them:
‘As the value in exchange will be determined by what the members of
the community at the time are prepared to give,... it will be determined
by the social estimation of its utility for the support of life and its scar-
city. It will depend upon its capacity to satisfy the wants and desires of
the people with whom commercial transactions are possible and practi-
cable. Father Slater then goes on categorically to refute Dr. Cunningham’s
presentation of the objectivity of price: ‘All that that doctrine asserts is
that there should be, and that there is. an equivalent in social value
between the commodity and its price at a certain time and in a certain
place; it says nothing whatever about the stability or permanence of
prices at different times and at different places. By maintaining that the
just price did not depend upon the valuation of the individual buyer or
seller the mediaeval doctors did not dream of making it intrinsic to the
object.’ In the work on Moral Theology, to which we have referred,
expressions occur which lead one to believe that Father Slater did not
see any great difference between the mediaeval just price arrived at by
common estimation and the modern normal or market price arrived at
by open competition. Thus, in endeavouring to correct Dr. Cunningham’s
misunderstanding, Father Slater seems to have gone too far in the other
direction, and his position has been ably and, in our judgment, success-
fully, controverted by Father Kelleher.
The point at issue between the upholders of the two opposing views
on just price is well stated by Father Kelleher in the first of his articles
on the subject: ‘We must try to find out whether the just and fair price
determined the rate of exchange, or whether the rate of exchange, being
determined without an objective standard and merely according to the
play of human motives, determines what we call the just and fair price.’266
We have already demonstrated that the common estimation referred to
by the mediaeval doctors was something quite apart from the modern72/George O’Brien
higgling in the market; and that, far from being merely the result of
unbridled competition on both sides, it was rather the considered judg-
ment of the bestinformed members of the community. As we have seen,
even Dr. Cunningham admits that there was a fundamental difference
between the common estimation of the scholastics and the modern com-
petitive price. This is clearly demonstrated by Father Kelleher, who fur-
ther establishes the proposition that the modern price is purely subjec-
tive, and that no subjective price can rest on an ethical basis. The ques-
tion at issue therefore between what we may call the subjective and
objective schools is not whether the sale price was determined by com-
petition in the modern sense, but whether the common estimation of
those best qualified to form an opinion on the subject in itself deter-
mined the just price, or whether it was merely the most reliable evidence
of what the just price in fact was at a particular moment.
Father Kelleher draws attention to the fact that Aquinas in his ar-
ticle on price did not specifically affirm that the just price was objective,
but he explains this omission by saying that the objectivity of the price
was so well and universally understood that it was unnecessary expressly
to restate it. Indeed, as we saw above, the teaching of Aquinas on price
left a great deal to be supplied by later writers, not because he was in
any doubt about the subject, but because the theory was so well under-
stood. ‘Not even in St. Thomas can we find a formal discussion of the
moral obligation of observing an objective equivalence in contracts of
buying and selling. He simply took it for granted, as, indeed, was inevi-
table, seeing that, up to his time and for long after, all Catholic thought
and legislation proceeded on that hypothesis. But that he actually did
take it for granted, he has given many clear indications in his article on
Justice which leave us no room for reasonable doubt.’267 As Father
Kelleher very cogently points out, the discussion in Aquinas’s article on
commerce, whether it was lawful to buy cheap and sell dear, very clearly
indicates that the author maintained the objective theory, because if the
just price were simply determined by what people were willing to give,
this question could not have arisen.
Nor is the fact that the just price admitted of a certain elasticity an
argument in favour of its being subjective. Father Kelleher fully admits
that the common estimation was the general criterion of just price, and,
of course, the common estimation could not, of its very nature, be rigid
and immutable. ‘Commodities should, indeed, exchange according to
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value stamped on their faces. Even if we assume that the standard of
exchange was the cost of production, there would still remain room for
a certain amount of difference of opinion as to what exactly their value
would be in particular instances. Suppose that the commodity offered
for sale was a suit of clothes, in estimating its value on the basis of the
cost of production, opinions might differ as to the precise amount of
time required for making it, or as to the cost of the cloth out of which it
was made. Unless recourse was to be had to an almost interminable
process of calculations, nobody could say authoritatively what precisely
the value was, and in practice the determination of value had perforce to
be left to the ordinary human estimate of what it was, which of its very
nature was bound to admit a certain margin of fluctuation. Thus we can
easily understand how, even with an objective standard of value, the just
price might be admitted to vary within the limits of the maximum as it
might be expected to be estimated by sellers and the minimum as it
would appear just to buyers. The sort of estimation of which St. Tho-
mas speaks is therefore nothing else than a judgment, which, being hu-
man, is liable to be slightly in excess or defect of the objective value
about which it is formed.’268 As Father Kelleher puts it on a later page,
‘There is a sense certainly in which, with a solitary exception in the case
of wages, it may be said with perfect truth that the common estimation
determines the just price. That is, the common estimation is the proxi-
mate practical criterion.’269
Father Kelleher uses in support of his contention a very ingenious
argument drawn from the doctrine of usury. As we said in the first chap-
ter, and as we shall prove in detail in the next section, the prohibition of
usury was simply one of the applications of the theory of equivalence in
contracts—in other words, it was the determination of the just price to
be paid in an exchange of money for money. If, asks Father Kelleher, the
common estimation was the final test of just price, why was not moder-
ate usury allowed ? That the general opinion of the community in the
Middle Ages was undoubtedly in favour of allowing a reasonable per-
centage on loans is shown by the constant striving of the Church to
prevent such a practice. Nevertheless the Church did not for a moment
relax its teaching on usury in spite of the almost universal judgment of
the people. Here, therefore, is a clear example of one contract in which
the standard of value is clearly objective, and it is only reasonable to
draw the conclusion that the same standard which applied in contracts
of the exchange of money should apply in contracts of the sale of other74/George O’Brien
articles.
Father Kelleher’s contention seems to be completely supported by
the passage from Nider which we have cited above, to the effect that the
Common estimation ceases to be the final test of the just price when the
contracting parties know or believe that the common estimation has
erred.270 This seems to us clearly to show that the common estimation
was but the most generally received test of what the just price in fact
was, but that it was in no sense a final or irrefutable criterion.271
The theory that the just price was objective seems to be accepted by
the majority of the best modern students of the subject. Sir William
Ashley says: ‘The fundamental difference between the mediaeval and
modern point of view is... that with us value is something entirely sub-
jective; it is what each individual cares to give for a thing. With Aquinas
it was entirely objective; something outside the will of the individual
purchaser or seller; something attached to the thing itself, existing whether
he liked it or not, and that he ought to recognise.’272 Palgrave’s Dictio-
nary of Political Economy, following the authority of Knies, expresses
the same opinion: ‘Perhaps the contrast between mediaeval and modern
ideas of value is best expressed by saying that with us value is usually
something subjective, consisting of the mental determination of buyer
and seller, while to the schoolmen it was in a sense objective, something
intrinsically bound up with the commodity itself.’273 Dr. Ryan agrees
with this view : ‘The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries assumed that the objective price would be fair, since it was deter-
mined by the social estimate. In their opinion the social estimate would
embody the requirements of objective justice as fully as any device or
institution that was practically available. For the condition of the Middle
Ages and the centuries immediately following, this reasoning was un-
doubtedly correct. The agencies which created the social estimate and
determined prices—namely the civil law, the guilds, and custom—suc-
ceeded fairly in establishing a price that was equitable to all concerned.’274
Dr. Cleary says: ‘True, the pretium legate is regarded as being a just
price, but in order that it may be just, it supposes some objective ba-
sis— in other words, it rather declares than constitutes the just price.’275
Haney is also strongly of opinion that the just price was objective. ‘
Briefly stated, the doctrine was that every commodity had some one true
value which was objective and absolute.’276 The greater number of mod-
ern students therefore who have given most care and attention to the
question are inclined to the opinion that the just price was not subjec-An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/75
tive, but objective, and we see no valid reason for disagreeing with this
view, which seems to be fully warranted by the original authorities.
§7. The Mediaeval Attitude towards Commerce
Before passing from the question of price, we must discuss the legiti-
macy of the various occupations which were concerned with buying and
selling. The principal matter which arises for consideration in this re-
gard is the attitude of the mediaeval theologians towards commerce.
Aquinas discusses the legitimacy of commerce in the same question in
which he discusses just price, and indeed the two subjects are closely
allied, because the importance of the observance of justice in buying
and selling grew urgent as commerce extended and advanced.
In order to understand the disapprobation with which commerce
was on the whole regarded in the Middle Ages, it is necessary to appre-
ciate the importance of the Christian teaching on the dignity of labour.
The principle that, far from being a degrading or humiliating occupa-
tion, as it had been regarded in Greece and Rome, manual labour was,
on the contrary, one of the most noble ways of serving God, effected a
revolution in the economic sphere analogous to that which the Christian
sanctification of marriage effected in the domestic sphere. The Chris-
tian teaching on labour was grounded on the Divine precepts contained
in both the Old and New Testaments,277 and upon the example of Christ,
who was Himself a working man. The Gospel was preached amongst
the poor, and St. Paul continued his humble labours during his
apostolate.278 A life of idleness was considered something to be avoided,
instead of something to be desired, as it had been in the ancient
civilisations. Gerson says it is against the nature of man to wish to live
without labour as usurers do,279 and Langenstein inveighs against usu-
rers and all who live without work.280 ‘We read in Sebastian Brant that
the idlers are the most foolish amongst fools, they are to every people
like smoke to the eyes or vinegar to the teeth. Only by labour is God
truly praised and honoured; and Trithemius says “Man is born to labour
as the bird to fly, and hence it is contrary to the nature of man when he
thinks to live without work.”’281 The example of the monasteries, where
the performance of all sorts of manual labour was not thought inconsis-
tent with the administration of the sacred offices and the pursuit of the
highest intellectual exercises, acted as a powerful assertion to the laity
of the dignity of labour in the scheme of things.282 The value of the
monastic example in this respect cannot be too highly estimated. ‘When76/George O’Brien
we consider the results of the founding of monasteries,’ says Dr.
Cunningham, ‘we find influences at work that were plainly economic.
These communities can be best understood when we think of them as
Christian industrial colonies, and remember that they moulded society
rather by example than by precept. We are so familiar with the attacks
and satires on monastic life that were current at the Reformation period,
that it may seem almost a paradox to say that the chief claim of the
monks to our gratitude lies in this, that they helped to diffuse a better
appreciation of the duty and dignity of labour.’283
The result of this teaching and example was that, in the Middle
Ages, labour had been raised to a position of unquestioned dignity. The
economic benefit of this attitude towards labour must be obvious. It
made the working classes take a direct pride and interest in their work,
which was represented to be a means of sanctification. ‘Labour,’ ac-
cording to Dr. Cunningham, ‘was said to be pregnant with a double
advantage —the privilege of sharing with God in His work of carrying
out His purpose, and the opportunity of self-discipline and the helping
of one’s fellow-men.’284 ‘Industrial work,’ says Levasseur, ‘in the times
of antiquity had always had, in spite of the institutions of certain Em-
perors, a degrading character, because it had its roots in slavery; after
the invasion, the grossness of the barbarians and the levelling of towns
did not help to rehabilitate it. It was the Church which, in proclaiming
that Christ was the son of a carpenter, and the Apostles were simple
workmen, made known to the world that work is honourable as well as
necessary. The monks proved this by their example, and thus helped to
give to the working classes a certain consideration which ancient soci-
ety had denied them. Manual labour became a source of sanctifica-
tion.’285 The high esteem in which labour was held appears from the
whole artistic output of the Middle Ages. ‘Many of the simple artists of
the time represented the saints holding some instrument of work or en-
gaged in some industrial pursuit; as, for instance, the Blessed Virgin
spinning as she sat by the cradle of the divine Infant, and St. Joseph
using a saw or carpenter’s tools. “Since the Saints,” says the Christian
Monitor, “have laboured, so shall the Christian learn that by honourable
labour he can glorify God, do good, and save his own soul.”’286 Work
was, alongside of prayer and inseparable from it, the perfection of Chris-
tian life.287
It must not be supposed, however, that manual labour alone was
thought worthy of praise. On the contrary, the necessity for mental andAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/77
spiritual workers was fully appreciated, and all kinds of labour were
thought equally worthy of honour. ‘Heavy labourer’s work is the inevi-
table yoke of punishment, which, according to God’s righteous verdict,
has been laid upon all the sons of Adam. But many of Adam’s descen-
dants seek in all sorts of cunning ways to escape from the yoke and to
live in idleness without labour, and at the same time to have a superflu-
ity of useful and necessary things; some by robbery and plunder, some
by usurious dealings, others by lying, deceit, and all the countless forms
of dishonest and fraudulent gain, by which men are for ever seeking to
get riches and abundance without toil. But while such men are striving
to throw off the yoke righteously imposed on them by God, they are
heaping on their shoulders a heavy burden of sin. Not so, however, do
the reasonable sons of Adam proceed; but, recognising in sorrow that
for the sins of their first father God has righteously ordained that only
through the toil of labour shall they obtain what is necessary to life, they
take the yoke patiently on them.... Some of them, like the peasants, the
handicraftsmen, and the tradespeople, procure for themselves and oth-
ers, in the sweat of their brows and by physical work, the necessary
sustenance of life. Others, who labour in more honourable ways, earn
the right to be maintained by the sweat of others’ brows— for instance,
those who stand at the head of the commonwealth; for by their laborious
exertion the former are enabled to enjoy the peace, the security, without
which they could not exist. The same holds good of those who have the
charge of spiritual matters....’288 ‘Because,’ says Aquinas, ‘many things
are necessary to human life, with which one man cannot provide him-
self, it is necessary that different things should be done by different
people; therefore some are tillers of the soil, some are raisers of cattle,
some are builders, and so on; and, because human life does not simply
mean corporal things, but still more spiritual things, therefore it is nec-
essary that some people should be released from the care of attending to
temporal matters. This distribution of different offices amongst differ-
ent people is in accordance with Divine providence.’289
All forms of labour being therefore admitted to be honourable and
necessary, there was no difficulty felt about justifying their reward. It
was always common ground that services of all kinds were entitled to be
properly remunerated, and questions of difficulty only arose when a
claim was made for payment in a transaction where the element of ser-
vice was not apparent.290 The different occupations in which men were
engaged were therefore ranked in a well-recognised hierarchy of dignity78/George O’Brien
according to the estimate to which they were held to be entitled. The
Aristotelean division of industry into artes possessivae and artes
pecuniativae was generally followed, the former being ranked higher
than the latter. ‘The industries called possessivae, which are immedi-
ately useful to the individual, to the family, and to society, producing
natural wealth, are also the most natural as well as the most estimable.
But all the others should not be despised. The natural arts are the true
economic arts, but the arts which produce artificial riches are also esti-
mable in so far as they serve the true national economy; the commuta-
tion of the exchanges and the cambium being necessary to the general
good, are good in so far as they are subordinate to the end of true economy.
One may say the same thing about commerce. In order, then, to estimate
the value of an industrial art, one must examine its relation to the gen-
eral good.’291 Even the artes possessivae were not all considered equally
worthy of praise, but were ranked in a curious order of professional
hierarchy. Agriculture was considered the highest, next manufacture,
and lastly commerce. Roscher says that, whereas all the scholastics were
agreed on the excellence of agriculture as an occupation, the best they
could say of manufacture was Deo non displicet, whereas of commerce
they said Deo placere non potest; and draws attention to the interesting
consequence of this, namely, that the various classes of goods that took
part in the different occupations were also ranked in a certain order of
sacredness. Immovables were thought more worthy of protection against
execution and distress than movables, and movables than money.292
Aquinas advises the rulers of States to encourage the artes possessivae,
especially agriculture.293 The fullest analysis of the order in which the
different artes possessivae should be ranked is to be found in Buridan’s
Commentaries on Aristotle’s Politics. He places first agriculture, which
comprises cattle-breeding, tillage, and hunting; secondly, manufacture,
which helps to supply man’s corporal needs, such as building and archi-
tecture; thirdly, administrative occupations; and lastly, commerce. The
Christian Exhortation, quoted by Janssen,294 says, ‘The farmer must in
all things be protected and encouraged, for all depend on his labour,
from the monarch to the humblest of mankind, and his handiwork is in
particular honourable and well pleasing to God.’
The division of occupations according to their dignity adopted by
Nicholas Oresme is somewhat unusual. He divides professions into (1)
honourable, or those which increase the actual quantity of goods in the
community or help its development, such as ecclesiastical offices, theAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/79
law, the soldiery, the peasantry, artisans, and merchants, and (2) de-
grading—such as campsores, mercatores monetae sen billonatores.295
No occupation, therefore, which involved labour, whether manual
or mental, gave any ground for difficulty with regard to its remunera-
tion. The business of the trader or merchant, on the other hand, was one
which called for some explanation. It is important to understand what
commerce was taken to mean. The definition which Aquinas gives was
accepted by all later writers: ‘A tradesman is one whose business con-
sists in the exchange of things. According to the philosopher, exchange
of things is twofold; one natural, as it were, and necessary, whereby one
commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a
commodity in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such trading, properly
speaking, does not belong to traders, but rather to housekeepers or civil
servants, who have to provide the household or the State with the neces-
saries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for
money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessi-
ties of life, but for profit; and this kind of trade, properly speaking,
regards traders.’ It is to be remarked in this definition, that it is essen-
tial, to constitute trade, that the exchange or sale should be for the sake
of profit, and this point is further emphasised in a later passage of the
same article: ‘Not every one that sells at a higher price than he bought is
a trader, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the
contrary, he buys, not for sale, but for possession, and afterwards for
some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction, even if he sell at
a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the
thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of
place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the
thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by hand. In
this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.’296 The importance of this
definition is that it rules out of the discussion all cases where the goods
have been in any way improved or rendered more valuable by the ser-
vices of the seller. Such improvement was always reckoned as the result
of labour of one kind or another, and therefore entitled to remuneration.
The essence of trade in the scholastic sense was selling the thing un-
changed at a higher price than that at which it had been bought, for the
sake of gain.297
The legitimacy of trade in this sense was only gradually admitted.
The Fathers of the Church had with one voice condemned trade as being
an occupation fraught with danger to the soul. Tertullian argued that80/George O’Brien
there would be no need of trade if there were no desire for gain, and that
there would be no desire for gain if man were not avaricious. Therefore
avarice was the necessary basis of all trade.298 St. Jerome thought that
one man’s gain in trading must always be another’s loss; and that, in
any event, trade was a dangerous occupation since it offered so many
temptations to fraud to the merchant.299 St. Augustine proclaimed all
trade evil because it turns men’s minds away from seeking true rest,
which is only to be found in God, and this opinion was embodied in the
Corpus Juris Canonici.300 This early view that all trade was to be indis-
criminately condemned could not in the nature of things survive experi-
ence, and a great step forward was taken when Leo the Great pronounced
that trade was neither good nor bad in itself, but was rendered good or
bad according as it was honestly or dishonestly carried on.301
The scholastics, in addition to condemning commerce on the au-
thority of the patristic texts, condemned it also on the Aristotelean ground
that it was a chrematistic art, and this consideration, as we have seen
above, enters into Aquinas’s article on the subject.302
The extension of commercial life which took place about the begin-
ning of the thirteenth century, raised acute controversies about the le-
gitimacy of commerce. Probably nothing did more to broaden the teach-
ing on this subject than the necessity of justifying trade which became
more and more insistent after the Crusades.303
By the time of Aquinas the necessity of commerce had come to be
fully realised, as appears from the passage in the De Regimine Principum:
‘There are two ways in which it is possible to increase the affluence of
any State. One, which is the more worthy way, is on account of the
fertility of the country producing an abundance of all things which are
necessary for human life, the other is through the employment of com-
merce, through which the necessaries of life are brought from different
places. The former method can be clearly shown to be the more desir-
able.... It is more admirable that a State should possess an abundance of
riches from its own soil than through commerce. For the State which
needs a number of merchants to maintain its subsistence is liable to be
injured in war through a shortage of food if communications are in any
way impeded. Moreover, the influx of strangers corrupts the morals of
many of the citizens... whereas, if the citizens themselves devote them-
selves to commerce, a door is opened to many vices. For when the desire
of merchants is inclined greatly to gain, cupidity is aroused in the hearts
of many citizens.... For the pursuit of a merchant is as contrary as pos-An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/81
sible to military exertion. For merchants abstain, from labours, and while
they enjoy the good things of life, they become soft in mind and their
bodies are rendered weak and unsuitable for military exercises.... It there-
fore behoves the perfect State to make a moderate use of commerce.’304
Aquinas, who, as we have seen, recognised the necessity of com-
merce, did not condemn all trade indiscriminately, as the Fathers had
done, but made the motive with which commerce was carried on the test
of its legitimacy: ‘Trade is justly deserving of blame, because, consid-
ered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit, and
tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain de-
basement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not
imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain, which is the end
of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or nec-
essary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue;
wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary
or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for in-
stance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire
by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the
needy; or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage—
for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life—and seek gain,
not as an end, but as payment for his labour.’305 This is important in
connection with what we have said above as to property, as it shows
that the trader was quite justified in seeking to obtain more profits, pro-
vided that they accrued for the benefit of the community. This justifica-
tion of trade according to the end for which it was carried on, was not
laid down for the first time by Aquinas, but may be found stated in an
English treatise of the tenth century entitled The Colloquy of Archbishop
Alfric, where, when a doctor asks a merchant if he wishes to sell his
goods for the same price for which he has bought them, the merchant
replies: ‘I do not wish to do so, because if I do so, how would I be
recompensed for my trouble? but I wish to sell them for more than I paid
for them so that I might secure some gain wherewith to support myself,
my wife, and family.’306
In spite of the fact that the earlier theory that no commercial gain
which did not represent payment for labour could be justified was still
maintained by some writers—for instance, Raymond de Pennafort307 —
the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas was generally accepted throughout
the later Middle Ages. Canonists and theologians accepted without hesi-
tation the justification of trade formulated by Aquinas.308 Henri de82/George O’Brien
Gand,309 Duns Scotus,310 and François de Mayronis311 unhesitatingly
accepted the view of Aquinas, and incorporated it in their works.312 ‘An
honourable merchant,’ says Trithemius, ‘who does not only think of
large profits, and who is guided in all his dealings by the laws of God
and man, and who gladly gives to the needy of his wealth and earnings,
deserves the same esteem as any other worker. But it is no easy matter to
be always honourable in all mercantile dealings and not to become usu-
rious. Without commerce no community can of course exist, but im-
moderate commerce is rather hurtful than beneficial, because it fosters
greed of gain and gold, and enervates and emasculates the nation through
love of pleasure and luxury.’313 Nider says that to buy not for use but for
sale at a higher price is called trade. Two special rules apply to this :
first, that it should be useful to the State, and second, that the price
should correspond to the diligence, prudence, and risk undertaken in the
transaction.314
The later writers in the fifteenth century seem to have regarded trade
more liberally even than Aquinas, although they quote his dictum on the
subject as the basis of their teaching. Instead of condemning all com-
merce as wrong unless it was justified by good motives, they were rather
inclined to treat commerce as being in itself colourless, but capable of
becoming evil by bad motives. Carletus says: ‘Commerce in itself is
neither bad nor illegal, but it may become bad on account of the circum-
stances and the motive with which it is undertaken, the persons who
undertake it, or the manner in which it is conducted. For instance, com-
merce undertaken through avarice or a desire for sloth is bad; so also is
commerce which is injurious to the republic, such as engrossing.’315
Endemann, having thoroughly studied all the fifteenth-century writers
on the subject, says that commerce might be rendered unjustifiable ei-
ther by subjective or objective reasons. Subjective illegality would arise
from the person trading—for instance, the clergy—or the motive with
which trade was undertaken; objective illegality on account of the ob-
ject traded in such as weapons in war-time, or the bodies of free men.316
Speculative trading, and what we to-day call profiteering, were forbid-
den in all circumstances.317
We need not dwell upon the prohibition of trading by the clergy,
because it was simply a rule of discipline which has not any bearing
upon general economic teaching, except in so far as it shows that com-
merce was considered an occupation dangerous to virtue. Aquinas puts
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themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil. This
happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which
clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so many vices,
since “a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips.”318 There is also
another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly
cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore
the Apostle says:319 “No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself
with secular business.” Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in
the first-mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the
necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.’320 The rule of St.
Benedict contains a strong admonition to those who may be entrusted
with the sale of any of the products of the monastery, to avoid all fraud
and avarice.321
On the whole, the attitude towards commerce seems to have grown
more liberal in the course of the Middle Ages. At first all commerce was
condemned as sinful; at a later period it was said to be justifiable pro-
vided it was influenced by good motives; while at a still later date the
method of treatment was rather to regard it as a colourless act in itself
which might be rendered harmful by the presence of bad motives. This
gradual broadening of the justification of commerce is probably a re-
flection of the necessities of the age, which witnessed a very great ex-
pansion of commerce, especially of foreign trade. In the earlier centu-
ries remuneration for undertaking risk was prohibited on the authority
of a passage in the Gregorian Decretals, but the later writers refused to
disallow it.322 The following passage from Dr. Cunningham’s Growth of
English Industry and Commerce correctly represents the attitude of the
Church towards commerce at the end of the Middle Ages: ‘The ecclesi-
astic who regarded the merchant as exposed to temptations in all his
dealings would not condemn him as sinful unless it were clear that a
transaction were entered on solely for greed, and hence it was the ten-
dency for moralists to draw additional distinctions, and refuse to pro-
nounce against business practices where common sense did not give the
benefit of the doubt.’323 We have seen that one motive which would
justify the carrying on of trade was the desire to support one’s self and
one’s family. Of course this motive was capable of bearing a very ex-
tended and elastic interpretation, and would justify increased commer-
cial profits according as the standard of life improved. The other motive
given by the theologians, namely, the benefit of the State, was also one
which was capable of a very wide construction. One must remember84/George O’Brien
that even the manual labourer was bound not to labour solely for avari-
cious gain, but also for the benefit of his fellow-men. ‘It is not only to
chastise our bodies,’ says Basil, ‘it is also by the love of our neighbour
that the labourer’s life is useful so that God may furnish through us our
weaker brethren’;324 and a fifteenth-century book on morality says: ‘Man
should labour for the honour of God. He should labour in order to gain
for himself and his family the necessaries of life and what will contrib-
ute to Christian joy, and moreover to assist the poor and the sick by his
labours. He who acting otherwise seeks only the pecuniary recompense of
his work does ill, and his labours are but usury. In the words of St. Augus-
tine, “thou shalt not commit usury with the work of thy hands, for thus wilt
thou lose thy soul.”’325 The necessity for altruism and regard for the needs
of one’s neighbour as well as of one’s self were therefore motives necessary
to justify labour as well as commerce; and it would be wrong to conclude
that the teaching of the scholastics on the necessity for a good motive to
justify trade operated to damp individual enterprise, or to discourage those
who were inclined to launch commercial undertakings, any more than the
insistence on the need for a similar motive in labourers was productive of
idleness. What the mediaeval teaching on commerce really amounted to
was that, while commerce was as legitimate as any other occupation, ow-
ing to the numerous temptations to avarice and dishonesty which it in-
volved, it must be carefully scrutinised and kept within due bounds. It was
more difficult to insure the observance of the just price in the case of a sale
by a merchant than in one by an artificer; and the power which the mer-
chant possessed of raising the price of the necessaries of life on the poor by
engrossing and speculation rendered him a person whose operations should
be carefully controlled.
Finally, it must be clearly understood that the attempt of some mod-
ern writers to base the mediaeval justification of commerce on an analy-
sis of all commercial gains as the payment for labour rests on a pro-
found misunderstanding. As we have already pointed out, Aquinas dis-
tinctly rules out of consideration in his treatment of commerce the case
where the goods have been improved in value by the exertions of the
merchant. When the element of labour entered into the transaction the
matter was clearly beyond doubt, and the lengthy discussion devoted to
the question of commerce by Aquinas and his followers shows that in
justifying commercial gains they were justifying a gain resting not on
the remuneration for the labour, but on an independent title.An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/85
§8. Cambium
There was one department of commerce, namely, cambium, or money-
changing, which, while it did not give any difficulty in theory, involved
certain difficulties in practice, owing to the fact that it was liable to be
used to disguise usurious transactions. Although cambium was, strictly
speaking, a special branch of commerce, it was nevertheless usually
treated in the works on usury, the reason being that many apparent con-
tracts of cambium were in fact veiled loans, and that it was therefore a
matter of importance in discussing usury to explain the tests by which
genuine and usurious exchanges could be distinguished. Endemann treats
this subject very fully and ably;326 but for the purpose of the present
essay it is not necessary to do more than to state the main conclusions at
which he arrives.
Although the practice of exchange grew up slowly and gradually
during the later Middle Ages, and, consequently, the amount of space
devoted to the discussion of the theory of exchange became larger as
time went on, nevertheless there is no serious difference of opinion be-
tween the writers of the thirteenth century, who treat the subject in a
fragmentary way, and those of the fifteenth, who deal with it exhaus-
tively and systematically. Aquinas does not mention cambium in the
Summa, but he recognises the necessity for some system of exchange in
the De Regimine Principum.327 All the later writers who mention cam-
bium are agreed in regarding it as a species of commerce to which the
ordinary rules regulating all commerce apply. Francis de Mayronis says
that the art of cambium is as natural as any other kind of commerce,
because of the diversity of the currencies in different kingdoms, and
approves of the campsor receiving some remuneration for his labour
and trouble.328 Nicholas de Ausmo, in his commentary on the Summa
Pisana, written in the beginning of the fifteenth century, says that the
campsor may receive a gain from his transactions, provided that they
are not conducted with the sole object of making a profit, and that the
gain he may receive must be limited by the common estimation of the
place and time. This is practically saying that cambium may be carried
on under the same conditions as any other species of commerce. Biel
says that cambium is only legitimate if the campsor has the motive of
keeping up a family or benefiting the State, and that the contract may
become usurious if the gain is not fair and moderate.329 The right of the
campsor to some remuneration for risk was only gradually admitted,
and forms the subject of much discussion amongst the jurists.330 This86/George O’Brien
hesitation in allowing remuneration for risk was not peculiar to cam-
bium, but, as we have seen above, was common to all commerce.
Endemann points out how the theologians and jurists unanimously in-
sisted that cambium could not be justified except when the just price
was observed, and that, when the doctrine attained its full development,
the element of labour was but one of the constituents in the estimation of
that price.331
All the writers who treated of exchange divided it into three kinds;
ordinary exchange of the moneys of different currencies (cambium
minutum), exchange of moneys of different currencies between different
places, the justification for which rested on remuneration for an imagi-
nary transport (cambium per litteras), and usurious exchange of mon-
eys of the same currency (cambium siccum). The former two species of
cambium were justifiable, whereas the last was condemned.332
The most complete treatise on the subject of money exchange is that
of Thomas da Vio, written in 1499. The author of this treatise divides
money-changing into three kinds, just, unjust, and doubtful. There were
three kinds of just change; cambium minutum, in which the campsor
was entitled to a reasonable remuneration for his labour; cambium per
litteras, in which the campsor was held entitled to a wage (merces) for
an imaginary transportation; and thirdly, when the campsor carried money
from one place to another, where it was of higher value. The unjust
change was when the contract was a usurious transaction veiled in the
guise of a genuine exchange. Under the doubtful changes, the author
discusses various special points which need not detain us here.
Thomas da Vio then goes on to discuss whether the justifiable ex-
change can be said to be a species of loan, and concludes that it can not,
because all that the campsor receives is an indemnity against loss and a
remuneration for his labour, trouble, outlay, and risk, which is always
justifiable. He then goes on to state the very important principle, that in
cambium money is not to be considered a measure of value, but a vend-
ible commodity,333 a distinction which Endemann thinks was productive
of very important results in the later teaching on the subject.334 The last
question treated in the treatise is the measure of the campsor’s profit,
and here the contract of exchange is shown to be on all fours with every
other contract, because the essential principle laid down for determining
its justice is the observance of the equivalence between both parties.335An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/87
Section 2. — The Sale of the Use of Money
§1. Usury in Greece and Rome
The prohibition of usury has always occupied such a large place in
histories of the Middle Ages, and particularly in discussions relating to
the attitude of the Church towards economic questions, that it is impor-
tant that its precise foundation and extent should be carefully studied.
The usury prohibition has been the centre of so many bitter controver-
sies, that it has almost become part of the stock-in-trade of the theologi-
cal mob orators. The attitude of the Church towards usury only takes a
slightly less prominent place than its attitude towards Galileo in the
utterances of those who are anxious to convict it of error. We have
referred to this current controversy, not in order that we might take a
part in it, but that, on the contrary, we might avoid it. It is no part of our
purpose in our treatment of this subject to discuss whether the usury
prohibition was or was not suitable to the conditions of the Middle Ages;
whether it did or did not impede industrial enterprise and commercial
expansion; or whether it was or was not universally disregarded and
evaded in real life. These are inquiries which, though full of interest,
would not be in place in a discussion of theory. All we are concerned to
do in the following pages is to indicate the grounds on which the prohi-
bition of usury rested, the precise extent of its application, and the con-
ceptions of economic theory which it indicated and involved.
We must remark in the first place that the prohibition of usury was
in no sense peculiar to the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, but, on
the contrary, was to be found in many other religious and legal sys-
tems—for instance, in the writings of the Greek and Roman philoso-
phers, amongst the Jews, and the followers of Mohammed. We shall
give a very brief account of the other prohibitions of usury before com-
ing to deal with the scholastic teaching on the subject.
We can find no trace of any legal prohibition of usury in ancient
Greece. Although Solon’s laws contained many provisions for the relief
of poor debtors, they did not forbid the taking of interest, nor did they
limit the rate of interest that might be taken.336 In Rome the Twelve
Tables fixed a maximum rate of interest, which was probably ten or
twelve per cent, per annum, but which cannot be determined with cer-
tainty owing to the doubtful signification of the expression ‘unciarum
foenus.’ The legal rate of interest was gradually reduced until the year
347 B.C., when five per cent, was fixed as a maximum. In 342 B.C.
interest was forbidden altogether by the Genucian Law; but this law,88/George O’Brien
though never repealed, was in practice quite inoperative owing to the
facility with which it could be evaded; and consequently the oppression
of borrowers was prevented by the enactment, or perhaps it would be
more correct to say the general recognition, of a maximum rate of inter-
est of twelve per cent, per annum. This maximum rate—the Centesima—
remained in operation until the time of Justinian.337 Justinian, who was
under the influence of Christian teaching, and who might therefore be
expected to have regarded usury with unfavourable eyes, fixed the fol-
lowing maximum rates of interest—maritime loans twelve per cent.;
loans to ordinary persons, not in business, six per cent.; loans to high
personages (illustres) and agriculturists, four per cent.338 While the tak-
ing of interest was thus approved or tolerated by Greek and Roman law,
it was at the same time reprobated by the philosophers of both coun-
tries. Plato objects to usury because it tends to set one class, the poor or
the borrowers, against another, the rich or the lenders; and goes so far
as to make it wrong for the borrower to repay either the principal or
interest of his debt. He further considers that the profession of the usu-
rer is to be despised, as it is an illiberal and debasing way of making
money.339 While Plato therefore, disapproves in no ambiguous words of
usury, he does not develop the philosophical bases of his objection, but
is content to condemn it rather for its probable ill effects than on ac-
count of its inherent injustice.
Aristotle condemns usury because it is the most extreme and dan-
gerous form of chrematistic acquisition, or the art of making money for
its own sake. As we have seen above, in discussing the legitimacy of
commerce, buying cheap and selling dear was one form of chrematistic
acquisition, which could only be justified by the presence of certain
motives; and usury, according to the philosopher, was a still more strik-
ing example of the same kind of acquisition, because it consisted in
making money from money, which was thus employed for a function
different from that for which it had been originally invented. ‘Usury is
most reasonably detested, as the increase of our fortune arises from the
money itself, and not by employing it for the purpose for which it was
intended. For it was devised for the sake of exchange, but usury multi-
plies it. And hence usury has received the name of {tÒkoj}, or produce;
for whatever is produced is itself like its parents; and usury is merely
money born of money; so that of all means of money-making it is the
most contrary to nature.’340 We need not pause here to discuss the pre-
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to us not so much of importance in themselves, as because they sug-
gested a basis for the treatment of usury to Aquinas and his followers.341
In Rome, as in Greece, the philosophers and moralists were unani-
mous in their condemnation of the practice of usury. Cicero condemns
usury as being hateful to mankind, and makes Cato say that it is on the
same level of moral obliquity as murder; and Seneca makes a point that
became of some importance in the Middle Ages, namely, that usury is
wrongful because it involves the selling of time.342 Plutarch develops
the argument that money is sterile, and condemns the practices of con-
temporary money-lenders as unjust.343 The teaching of the philosophers
as to the unlawfulness of usury was reflected in the popular feeling of
the time.344
§2. Usury in the Old Testament
The question of usury therefore attracted considerable attention in the
teaching and practice of pagan antiquity. It occupied an equally impor-
tant place in the Old Testament. In Exodus we find the first prohibition
of usury: ‘If thou lend money to any of my people being poor, thou shalt
not be to him as a creditor, neither shall ye lay upon him usury.’345 In
Leviticus we read: ‘And if thy brother be waxen poor, and his hand fail
with thee; then thou must uphold him; as a stranger and a sojourner
shall he live with thee. Take thou no money of him or increase, but fear
thy God that thy brother may live with thee. Thou shalt not give him thy
money upon usury, nor give him victuals for increase.’346 Deuteronomy
lays down a wider prohibition: ‘Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy
brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is lent
upon usury; unto a foreigner thou mayest lend upon usury, but unto thy
brother thou mayest not lend upon usury.’347 It will be noticed that the
first and second of these texts do not forbid usury except in the case of
loans to the poor, and, if we had them alone to consider, we could con-
clude that loans to the rich or to business men were allowed. The last
text, however, extends the prohibition to all loans to one’s brother—an
expression which was of importance in Christian times, as Christian
writers maintained the universal brotherhood of man.
It is unnecessary for us to discuss the underlying considerations
which prompted these ordinances. Dr. Cleary, who has studied the mat-
ter with great care, concludes that: ‘The legislator was urged mostly by
economic considerations.... The permission to extract usury from strang-
ers—a permission which later writers, such as Maimonides, regarded90/George O’Brien
as a command— clearly favours the view that the legislator was guided
by economic principles. It is more difficult to say whether he based his
legislation on the principle that usury is intrinsically unjust—that is to
say, unjust even when taken in moderation. There is really nothing in the
texts quoted to enable us to decide. The universality of the prohibition
when there is question solely of Jews goes to show that usury as such
was regarded as unjust; whilst its permission as between Jew and Gen-
tile favours the contradictory hypothesis.’348 Modern Jewish thought is
inclined to hold the view that these prohibitions were based upon the
assumption that usury was intrinsically unjust, but that the taking of
usury from the Gentiles was justified on the principle of compensation;
in other words, that Jews might exact usury from those who might exact
it from them.349 It is at least certain that usury was regarded by the
writers of the Old Testament as amongst the most terrible of sins.350
The general attitude of the Jews towards usury cannot be better
explained than by quoting Dr. Cleary’s final conclusion on the subject:
‘It appears therefore that in the Old Testament usury was universally
prohibited between Israelite and Israelite, whilst it was permitted be-
tween Israelite and Gentile. Furthermore, it seems impossible to decide
what was the nature of the obligations imposed—whether the prohibi-
tion supposed and ratified an already existing universal obligation, in
charity or justice, or merely imposed a new obligation in obedience,
binding the consciences of men for economic or political reasons. So,
too, it seems impossible to decide absolutely whether the decrees were
intended to possess eternal validity; the probabilities, however, seem to
favour very strongly the view that they were intended us mere economic
regulations suited to the circumstances of the time. This does not, of
course, decide the other question, whether, apart from such positive regu-
lations, there already existed an obligation arising from the natural law;
nor would the passing of the positive law into desuetude affect the exist-
ence of the other obligation.’351
Before we pass from the consideration of the Old Testament to that
of the New, we may mention that the taking of interest by Mohammed-
ans is forbidden in the Koran.352
§3. Usury in the First Twelve Centuries of Christianity.
The only passage in the Gospels which bears directly on the question of
usury is a verse of St. Luke, the correct reading of which is a matter of
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love your enemies, and do them good, and lend, never despairing (nihil
desperantes); and your reward shall be great.’ If this be the true reading
of the verse, it does not touch the question of usury at all, as it is simply
an exhortation to lend without worrying whether the debtor fail or not.354
The more generally received reading of this verse, however, is that adopted
by the Vulgate, ‘mutuum date, nihil hide sperantes’—’lend hoping for
nothing thereby.’ If this be the correct reading, the verse raises consider-
able difficulties of interpretation. It may simply mean, as Mastrofini
interprets it, that all human actions should be performed, not in the hope
of obtaining any material reward, but for the love of God and our
neighbour; or it may contain an actual precept or counsel relating to the
particular subject of loans. If the latter be the correct interpretation, the
further question arises whether the recommendation is to renounce merely
the interest of a loan or the principal as well. We need not here engage
on the details of the controversy thus aroused; it is sufficient to say that
it is the almost unanimous opinion of modern authorities that the verse
recommends the renunciation of the principal as well as the interest; and
that, if this interpretation is correct, the recommendation is not a pre-
cept, but a counsel.355 Aquinas thought that the verse was a counsel as
to the repayment of the principal, but a precept as to the payment of
interest, and this opinion is probably correct.356 With the exception of
this verse, there is not a single passage in the Gospels which prohibits
the taking of usury.
We must now give some account of the teaching on usury which
was laid down by the Fathers and early councils of the Church; but at
the same time we shall not attempt to treat this in an exhaustive way,
because, although the early Christian teaching is of interest in itself, it
exercised little or no influence upon the great philosophical treatment of
the same subject by Aquinas and his followers, which is the principal
subject to be discussed in these pages. The first thing we must remark is
that the prohibition of usury was not included by the Council of Jerusa-
lem amongst the ‘necessary things’ imposed upon converts from the
Gentiles.357 This would seem to show that the taking of usury was not
regarded as unlawful by the Apostles, who were at pains expressly to
forbid the commission of offences, the evil of which must have appeared
plainly from the natural law—for instance, fornication. The Didache,
which was used as a book of catechetical instruction for catechumens,
does not specifically mention usury; the forcing of the repayment of
loans from the poor who are unable to pay is strongly reprobated; but92/George O’Brien
this is not so in the case of the rich.358 Clement of Alexandria expressly
limits his disapprobation of usury to the case of loans between brothers,
whom he defines as ‘participators in the same word,’ i.e., fellow Chris-
tians; and in any evert it is clear that he regards it as sin against charity,
but not against justice.359
Tertullian is one of the first of the Fathers to lay down positively
that the taking of usury is sinful. He regards it as obviously wrong for
Christians to exact usury on their loans, and interprets the passage of
St. Luke, to which we have referred, as a precept against looking for
even the repayment of the principal.360 On the other hand, Cyprian, writing
in the same century, although he declaims eloquently and vigorously
against the usurious practices of the clergy, does not specifically ex-
press the opinion that the taking of usury is wrong in itself.361
Thus, during the first three centuries of Christianity, there does not
seem to have been, as far as we can now ascertain, any definite and
general doctrine laid down on the subject of usury. In the year 305 or
306 a very important step forward was taken, when the Council of Elvira
passed a decree against usury. This decree, as given by Ivo and Gratian,
seems only to have applied to usury on the part of the clergy, but as
given by Mansi it affected the clergy and laity alike. ‘Should any cleric
be found to have taken usury,’ the latter version runs, ‘let him be de-
graded and excommunicated. Moreover, if any layman shall be proved
a usurer, and shall have promised, when corrected, to abstain from the
practice, let him be pardoned. If, on the contrary, he perseveres in his
evil-doing, he is to be excommunicated.’362 Although the Council of
Elvira was but a provincial Council, its decrees are important, as they
provided a model for later legislation. Dr. Cleary thinks that Mansi’s
version of this decree is probably incorrect, and that, therefore, the Coun-
cil only forbade usury on the part of the clergy. In any event, with this
one possible and extremely doubtful exception, there was no conciliar
legislation affecting the practice of usury on the part of the laity until
the eighth century. Certain individual popes censured the taking of usury
by laymen, and the Council of Nice expressed the opinion that such a
practice was contrary to Christ’s teaching, but there is nowhere to be
found an imperative and definite prohibition of the taking of usury ex-
cept by the clergy.363
The inconclusive result of the Christian teaching up to the middle of
the fourth century is well summarised by Dr. Cleary: ‘Hitherto we have
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sign a reason for them other than that of positive legislation. Most of the
statements of these early patristic writers, as well as possibly all of the
early Christian legislative enactments, deal solely with the practice of
usury by the clergy; still, there is sufficient evidence to show that in
those days it was reprobated even for the Christian laity, for the Didache
and Tertullian clearly teach or presuppose its prohibition, while the
oecumenical Council of Nice certainly presupposed its illegality for the
laity, though it failed to sustain its doctrinal presuppositions with corre-
sponding ecclesiastical penalties. With the exception of some very vague
statements by Cyprian and Clement of Alexandria, we find no attempt
to state the nature of the resulting obligation—that is to say, we are not
told whether there is an obligation of obedience, of justice, or of charity.
The prohibition indeed seems to be regarded as universal; and it may
very well be contended that for the cases the Fathers consider it was in
fact universal—for the loans with which they are concerned, being ne-
cessitous, should be, in accordance with Christian charity, gratuitous—
even if speculatively usurious loans in general were not unjust.’364
The middle of the fourth century marked the opening of a new pe-
riod—’a period when oratorical denunciations are profuse, and when
consequently philosophical speculation, though fairly active, is of too
imaginative a character to be sufficiently definite.’365 St. Basil’s Homi-
lies on the Fourteenth Psalm contain a violent denunciation of usury,
the reasoning of which was repeated by St. Gregory of Nyssa366 and St.
Ambrose.367 These three Fathers draw a terrible picture of the state of
the poor debtor, who, harassed by his creditors, falls deeper and deeper
into despair, until he finally commits suicide, or has to sell his children
into slavery. Usury was therefore condemned by these Fathers as a sin
against charity; the passage from St. Luke was looked on merely as a
counsel in so far as it related to the repayment of the principal, but as a
precept so far as it related to usury; but the notion that usury was in its
very essence a sin against justice does not appear to have arisen. The
natural sterility of money is referred to, but not developed; and it is
suggested, though not categorically stated, that usury may be taken from
wealthy debtors.368
The other Fathers of the later period do not throw very much light
on the question of how usury was regarded by the early Church. St.
Hilary369 and Jerome370 still base their objection on the ground of its
being an offence against charity; and St. Augustine, though he would
like to make restitution of usury a duty, treats the matter from the same94/George O’Brien
point of view.371 On the other hand, there are to be found patristic utter-
ances in favour of the legality of usury, and episcopal approbations of
civil codes which permitted it.372 The civil law did not attempt to sup-
press usury, but simply to keep it within due bounds.373 The result of the
patristic teaching therefore was on the whole unsatisfactory and inconclu-
sive. ‘Whilst patristic opinion,’ says Dr. Cleary, ‘is very pronounced in
condemning usury, the condemnation is launched against it more be-
cause of its oppressiveness than for its intrinsic injustice. As Dr. Funk
has pointed out, one can scarcely cite a single patristic opinion which
can be said clearly to hold that usury is against justice, whilst there are,
on the contrary, certain undercurrents of thought in many writers, and
certain explicit statements in others, which tend to show that the Fathers
would not have been prepared to deal so harshly with usurers, did usu-
rers not treat their debtors so cruelly.... Of keen philosophical analysis
there is none.... On the whole, we find the teachings of the Fathers crude
and undeveloped.’ 374
The practical teaching with regard to the taking of usury made an
important advance in the eighth and ninth centuries, although the philo-
sophical analysis of the subject did not develop any more fully. A ca-
pitulary canon made in 789 decreed ‘that each and all are forbidden to
give anything on usury’; and a capitulary of 813 states that ‘not only
should the Christian clergy not demand usury, laymen should not.’ In
825 it was decreed that the counts were to assist the bishops in their
suppression of usury; and in 850 the Synod of Ticinum bound usurers
to restitution.375 The underlying principles of these enactments is as ob-
scure as their meaning is plain and definite. There is not a single trace of
the keen analysis with which Aquinas was later to illuminate and adorn
the subject.
§4. The Mediaeval Prohibition of Usury
The tenth and eleventh centuries saw no advance in the teaching on
usury. The twelfth century, however, ushered in a new era. ‘Before that
century controversy had been mostly confined to theologians, and treated
theologically, with reference to God and the Bible, and only rarely with
regard to economic considerations. After the twelfth century the discus-
sion was conducted on a gradually broadening economic basis—ap-
peals to the Fathers, canonists, philosophers, the jus divinum, the jus
naturale, the jus humanum, became the order of the day.’376 Before we
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which was inaugurated for all practical purposes by Aquinas, we must
briefly refer to the ecclesiastical legislation on the subject.
In 1139 the second Lateran Council issued a very strong declara-
tion against usurers. ‘We condemn that disgraceful and detestable ra-
pacity, condemned alike by human and divine law, by the Old and the
New Testaments, that insatiable rapacity of usurers, whom we hereby
cut off from all ecclesiastical consolation; and we order that no arch-
bishop, bishop, abbot, or cleric shall receive back usurers except with
the very greatest caution, but that, on the contrary, usurers are to be
regarded as infamous, and shall, if they do not repent, be deprived of
Christian burial.’377 It might be argued that this decree was aimed against
immoderate or habitual usury, and not against usury in general, but all
doubt as regards the attitude of the Church was set at rest by a decree of
the Lateran Council of 1179. This decree runs : ‘Since almost in every
place the crime of usury has become so prevalent that many people give
up all other business and become usurers, as if it were lawful, regarding
not its prohibition in both Testaments, we ordain that manifest usurers
shall not be admitted to communion, nor, if they die in their sins, be
admitted to Christian burial, and that no priest shall accept their alms.’378
Meanwhile, Alexander III, having given much attention to the subject of
usury, had come to the conclusion that it was a sin against justice. This
recognition of the essential injustice of usury marked a turning-point in
the history of the treatment of the subject; and Alexander III seems
entitled to be designated the ‘pioneer of its scientific study.’379 Innocent
III followed Alexander in the opinion that usury was unjust in itself, and
from his time forward there was but little further disagreement upon the
matter amongst the theologians.380
In 1274 Gregory X, in the Council of Lyons, ordained that no com-
munity, corporation, or individual should permit foreign usurers to hire
houses, but that they should expel them from their territory; and the
disobedient, if prelates, were to have their lands put under interdict,
and, if laymen, to be visited by their ordinary with ecclesiastical cen-
sures.381 By a further canon he ordained that the wills of usurers who
did not make restitution should be invalid.382 This brought usury defi-
nitely within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.383 In 1311 the
Council of Vienne declared all secular legislation in favour of usury null
and void, and branded as heresy the belief that usury was not sinful.384
The precise extent and interpretation of this decree have given rise to a
considerable amount of discussion,385 which need not detain us here,96/George O’Brien
because by that time the whole question of usury had come under the
treatment of the great scholastic writers, whose teaching is more par-
ticularly the subject matter of the present essay.
Even as late as the first half of the thirteenth century there was no
serious discussion of usury by the theologians. William of Paris,
Alexander of Hales, and Albertus Magnus simply pronounced it sinful
on account of the texts in the Old and New Testaments, which we have
quoted above.386 It was Aquinas who really put the teaching on usury
upon the new foundation, which was destined to support it for so many
hundred years, and which even at the present day appeals to many sym-
pathetic and impartial inquirers. Mr. Lecky apologises for the obscurity
of his account of the argument of Aquinas, but adds that the confusion
is chiefly the fault of the latter;387 but the fact that Mr. Lecky failed to
grasp the meaning of the argument should not lead one to conclude that
the argument itself was either confused or illogical. The fact that it for
centuries remained the basis of the Catholic teaching on the subject is a
sufficient proof that its inherent absurdity did not appear apparent to
many students at least as gifted as Mr. Lecky. We shall quote the article
of Aquinas at some length, because it was universally accepted by all
the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with whose
opinions we are concerned in this essay. To quote later writings is sim-
ply to repeat in different words the conclusions at which Aquinas ar-
rived.388
In answer to the question ‘whether it is a sin to take usury for money
lent,’ Aquinas replies: ‘To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself,
because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to
inequality, which is contrary to justice.
‘In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are cer-
tain things the use of which consists in their consumption; thus we con-
sume wine when we use it for drink, and we consume wheat when we
use it for food. Wherefore in such-like things the use of the thing must
not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the
use of the thing is granted the thing itself; and for this reason to lend
things of this kind is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly, if a man
wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be
selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist,
wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like manner
he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double
payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, theAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/97
price of the use, which is called usury.
‘On the other hand, there are other things the use of which does not
consist in their consumption; thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to
destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted; for instance,
one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house, while
reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or, vice versa, he may grant
the use of a house while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man
may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this,
revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use,
as happens in renting and letting a house.
‘But money, according to the philosopher,389 was invented chiefly
for the purpose of exchange; and consequently the proper and principal
use of money is its consumption or alienation, whereby it is sunk in
exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for
the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury; and, just as a
man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so he is bound to restore
the money which he has taken in usury.’390
The essential thing to notice in this explanation is that the contract
of mutuum is shown to be a sale. The distinction between things which
are consumed in use (res fungibiles), and which are not consumed in
use (res non fungibiles) was familiar to the civil lawyers; but what they
had never perceived was precisely what Aquinas perceived, namely, that
the loan of a fungible thing was in fact not a loan at all, but a sale, for
the simple reason that the ownership in the thing passed. Once the trans-
action had been shown to be a sale, the principle of justice to be applied
to it became obvious. As we have seen above, in treating of sales, the
essential basis of justice in exchange was the observance of aequalitas
between buyer and seller—in other words, the fixing of a just price. The
contract of mutuum, however, was nothing else than a sale of fungibles,
and therefore the just price in such a contract was the return of fungibles
of the same value as those lent. If the particular fungible sold happened
to be money, the estimation of the just price was a simple matter—it
was the return of an amount of money of equal value. As money hap-
pened to be the universal measure of value, this simply meant the return
of the same amount of money. Those who maintained that something
additional might be claimed for the use of the money lost sight of the
fact that the money was incapable of being used apart from its being
consumed.391 To ask for payment for the sale of a thing which not only
did not exist, but which was quite incapable of existence, was clearly to98/George O’Brien
ask for something for nothing—which obviously offended against the
first principles of commutative justice. ‘ He that is not bound to lend,’
says Aquinas in another part of the same article, ‘may accept repayment
for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid
according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent, where-
fore, if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use
but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something
non-existent, and so his exaction is unjust.’392 And in the next article the
principle that mutuum is a sale appears equally clearly: ‘Money cannot
be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid
back.’393
The difficulty which moderns find in understanding this teaching, is
that it is said to be based on the sterility of money. A moment’s thought,
however, will convince us that money is in fact sterile until labour has
been applied to it. In this sense money differs in its essence from a cow
or a tree. A cow will produce calves, or a tree will produce fruit without
the application of any exertion by its owner; but, whatever profit is
derived from money, is derived from the use to which it is put by the
person who owns it. This is all that the scholastics meant by the sterility
of money. They never thought of denying that money, when properly
used, was capable of bringing its employer a profit; but they emphati-
cally asserted that the profit was due to the labour, and not to the money.
Antoninus of Florence clearly realised this: ‘Money is not profit-
able of itself alone, nor can it multiply itself, but it may become profit-
able through its employment by merchants’;394 and Bernardine of Si-
enna says: ‘Money has not simply the character of money, but it has
beyond this a productive character, which we commonly call capital.’395
‘What is money,’ says Brants, ‘if it is not a means of exchange, of
which the employment and preservation will give a profit, if he who
possesses it is prudent, active, and intelligent? If this money is well
employed, it will become a capital, and one may derive a profit from it;
but this profit arises from the activity of him who uses it, and conse-
quently this profit belongs to him—it is the fruit, the remuneration of
his labour.... Did they (the scholastics) say that it was impossible to
draw a profit from a sum of money? No; they admitted fully that one
might de pecunia lucrari; but this lucrum does not come from the pecu-
nia, but from the application of labour to the sum.’396
Therefore, if the borrower did not derive any profit from the loan,
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loan was the return of the amount lent; if, on the contrary, the borrower
had made a profit from it, it was the reward of his labour, and not the
fruit of the loan itself. To repay more than the sum lent would therefore
be to make a payment to one person for the labour of another.397 The
exaction of usury was therefore the exploitation of another man’s exer-
tion.398
It is interesting to notice how closely the rules applying in the case
of sales were applied to usury. The raising of the price of a loan on
account of some special benefit derived from it by the borrower is pre-
cisely analogous to raising the sale price of an object because it is of
some special individual utility to the buyer. On the other hand, as we
shall see further down, any special damage suffered by the lender was a
sufficient reason for exacting something over and above the amount
lent; this was precisely the rule that applied in the case of sales, when
the seller suffered any special damage from parting with the object sold.
Thus the analogy between sales and loans was complete at every point.
In both, equality of sacrifice was the test of justice.
Nor could it be suggested that the delay in the repayment of the loan
was a reason for increasing the amount to be repaid, because this really
amounted to a sale of time, which, of its nature, could not be owned.399
The scholastic teaching, then, on the subject was quite plain and
unambiguous. Usury, or the payment of a price for the use of a sum lent
in addition to the repayment of the sum itself, was in all cases prohib-
ited. The fact that the payment demanded was moderate was irrelevant;
there could be no question of the reasonableness of the amount of an
essentially unjust payment.400 Nor was the payment of usury rendered
just because the loan was for a productive purpose—in other words, a
commercial loan. Certain writers have maintained that in this case usury
was tolerated;401 but they can easily be refuted. As we have seen above,
mutuum was essentially a sale, and, therefore, no additional price could
be charged because of some special individual advantage enjoyed by the
buyer (or borrower). It was quite impossible to distinguish, according
to the scholastic teaching, between taking an additional payment be-
cause the lender made a profit by using the loan wisely, and taking it
because the borrower was in great distress, and therefore derived a greater
advantage from the loan than a person in easier circumstances. The
erroneous notion that loans for productive purposes were entitled to any
special treatment was finally dispelled in 1745 by an encyclical of
Benedict XIV.402100/George O’Brien
§5. Extrinsic Titles
Usury, therefore, was prohibited in all cases. Many people at the present
day think that the prohibition of usury was the same thing as the prohi-
bition of interest. There could not be a greater mistake. While usury was
in all circumstances condemned, interest was in every case allowed. The
justification of interest rested on precisely the same ground as the prohi-
bition of usury, namely, the observance of the equality of commutative
justice. It was unjust that a greater price should be paid for the loan of a
sum of money than the amount lent; but it was no less unjust that the
lender should find himself in a worse position because of his having
made the loan. In other words, the consideration for the loan could not
be increased because of any special benefit which it conferred on the
borrower, but it could be increased on account of any special damage
suffered by the lender—precisely the same rule as we have seen applied
in the case of sales.  The borrower must, in addition to the repayment of
the loan, indemnify the lender for any damage he had suffered. The
measure of the damage was the difference between the lender’s condi-
tion before the loan was made and after it had been repaid—in other
words, he was entitled to compensation for the difference in his condi-
tion occasioned by the transaction—id quod interest.
Before we discuss interest properly so called, we must say a word
about another analogous but not identical title of compensation, namely,
the poena conventionalis. It was a very general practice, about the le-
gitimacy of which the scholastics do not seem to have had any doubt, to
attach to the original contract of loan an agreement that a penalty should
be paid in case of default in the repayment of the loan at the stipulated
time.403 The justice of the poena conventionalis was recognised by
Alexander of Hales,404 and by Duns Scotus, who gives a typical form of
the stipulation as follows: ‘I have need of my money for commerce, but
shall lend it to you till a certain day on the condition that, if you do not
repay it on that day, you shall pay me afterwards a certain sum in addi-
tion, since I shall suffer much injury through your delay.’405 The poena
conventionalis must not be confused with either of the titles damnum
emergens or lucrum cessans, which we are about to discuss; it was
distinguished from the former by being based upon a presumed injury,
whereas the injury in damnum emergens must be proved; and for the
latter because the damage must be presumed to have occurred after the
expiration of the loan period, whereas in lucrum cessans the damage
was presumed to have occurred during the currency of the loan period.An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/101
The important thing to remember is that these titles were really dis-
tinct.406 The essentials of a poena conventionalis were, stipulation from
the first day of the loan, presumption of damage, and attachment to a
loan which was itself gratuitous.407 The Summa Astesana, clearly main-
tained the distinction between the two titles of compensation,408 as also
did the Summa Angelica.409
The first thing to be noted on passing from the poena conventionalis
to interest proper is that the latter ground of compensation was gener-
ally divided into two kinds, damnum emergens and lucrum cessans.
The former included all cases where the lender had incurred an actual
loss by reason of his having made the loan; whereas the latter included
all cases where the lender, by parting with his money, had lost the op-
portunity of making a profit. This distinction was made at least as early
as the middle of the thirteenth century, and was always adopted by later
writers.410
The title damnum emergens never presented any serious difficulty.
It was recognised by Albertus Magnus,411 and laid down so clearly by
Aquinas that it was not afterwards questioned: ‘A lender may without
sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss
he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of
money, but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids
a greater loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay
the lender with what he has gained.’412 The usual example given to illus-
trate how damnum emergens might arise, was the case of the lender
being obliged, on account of the failure of the borrower, to borrow money
himself at usury.413
Closely allied to the title of damnum emergens was that of lucrum
cessans. According to some writers, the latter was the only true interest.
Dr. Cleary quotes some thirteenth-century documents in which a clear
distinction is made between damnum and interesse;414 and it seems to
have been the common custom in Germany at a later date to distinguish
between interesse and schaden.415 Although the division between these
two titles was very indefinite, they did not meet recognition with equal
readiness; the title damnum emergens was universally admitted by all
authorities; while that of lucrum cessans was but gradually admitted,
and hedged round with many limitations.416
The first clear recognition of the title lucrum cessans occurs in a
letter from Alexander III, written in 1176, and addressed to the Arch-
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people buy pepper and cinnamon and other wares, at the time worth not
more than five pounds, promising those from whom they received them
six pounds at an appointed time. Though contracts of this kind and
under such a form cannot strictly be called usurious, yet, nevertheless,
the vendors incur guilt, unless they are really doubtful whether the wares
might be worth more or less at the time of payment. Your citizens will
do well for their own salvation to cease from such contracts.’417 As Dr.
Cleary points out, the trader is held by this decision to be entitled to a
recompense on account of a probable loss of profit, and the decision
consequently amounts to a recognition of the title lucrum cessans.418
The title is also recognised by Scotus and Hostiensis.419
The attitude of Aquinas to the admission of lucrum cessans is ob-
scure. In the article on usury he expressly states that ‘the lender cannot
enter an agreement for compensation through the fact that he makes no
profit out of his money, because he must not sell that which he has not
yet, and may be prevented in many ways from having.’420 Two com-
ments must be made on this passage; first, that it only refers to making
a stipulation in advance for compensation for profit lost, and does not
condemn the actual payment of compensation;421 second, that the point
is made that the probability of gaining a profit on money is so problem-
atical as to make it unsaleable. As Ashley points out, the latter consid-
eration was peculiarly important at the time when the Summa was com-
posed; and, when in the course of the following two centuries the oppor-
tunities for reasonably safe and profitable business investments increased,
the great theologians conceived that they were following the real thought
of Aquinas by giving to this explanation a pure contemporanea expositio.
The argument in favour of this construction is strengthened by a refer-
ence to the article of the Summa dealing with restitution,422 where it is
pointed out that a man may suffer in two ways—first, by being deprived
of what he actually has, and, second, by being prevented from obtaining
what he was on his way to obtain. In the former case an equivalent must
always be restored, but in the latter it is not necessary to make good an
equivalent, ‘because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it
actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely
virtually or potentially, and so, were he to be indemnified by receiving
the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him,
but more, and this is not necessary for salvation. However, he is bound
to make some compensation according to the condition of persons and
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the profit not actually, but only virtually; and it may be hindered in
many ways.’423 It seems quite clear from these passages that Aquinas
admitted the right to compensation for a profit which the lender was
hindered from making on account of the loan; but that, in the circum-
stances of the time, the probability of making such a profit was so re-
mote that it could not be made the basis of pecuniary compensation. The
probability of there being a lucrum cessans was thought small, but the
justice of its reward, if it did in fact exist, was admitted.
This interpretation steadily gained ground amongst succeeding writ-
ers; so that, in spite of some lingering opposition, the justice of the title
lucrum cessans was practically universally admitted by the theologians
of the fifteenth century.424
Of course the burden of proving that an opportunity for profitable
investment had been really lost was on the lender, but this onus was
sufficiently discharged if the probability of such a loss were established.
In the fifteenth century, with the expansion of commerce, it came to be
generally recognised that such a probability could be presumed in the
case of the merchant or trader.425 The final condition of this develop-
ment of the teaching on lucrum cessans is thus stated by Ashley:426
‘Any merchant, or indeed any person in a trading centre where there
were opportunities of business investment (outside money-lending it-
self) could, with a perfectly clear conscience, and without any fear of
molestation, contract to receive periodical interest from the person to
whom he lent money; provided only that he first lent it to him gratu-
itously, for a period that might be made very short, so that technically
the payment would not be reward for the use, but compensation for the
non-return of the money.’ At a later period than that of which we are
treating in the present essay the short gratuitous period could be dis-
pensed with, but until the end of the fifteenth century it seems to have
been considered essential.427
Of course the amount paid in respect of lucrum cessans must be
reasonable in regard to the loss of opportunity actually experienced;
‘Lenders,’ says Buridan, ‘must not take by way of lucrum cessans more
than they would have actually made by commerce or in exchange’;428
and Ambrosius de Vignate explains that compensation must only be
made for ‘ the time and just interesse of the lost gain, which must be
certain and proximate.’429
There was another title on account of which more than the amount
of the loan could be recovered, namely, periculum sortis. In one sense it104/George O’Brien
was a contradiction in terms to speak of the element of risk in connec-
tion with usury, because from its very definition usury was gain without
risk as opposed to profit from a trading partnership, which, as we shall
see presently, consisted of gain coupled with the risk of loss. It could not
be lost sight of, however, that in fact there might be a risk of the loan not
being repaid through the insolvency of the borrower, or some other cause,
and the question arose whether the lender could justly claim any com-
pensation for the undertaking of this risk. ‘Regarded as an extrinsic
title, risk of losing the principal is connected with the contract of mut-
uum, and entitles the lender to some compensation for running the risk
of losing his capital in order to oblige a possibly insolvent debtor. The
greater the danger of insolvency, the greater naturally would be the charge.
The contract was indifferent to the object of the loan; it mattered not
whether it was intended for commerce or consumption; it was no less
indifferent to profit on the part of the borrower; it took account simply
of the latter’s ability to pay, and made its charge accordingly. It re-
sembled consequently the contracts made by insurance companies,
wherein there is a readiness to risk the capital sum for a certain rate of
payment; the only difference was that the probabilities charged for were
not so much the likelihood of having to pay, as the likelihood of not
receiving back.’430
We have referred above, when dealing with the legitimacy of com-
mercial profits, to the difficulty which was felt in admitting the justice
of compensation for risk, on account of the Gregorian Decretal on the
subject. The same decree gave rise to the same difficulty in connection
with the justification of a recompense for periculum sortis. There was a
serious dispute about the actual wording of the decree, and even those
who agreed as to its wording differed as to its interpretation.431 The
justice of the title was, however, admitted by Scotus, who said that it
was lawful to stipulate for recompense when both the principal and
surplus were in danger of being lost;432 by Carletus;433 and by Nider.434
The question, however, was still hotly disputed at the end of the fif-
teenth century, and was finally settled in favour of the admission of the
title as late as 1645.435
§6. Other Cases in which more than the Loan could be repaid
We have now discussed the extrinsic titles— poena conventionalis,
damnum emergens, lucrum cessans, and periculum sortis. There were
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extrinsic titles, on which more than the amount of the loan might be
justly returned to the lender. In the first place, the lender might justly
receive anything that the borrower chose to pay over and above the
loan, voluntarily as a token of gratitude. ‘Repayment for a favour may
be done in two ways,’ says Aquinas. ‘In one way, as a debt of justice;
and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed contract; and its
amount is measured according to the favour received. Wherefore the
borrower of money, or any such thing the use of which is its consump-
tion, is not bound to repay more than he received in loan; and conse-
quently it is against justice if he is obliged to pay back more. In another
way a man’s obligation to repayment for favour received is based on a
debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the feel-
ing with which the favour was conferred than on the question of the
favour itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involv-
ing a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of
such a repayment.’436
It was also clearly understood that it was not wrongful to borrow at
usury under certain conditions. In such cases the lender might commit
usury in receiving, but the borrower would not commit usury in paying
an amount greater than the sum lent. It was necessary, however, in order
that borrowing at usury might be justified, that the borrower should be
animated by some good motive, such as the relief of his own or another’s
need. The whole question was settled once and for all by Aquinas: ‘It is
by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use
of another’s sin for a good end, since even God uses all sin for some
good, since He draws some good from every evil.... Accordingly it is by
no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury; yet
it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so, and is
a usurer by profession, provided that the borrower have a good end in
view, such as the relief of his own or another’s need.... He who borrows
for usury does not consent to the usurer’s sin, but makes use of it. Nor
is it the usurer’s acceptance of usury that pleases him, but his lending,
which is good.’437
We should mention here the montes pietatis, which occupied a promi-
nent place among the credit-giving agencies of the later Middle Ages,
although it is difficult to say whether their methods were examples of or
exceptions to the doctrines forbidding usury. These institutions were
formed on the model of the monies profani, the system of public debt
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century,438 the Italian States had recourse to forced loans in order to
raise reserves for extraordinary necessities, and, in order to prevent the
growth of disaffection among the citizens, an annual percentage on such
loans was paid. A fund raised by such means was generally called a
mons or heap. The propriety of the payment of this percentage was
warmly contested during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries—the
Dominicans and Franciscans defending it, and the Augustinians attack-
ing it. But its justification was not difficult. In the first place, the loans
were generally, if not universally, forced, and therefore the payment of
interest on them was purely voluntary. As we have seen, Aquinas was
quite clear as to the lawfulness of such a voluntary payment. In the
second place, the lenders were almost invariably members of the trading
community, who were the very people in whose favour a recompense
for lucrum cessans would be allowed.439 Laurentius de Rodulphis ar-
gued in favour of the justice of these State loans, and contended that the
bondholders were entitled to sell their rights, but advised good Chris-
tians to abstain from the practice of a right about the justice of which
theologians were in such disagreement;440 and Antoninus of Florence,
who was in general so strict on the subject of usury, took the same
view.441
It was probably the example of these State loans, or montes profani,
that suggested to the Franciscans the possibility of creating an
organisation to provide credit facilities for poor borrowers, which was
in many ways analogous to the modern co-operative credit banks. Prior
to the middle of the fifteenth century, when this experiment was initi-
ated, there had been various attempts by the State to provide credit
facilities for the poor, but these need not detain us here, as they did not
come to anything.442 The first of the mantes pietatis was founded at
Orvieto by the Franciscans in 1462, and after that year they spread
rapidly.443 The montes, although their aim was exclusively philanthropic,
found themselves obliged to make a small charge to defray their work-
ing expenses, and, although one would think that this could be amply
justified by the title of damnum emergens, it provoked a violent attack
by the Dominicans. The principal antagonist of the montes pietatis was
Thomas da Vio, who wrote a special treatise on the subject, in which he
made the point that the mantes charged interest from the very beginning
of the loan, which was a contradiction of all the previous teaching on
interest.444
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montes. It was felt that, if the poor must borrow, it was better that they
should borrow at a low rate of interest from philanthropic institutions
than at an extortionate rate from usurers; several montes were estab-
lished under the direct protection of the Popes;445 and finally, in 1515,
the Lateran Council gave an authoritative judgment in favour of the
montes. This decree contains an excellent definition of usury as it had
come to be accepted at that date: ‘Usury is when gain is sought to be
acquired from the use of a thing, not fruitful in itself, without labour,
expense, or risk on the part of the lender.’446
It was generally admitted by the theologians that the taking of usury
might be permitted by the civil authorities, although it was insisted that
acting in accordance with this permission did not absolve the conscience
of the usurer. Albertus Magnus conceded that ‘ although usury is con-
trary to the perfection of Christian laws, it is at least not contrary to
civil interests’;447 and Aquinas also justified the toleration of usury by
the State: ‘Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of
the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of
many advantages if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments
appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that
it looks upon usury as harmonising with justice, but lest the advantage
of many should be hindered.’448 Although this opinion was controverted
by
Ægeidius Romanus,449 it was generally accepted by later writers.
Thus Gerson says that ‘ the civil law, when it tolerates usury in some
cases, must not be said to be always contrary to the law of God or the
Church. The civil legislator, acting in the manner of a wise doctor, tol-
erates lesser evils that greater ones may be avoided. It is obviously less
of an evil that slight usury should be permitted for the relief of want,
than that men should be driven by their want to rob or steal, or to sell
their goods at an unfairly low price.’450 Buridan explains that the atti-
tude of the State towards usury must never be more than one of tolera-
tion; it must not actively approve of usury, but it may tacitly refuse to
punish it.451
§7. The Justice of Unearned Income
Many modern socialists—’Christian’ and otherwise—have asserted that
the teaching of the Church on usury was a pronouncement in favour of
the unproductivity of capital.452 Thus Rudolf Meyer, one of the most
distinguished of ‘Christian socialists,’ has argued that if one recognises108/George O’Brien
the productivity of land or stock, one must also recognise the productiv-
ity of money, and that therefore the Church, in denying the productivity
of the latter, would be logically driven to deny the productivity of the
former.453 Anton Menger expresses the same opinion: ‘There is not the
least reason for attacking from the moral and religious standpoints loans
at interest and usury more than any other form of unearned income. If
one questions the legitimacy of loans at interest, one must equally con-
demn as inadmissible the other forms of profit from capital and lands,
and particularly the feudal institutions of the Middle Ages.... It would
have been but a logical consequence for the Church to have condemned
all forms of unearned revenue.’454
No such conclusion, however, can be properly drawn from the me-
diaeval teaching. The whole discussion on usury turned on the distinc-
tion which was drawn between things of which the use could be trans-
ferred without the ownership, and things of which the use could not be
so transferred. In the former category were placed all things which could
be used, either by way of enjoyment or employment for productive pur-
poses, without being destroyed in the process; and in the latter all things
of which the use or employment involved the destruction.
With regard to income derived from the former, no difficulty was
ever felt; a farm or a house might be let at a rent without any question,
the return received being universally regarded as one of the legitimate
fruits of the ownership of the thing. With regard to the latter, however, a
difficulty did arise, because it was felt that a so-called loan of such
goods was, when analysed, in reality a sale, and that therefore any in-
crease which the goods produced was in reality the property, not of the
lender, but of the borrower. That money was in all cases sterile was
never suggested; on the contrary, it was admitted that it might produce a
profit if wisely and prudently employed in industry or commerce; but it
was felt that such an increase, when it took place, was the rightful prop-
erty of the owner of the money. But when money was lent, the owner of
this money was the borrower, and therefore, when money which was
lent was employed in such a way as to produce a profit, that profit
belonged to the borrower, not the lender. In this way the schoolmen were
strictly logical; they fully admitted that wealth could produce wealth;
but they insisted that that additional wealth should accrue to the owner
of the wealth that produced it. The fact is, as Bohm-Bawerk has pointed
out, that the question of the productivity of capital was never discussed
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ous. The justice of receiving an income from an infungible thing which
was temporarily lent by its owner, was discussed and supported; but the
justice of the owner of such a thing receiving an income from the thing
so long as it remained in his own possession was never discussed, be-
cause it was universally admitted.455 It is perfectly correct to say that
the problems which have perplexed modern writers as to the justice of
receiving an unearned income from one’s property never occurred to the
scholastics; such problems can only arise when the institution of private
property comes to be questioned; and private property was the keystone
of the whole scholastic economic conception. In other words, the justice
of a reward for capital was admitted because it was unquestioned.
The question that caused difficulty was whether money could be
considered a form of capital. At the present day, when the opportunities
of industrial investment are wider than they ever were before, the prin-
cipal use to which money is put is the financing of industrial enter-
prises; but in the Middle Ages this was not the case, precisely because
the opportunities of profitable investment were so few. This is the rea-
son why the mediaeval writers did not find it necessary to discuss in
detail the rights of the owner of money who used it for productive pur-
poses. But of the justice of a profit being reaped when money was actu-
ally so employed there was no doubt at all. As we have seen, the bor-
rower of a sum of money might reap a profit from its wise employment;
there was no question about the justice of taking such a profit; and the
only matter in dispute was whether that profit should belong to the bor-
rower or the lender of the money. This dispute was decided in favour of
the borrowed on the ground that, according to the true nature of the
contract of mutuum, the money was his property. It was, therefore, never
doubted that even money might produce a profit for its owner. The only
difference between infungible goods and money was that, in the case of
the former, the use might be transferred apart from the property, whereas,
in the case of the latter, it could not be so transferred.
The recognition of the title lucrum cessans as a ground for remu-
neration clearly implies the recognition of the legitimacy of the owner of
money deriving a profit from its use; and the slowness of the scholastics
to admit this title was precisely because of the rarity of opportunities for
so employing money in the earlier Middle Ages. The nature of capital
was clearly understood; but the possibility of money constituting capi-
tal arose only with the extension of commerce and the growth of profit-
able investments. Those scholastics who strove to abolish or to limit the110/George O’Brien
recognition of lucrum cessans as a ground for remuneration did not
deny the productivity of capital, but simply thought the money had not
at that time acquired the characteristics of capital.456
If there were any doubt about the fact that the scholastics recognised
the legitimacy of unearned income, it would be dispelled by an under-
standing of their teaching on rents and partnership, in the former of
which they distinctly acknowledged the right to draw an unearned in-
come from one’s land, and in the latter of which they acknowledged the
same right in regard to one’s money.457
§8. Rent Charges
There was never any difficulty about admitting the justice of receiving a
rent from a tenant in occupation of one’s lands, because land was under-
stood to be essentially a thing of which the use could be sold apart from
the ownership; and it was also recognised that the recipient of such a
rent might sell his right to a third party, who could then demand the rent
from the tenant. When this was admitted it was but a small step to admit
the right of the owner of land to create a rent in favour of another person
in consideration for some payment. The distinctions between a census
reservations, or a rent established when the possession of land was ac-
tually transferred to a tenant, and a census constitutivus, or a rent cre-
ated upon property remaining in the possession of the payer, did not
become the subject of discussion or difficulty until the sixteenth cen-
tury.458 The legitimacy of rent charges does not seem to have been ques-
tioned by the theologians; the best proof of this being the absence of
controversy about them in a period when they were undoubtedly very
common, especially in Germany.459 Langenstein, whose opinion on the
subject was followed by many later writers,460 thought that the receipt
of income from rent charges was perfectly justifiable, when the object
was to secure a provision for old age, or to provide an income for per-
sons engaged in the services of Church or State, but that it was unjusti-
fiable if it was intended to enable nobles to live in luxurious idleness, or
plebeians to desert honest toil. It is obvious that Langenstein did not
regard rent charges as wrongful in themselves, but simply as being the
possible occasions of wrong.461
In the fifteenth century definite pronouncements on rent charges
were made by the Popes. A large part of the revenue of ecclesiastical
bodies consisted of rent charges, and in 1425 several persons in the
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the ground that they were usurious. The question was referred to Pope
Martin V, whose bull deciding the matter was generally followed by all
subsequent authorities. The bull decides in favour of the lawfulness of
rent charges, provided certain conditions were observed. They must be
charged on fixed property (‘super bonis suis, dominiis, oppidis, terris,
agris, praediis, domibus et hereditatibus’) and determined beforehand;
they must be moderate, not exceeding seven or ten per cent; and they
must be capable of being repurchased at any moment in whole or in
part, by the repayment of the same sum for which they were originally
created. On the other hand, the payer of the rent must never be forced to
repay the purchase money, even if the goods on which the rent was
charged had perished—in other words, the contract creating the rent
charge was one of sale, and not of loan. The bull recites that such con-
ditions had been observed in contracts of this nature from time imme-
morial.462 A precisely similar decree was issued by Calixtus III in 1455.463
These decisions were universally followed in the fifteenth century.464
It was always insisted that a rent could only be charged upon something
of which the use could be separated from the ownership, as otherwise it
would savour of usury.465 In the sixteenth century interesting discus-
sions arose about the possibility of creating a personal rent charge, not
secured on any specific property, but such discussions did not trouble
the writers of the period which we are treating. The only instance of
such a contract being considered is found in a bull of Nicholas V in
1452, permitting such personal rent charges in the kingdoms of Aragon
and Sicily, but this permission was purely local, and, as the bull itself
shows, was designed to meet the exigencies of a special situation.466
§9. Partnership
The teaching on partnership contains such a complete disproof of the
contention that the mediaeval teaching on usury was based on the
unproductivity of capital, that certain writers have endeavoured to prove
that the permission of partnership was but a subterfuge, consciously
designed to justify evasions of the usury law. Further historical knowl-
edge, however, has dispelled this misconception; and it is now certain
that the contract of partnership was widely practised and tolerated long
before the Church attempted to insist on the observance of its usury
laws in everyday commercial life.467 However interesting an investiga-
tion into the commercial and industrial partnerships of the Middle Ages
might be, we must not attempt to pursue it here, as we have rigidly112/George O’Brien
limited ourselves to a consideration of teaching. We must refer, how-
ever, to the commenda, which was the contract from which the later
mediaeval partnership (societas) is generally admitted to have devel-
oped, because the commenda was extensively practised as early as the
tenth century, and, as far as we know, never provoked any expression of
disapproval from the Church. This silence amounts to a justification;
and we may therefore say that, even before Aquinas devoted his atten-
tion to the subject, the Church fully approved of an institution which
provided the owner of money with the means of procuring an unearned
income.
The commenda was originally a contract by which merchants who
wished to engage in foreign trade, but who did not wish to travel them-
selves, entrusted their wares to agents or representatives. The merchant
was known as the commendator or socius stans, and the agent as the
commendatarius or tractator. The most usual arrangement for the divi-
sion of the profits of the adventure was that the commendatarius should
receive one-fourth and the commendator three-fourths. At a slightly
later date contracts came to be common in which the commendatarius
contributed a share of capital, in which case he would receive one-fourth
of the whole profit as commendatarius, and a proportionate share of the
remainder as capitalist. This contract came to be generally known as
collegantia or societas. Contracts of this kind, though originally chiefly
employed in overseas enterprise, afterwards came to be utilised in inter-
nal trade and manufacturing industry.468
The legitimacy of the profits of the commendator never seems to
have caused the slightest difficulty to the canonists. In 1206 Innocent in.
advised the Archbishop of Genoa that a widow’s dowry should be en-
trusted to some merchant so that an income might be obtained by means
of honest gain.469 Aquinas expressly distinguishes between profit made
from entrusting one’s money to a merchant to be employed by him in
trade, and profit arising from a loan, on the ground that in the former
case the ownership of the money does not pass, and that therefore the
person who derives the profit also risks the loan. ‘He who lends money
transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the bor-
rower holds the money at his own risk, and is bound to pay it all back:
wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand, he that
entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of
society does not transfer the ownership of the money to them, for it
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craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently he may lawfully de-
mand, as something belonging to him, part of the profits derived from
his money.’470 This dictum of Aquinas was the foundation of all the later
teaching on partnership, and the importance of the element of risk was
insisted on in strong terms by the later writers. According to Baldus,
‘when there is no sharing of risk there is no partnership’;471 and Paul de
Castro says, ‘A partnership when the gain is shared, but not the loss, is
not to be permitted.’472 ‘The legitimacy,’ says Brants, ‘of the contract of
commenda always rested upon the same principle; capital could not be
productive except for him who worked it himself, or who caused it to be
worked on his own responsibility. This latter condition was realised in
commenda.’473
Although the contract of partnership was fully recognised by the
scholastics, it was not very scientifically treated, nor were the different
species of the contract systematically classified. The only classification
adopted was to divide contracts of partnership into two kinds—those
where both parties contributed labour to a joint enterprise, and those
where one party contributed labour and the other party money. The former
gave no difficulty, because the justice of the remuneration of labour was
admitted; but, while the latter was no less fully recognised, cases of it
were subjected to careful scrutiny, because it was feared that usurious
contracts might be concealed under the appearance of a partnership.474
The question which occupied the greatest space in the treatises on the
subject was the share in which the profits should be divided between the
parties. The only rule which could be laid down, in the absence of an
express contract, was that the parties should be remunerated in propor-
tion to the services which they contributed—a rule the application of
which must have been attended with enormous difficulties. Laurentius
de Rodulphis insists that equality must be observed;475 and Angelus de
Periglis de Perusio, the first monographist on the subject, does not throw
much more light on the question. The rule as stated by this last writer is
that in the first place the person contributing money must be repaid a
sum equal to what he put in, and the person contributing labour must be
paid a sum equal to the value of his labour, and that whatever surplus
remains must be divided between the two parties equally.476 The ques-
tion of the shares in which the profits should be distributed was not one,
however, that frequently arose in practice, because it was the almost
universal custom for the partners to make this a term of their original
contract. Within fairly wide limits it was possible to arrange for the114/George O’Brien
division of the profits in unequal shares—say two-thirds and one-third.
The shares of gain and loss must, however, be the same; one party could
not reap two-thirds of the profit and bear only one-third of the loss; but
it might be contracted that, when the loss was deducted from the gain,
one party might have two-thirds of the balance, and the other one-third.477
In no case, of course, could the party contributing the money stipulate
that his principal should in all cases be returned, because that was a
mutuum. The party contributing the labour might validly contract that
he should be paid for his labour in any case, but, if this was so, the
contract ceased to be a societas and became a locatio operarum, or
ordinary contract of work for wages. In all cases, common participation
in the gains and losses of the enterprise was an essential feature of the
contract of partnership.478
Before concluding the subject of partnership, we must make refer-
ence to the trinus contractus, which caused much discussion and great
difficulty. As we have seen, a contract of partnership was good so long
as the person contributing money did not contract that he should receive
his original money back in all circumstances. A contract of insurance
was equally justifiable. There was no doubt that A might enter into
partnership with B; he could further insure himself with C against the
loss of his capital, and with D against damage caused by fluctuations in
the rate of profits. Why, then, should he not simultaneously enter into all
three contracts with B? If he did so, he was still B’s partner, but at the
same time he was protected against the loss of his principal and a fair
return upon it—in other words, he was a partner, protected against the
risks of the enterprise. The legitimacy of such a contract—the trinus
contractus, as it was called—was maintained by Carletus in the Summa
Angelica, which was published about 1476, and by Biel.479 Early in the
sixteenth century Eck, a young professor at Ingolstadt, brought the ques-
tion of the legitimacy of this contract before the University of Bologna,
but no formal decision was pronounced, and, had it not been for the
reaction following the Reformation, the trinus contmctus would prob-
ably have gained general acceptance. As it was, it was condemned by a
provincial synod at Milan in 1565, and by Sixtus V in 1585.480
We should also refer to the contract of bottomry, which consisted of
a loan made to the owner—or in some cases the master—of a ship, on
the security of the ship, to be repaid with interest upon the safe conclu-
sion of a voyage. This contract could not be considered a partnership,
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probably escaped condemnation as usurious on the ground that the lender
shared in the risk of the enterprise. The payment of some additional sum
over and above the money lent might thus be justified on the ground of
periculum sortis. The contract, moreover, was really one of insurance
for the shipowner, and contracts of insurance were clearly legitimate. In
any event the legitimacy of loans on bottomry was not questioned be-
fore the sixteenth century.481
§10. Concluding Remarks on Usury
It is to be hoped that the above exposition of the mediaeval doctrine on
usury will dispel the idea that the doctrine was founded upon the injus-
tice of unearned income. Far from the receipt of an unearned income
from money or other capital being in all cases condemned, it was unani-
mously recognised, provided that the income accrued to the owner of
the capital, and not to somebody else, and that the rate of remuneration
was just. The teaching on partnership rested on the fundamental as-
sumption that a man might trade with his money, either by using it him-
self, or by allowing other people to use it on his behalf. In the latter case,
the person making use of the money might be either assured of being
paid a fixed remuneration for his services, in which case the contract
was one of locatio operarum, or he might be willing to let his remunera-
tion depend upon the result of the enterprise, in which case the contract
was one of societas. In either case the right of the owner of the money to
reap a profit from the operation was unquestioned, provided only that
he was willing to share the risks of loss. But if, instead of making use of
his money for trading either by his own exertions or by those of his
partner or agent, he chose to sell his money, he was not permitted to
receive more for it than its just price —which was, in fact, the repay-
ment of the same amount. This was what happened in the case of a
mutuum. In that case the ownership of the money was transferred to the
borrower, who was perfectly at liberty to trade with it, if he so desired,
and to reap whatever gain that trade produced. The prohibition of usury,
far from being proof of the injustice of an income from capital, is proof
of quite the contrary, because it was designed to insure that the income
from capital should belong to the owner of that capital and to no other
person.482 Although, therefore, no price could be paid for a loan, the
lender must be prevented from suffering any damage from making the
loan, and he might make good his loss by virtue of the implied collateral
contract of indemnity, which we discussed above when treating of ex-116/George O’Brien
trinsic titles. If the lender, through making the loan, had been prevented
from making a profit in trade, he might be indemnified for that loss. All
through the discussions on usury we find express recognition of the
justice of the owner of money deriving an income from its employment
all that the teaching of usury was at pains to define was who the person
was to whom money, which was the subject matter of a mutuum, be-
longed. It is quite impossible to comprehend how modern writers can
see in the usury teaching of the scholastics a fatal discouragement to the
enterprise of traders and capitalists; and it is equally impossible to un-
derstand how socialists can find in that doctrine any suggestion of sup-
port for the proposition that all unearned income is immoral and unjust.
Section 3. — The Machinery of Exchange
We have already drawn attention to the fact that there was no branch of
economics about which such profound ignorance ruled in the earlier
Middle Ages as that of money. As we stated above, even as late as the
twelfth century, the theologians were quite content to quote the ill-founded
and erroneous opinions of Isidore of Seville as final on the subject. It
will be remembered that we also remarked that the question of money
was the first economic question to receive systematic scientific treat-
ment from the writers of the later Middle Ages. This remarkable devel-
opment of opinion on this subject is practically the work of one man,
Nicholas Oresme, Bishop of Lisieux, whose treatise, De Origine, Natura,
Jure et Mutationibus Monetarum, is the earliest example of a pure eco-
nomic monograph in the modern sense. ‘The scholastics,’ says Roscher,
‘extended their inquiries from the economic point of view further than
one is generally disposed to believe; although it is true that they often
did so under a singular form.... We can, however, single out Oresme as
the greatest scholastic economist for two reasons : on account of the
exactitude and clarity of his ideas, and because he succeeded in freeing
himself from the pseudo-theological systematisation of things in gen-
eral, and from the pseudo-philosophical deduction in details.’483
Even in the thirteenth century natural economy had not been re-
placed to any large extent by money economy. The great majority of
transactions between man and man were carried on without the inter-
vention of money payments; and the amount of coin in circulation was
consequently small.484 The question of currency was not therefore one
to engage the serious attention of the writers of the time. Aquinas does
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ences to the subject in the De Regimine Principum— which occur in the
chapters of that work of which the authorship is disputed—simply go to
the length of approving Aristotle’s opinions on money, and advising the
prince to exercise moderation in the exercise of his power of coining
sive in mutando sive in diminuendo pondus.485
As is often the case, the discussion of the rights and duties of the
sovereign in connection with the currency only arose when it became
necessary for the public to protest against abuses. Philip the Fair of
France made it part of his policy to increase the revenue by tampering
with the coinage, a policy which was continued by his successors, until
it became an intolerable grievance to his subjects. In vain did the Pope
thunder against Philip;486 in vain did the greatest poet of the age de-
nounce ‘him that doth work With his adulterate money on the Seine.’487
Matters continued to grow steadily worse until the middle of the
fourteenth century. During the year 1348 there were no less than eleven
variations in the value of money in France; in 1349 there were nine, in
1351 eighteen, in 1353 thirteen, and in 1355 eighteen again. In the course
of a single year the value of the silver mark sprang from four to seven-
teen livres, and fell back again to four.488 The practice of fixing the price
of many necessary commodities must have aggravated the natural evil
consequences of such fluctuations.489
This grievance had the good result of fixing the attention of schol-
ars on the money question. ‘Under the stress of facts and of necessity,’
says Brants, ‘thinkers applied their minds to the details of the theory of
money, which was the department of economics which, thanks to events,
received the earliest illumination. Lawyers, bankers, money-changers,
doctors of theology, and publicists of every kind, attached a thoroughly
justifiable importance to the question of money. We are no doubt far
from knowing all the treatises which saw the light in the fourteenth
century upon this weighty question; but we know enough to affirm that
the monetary doctrine was very developed and very far-seeing.’490
Buridan analysed the different functions and utilities of money, and ex-
plained the different ways in which its value might be changed.491 He
did not, however, proceed to discuss the much more important question
as to when the sovereign was entitled to make these alterations. This
was reserved for Nicholas Oresme, who published his famous treatise
about the year 1373. The merits of this work have excited the unani-
mous admiration of all who have studied it. Roscher says that it con-
tains ‘a theory of money, elaborated in the fourteenth century, which118/George O’Brien
remains perfectly correct to-day, under the test of the principles applied
in the nineteenth century, and that with a brevity, a precision, a clarity,
and a simplicity of language which is a striking proof of the superior
genius of its author.’492 According to Brants, ‘the treatise of Oresme is
one of the first to be devoted ex professo to an economic subject, and it
expresses many ideas which are very just, more just than those which
held the field for a long period after him, under the name of mercantil-
ism, and more just than those which allowed of the reduction of money
as if it were nothing more than a counter of exchange.’493 ‘Oresme’s
treatise on money,’ says Macleod, ‘may be justly said to stand at the
head of modern economic literature. This treatise laid the foundations
of monetary science, which are now accepted by all sound economists.’494
‘Oresme’s completely secular and naturalistic method of treating one of
the most important problems of political economy,’ says Espinas, ‘is a
signal of the approaching end of the Middle Ages and the dawn of the
Renaissance.’495 Dr. Cunningham adds his tribute of praise: ‘The con-
ceptions of national wealth and national power were ruling ideas in eco-
nomic matters for several centuries, and Oresme appears to be the ear-
liest of the economic writers by whom they were explicitly adopted as
the very basis of his argument.... A large number of points of economic
doctrine in regard to coinage are discussed with much judgment and
clearness.’496 Endemann alone is497 inclined to quarrel with the pre-emi-
nence of Oresme; but on this question, he is in a minority of one.498
The principal question which Oresme sets out to answer, according
to the first chapter of this treatise, is whether the sovereign has the right
to alter the value of the money in circulation at his pleasure, and for his
own benefit. He begins the discussion by going over the same ground as
Aristotle in demonstrating the origin and utility of money, and then pro-
ceeds to discuss the most suitable materials which can be made to serve
as money. He decides in favour of gold and silver, and shows himself an
unquestioning bimetallist. He further admits the necessity of some token
money of small denominations, to be composed of the baser metals.
Having drawn attention to the transition from the circulation of money,
the value of which is recognised solely by weight, to the circulation of
that which is accepted for its imprint or superscription, the author in-
sists that the production of such an imprinted coinage is essentially a
matter for the sovereign authority in the State. Oresme now comes to
the central point of his thesis. Although, he says, the prince has un-
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means the owner of it after it has passed into circulation, because money
is a thing which in its essence was invented and introduced in the inter-
ests of society as a whole.
Oresme then proceeds to apply this central principle to the solution
of the question which he sets himself to answer, and concludes that, as
money is essentially a thing which exists for the public benefit, it must
not be tampered with, nor varied in value, except in cases of absolute
necessity, and in the presence of an uncontroverted general utility. He
bases his opposition to unnecessary monetary variation on the perfectly
sound ground that such variation is productive of loss either to those
who are bound to make or bound to receive fixed sums in payment of
obligations. The author then goes on to analyse the various kinds of
variation, which he says are five—figurae, proportionis, appellationis,
ponderis, and materiae. Changes of form (figurae) are only justified
when it is found that the existing form is liable to increase the damage
which the coins suffer from the wear and tear of usage, or when the
existing currency has been degraded by widespread illegal coining;
changes proportionis are only allowable when the relative value of the
different metals constituting the coinage have themselves changed; simple
changes of name (appellationis), such as calling a mark a pound, are
never allowed. Changes of the weight of the coins (ponderis) are pro-
nounced by Oresme to be just as gross a fraud as the arbitrary alteration
of the weights or measures by which corn or wine are sold; and changes
of matter (materiae) are only to be tolerated when the supply of the old
metal has become insufficient. The debasement of the coinage by the
introduction of a cheaper alloy is condemned.
In conclusion, Oresme insists that no alteration of any of the above
kinds can be justified at the mere injunction of the prince; it must be
accomplished per ipsam communitatem. The prince exercises the func-
tions of the community in the matter of coinage not as principalis actor,
but as ordinationis publicae executor. It is pointed out that arbitrary
changes in the value of money are really equivalent to a particularly
noxious form of taxation; that they seriously disorganise commerce and
impoverish many merchants; and that the bad coinage drives the good
out of circulation. This last observation is of special interest in a four-
teenth-century writer, as it shows that Gresham’s Law, which is usually
credited to a sixteenth-century English economist, was perfectly well
understood in the Middle Ages.499
This brief account of the ground which Oresme covered, and the120/George O’Brien
conclusions at which he arrived, will enable us to appreciate his impor-
tance. Although his clear elucidation of the principles which govern the
questions of money was not powerful enough to check the financial
abuses of the sovereigns of the later Middle Ages, they exercised a pro-
found influence on the thought of the period, and were accepted by all
the theologians of the fifteenth century.500
Chapter IV
Conclusion
We have now passed in review the principal economic doctrines of the
mediaeval schoolmen. We do not propose to attempt here any detailed
criticism of the merits or demerits of the system which we have but
briefly sketched. All that we have attempted to do is to present the doc-
trines in such a way that the reader may be in a position to pass judg-
ment on them. There is one aspect of the subject, however, to which we
may be allowed to direct attention before concluding this essay. It is the
fashion of many modern writers, especially those hostile to the Catholic
Church, to represent the Middle Ages as a period when all scientific
advance and economic progress were impeded, if not entirely prevented,
by the action of the Church. It would be out of place to inquire into the
advances which civilisation achieved in the Middle Ages, as this would
lead us into an examination of the whole history of the period; but we
think it well to inquire briefly how far the teaching of the Church on
economic matters was calculated to interfere with material progress.
This is the lowest standard by which we can judge the mediaeval eco-
nomic teaching, which was essentially aimed at the moral and spiritual
elevation of mankind; but it is a standard which it is worth while to
apply, as it is that by which the doctrines of the scholastics have been
most generally condemned by modern critics. To test the mediaeval eco-
nomic doctrine by this, the lowest standard, it may be said that it made
for the establishment and development of a rich and prosperous com-
munity. We may summarise the aim of the mediaeval teaching by saying
that, in the material sphere, it aimed at extended production, wise con-
sumption, and just distribution, which are the chief ends of all economic
activity.
It aimed at extended production through its insistence on the impor-
tance and dignity of manual labour.501 As we showed above, one of the
principal achievements of Christianity in the social sphere was to el-
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ample of Christ Himself and the Apostles must have made a deep im-
pression on the early Christians; but no less important was the living
example to be seen in the monasteries. The part played by the great
religious orders in the propagation of this dignified conception cannot
be exaggerated. St. Anthony had advised his imitators to busy them-
selves with meditation, prayer, and the labour of their hands, and bad
promised that the fear of God would reside in those who laboured at
corporal works; and similar exhortations were to be found in the rules
of Saints Macarius, Pachomius, and Basil.502 St. Augustine and St.
Jerome recommended that all religious should work for some hours each
day with their hands, and a regulation to this effect was embodied in the
Rule of St. Benedict.503 The example of educated and holy men volun-
tarily taking upon themselves the most menial and tedious employments
must have acted as an inspiration to the laity. The mere economic value
of the monastic institutions themselves must have been very great; agri-
culture was improved owing to the assiduity and experiments of the
monks;504 the monasteries were the nurseries of all industrial and artis-
tic progress;505 and the example of communities which consumed but a
small proportion of what they produced was a striking example to the
world of the wisdom and virtue of saving.506 Not the least of the services
which Christian teaching rendered in the domain of production was its
insistence upon the dominical repose.507
The importance which the scholastics attached to an extended and
widespread production is evidenced by their attitude towards the growth
of the population. The fear of over-population does not appear to have
occurred to the writers of the Middle Ages;508 on the contrary, a rapidly
increasing population was considered a great blessing for a country.509
This attitude towards the question of population did not arise merely
from the fact that Europe was very sparsely populated in the Middle
Ages, as modern research has proved that the density of population was
much greater than is generally supposed.510
The mediaeval attitude towards population was founded upon the
sanctity of marriage and the respect for human life. The utterances of
Aquinas on the subject of matrimony show his keen appreciation of the
natural social utility of marriage from the point of view of increasing
the population of the world, and of securing that the new generation
shall be brought up as good and valuable citizens.511 While voluntary
virginity is recommended as a virtue, it is nevertheless distinctly
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can be practised by only a small proportion of the human race, and that
it should only be practised by those who seek by detachment from earthly
pleasures to regard divine things.512 Aquinas further says that large fami-
lies help to increase the power of the State, and deserve well of the
commonwealth,513 and quotes with approbation the Biblical injunction
to ‘increase and multiply.’514 Ægidius Romanus demonstrates at length
the advantages of large families in the interests of the family and the
future of the nation.515
The growth of a healthy population was made possible by the refor-
mation of family life, which was one of the greatest achievements of
Christianity in the social sphere. In the early days of the Church the
institution of the family had been reconstituted by moderating the harsh-
ness of the Roman domestic rule (patria potestas), by raising the moral
and social position of women, and by reforming the system of testamen-
tary and intestate successions; and the great importance which the early
Church attached to the family as the basic unit of social life remained
unaltered throughout the Middle Ages.516
The Middle Ages were therefore a period when the production of
wealth was looked upon as a salutary and honourable vocation. The
wonderful artistic monuments of that era, which have survived the in-
tervening centuries of decay and vandalism, are a striking testimony to
the perfection of production in a civilisation in which work was consid-
ered to be but a form of prayer, and the manufacturer was prompted to
be, not a drudge, but an artist.
In the Middle Ages, however, as we have said before, man did not
exist for the sake of production, but production for the sake of man; and
wise consumption was regarded as at least as important as extended
production. The high estimation in which wealth was held resulted in
the elaboration of a highly developed code of regulation as to the man-
ner in which it should be enjoyed. We do not wish to weary the reader
with a repetition of that which we have already fully discussed; it is
enough to call attention to the fact that the golden mean of conduct was
the observance of liberality, as distinguished, on the one hand, from
avarice, or a too high estimation of material goods, and, on the other
hand, from prodigality, or an undue disregard for their value. Social
virtue consisted in attaching to wealth its proper value.
Far more important than its teaching either on production or con-
sumption was the teaching of the mediaeval Church on distribution,
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department of economic study that the teaching of the mediaevals ap-
pears in most marked contrast to the teaching of the present day, and it
is therefore in this department that the study of its doctrines is most
valuable. As we said above, the modern world has become convinced by
bitter experience of the impracticability of mere selfishness as the gov-
erning factor in distribution; and the economic thought of the time is
concentrated upon devising some new system of society which shall be
ruled by justice. On the one hand, we see socialists of various schools
attempting to construct a Utopia in which each man shall be rewarded,
not in accordance with his opportunities of growing rich at the expense
of his fellow-man, but according to the services he performs; while, on
the other hand, we find the Christian economists striving to induce a
harassed and bewildered world to revert to an older and nobler social
ethic.
It is no part of our present purpose to estimate the relative merits of
these two solutions for our admittedly diseased society. Nor is it our
purpose to attempt to demonstrate how far the system of economic teach-
ing which we have sketched in the foregoing pages is applicable at the
present day. We must, however, in this connection draw attention to one
important consideration, namely, that the mediaeval economic teaching
was expressly designed to influence the only constant element in human
society at every stage of economic development. Methods of production
may improve, hand may give place to machine industry, and mechanical
inventions may revolutionise all our conceptions of transport and com-
munication; but there is one element in economic activity that remains a
fixed and immutable factor throughout the ages, and that element is
man. The desires and the conscience of man remain the same, whatever
the mechanical environment with which he is encompassed. One reason
which suggests the view that the mediaeval teaching is still perfectly
applicable to economic life is that it was designed to operate upon the
only factor of economic activity that has not changed since the Middle
Ages—namely, the desires and conscience of man.
It is important also to draw attention to the fact that the acceptance
of the economic teaching of the mediaeval theologians does not neces-
sarily imply acceptance of their teaching on other matters. There is at
the present day a growing body of thinking men in every country who
are full of admiration for the ethical teaching of Christianity, but are
unable or unwilling to believe in the Christian religion. The fact of such
unbelief or doubt is no reason for refusing to adopt the Christian code of124/George O’Brien
social justice, which is founded upon reason rather than upon revela-
tion, and which has its roots in Greek philosophy and Roman law rather
than in the Bible and the writings of the Fathers. It has been said that
Christianity is the only religion which combines religion and ethics in
one system of teaching; but although Christian religious and ethical
teaching are combined in the teaching of the Catholic Church, they are
not inseparable. Those who are willing to discuss the adoption of the
Socialist ethic, which is not combined with any spiritual dogmas, should
not refuse to consider the Christian ethic, which might equally be adopted
without subscribing to the Christian dogma.
As we said above, it is no part of our intention to estimate the rela-
tive merits of the solutions of our social evils proposed by socialists and
by Catholic economists. One thing, however, we feel bound to emphasise,
and that is that these two solutions are not identical. It is a favourite
device of socialists, especially in Catholic countries, to contend that
their programme is nothing more than a restatement of the economic
ideals of the Catholic Church as exhibited in the writings of the mediae-
val scholastics. We hope that the foregoing pages are sufficient to dem-
onstrate the incorrectness of this assertion. Three main principles ap-
pear more or less clearly in all modern socialistic thought: first, that
private ownership of the means of production is unjustifiable; second,
that all value comes from labour; and, third, that all unearned income is
unjust. These three great principles may or may not be sound; but it is
quite certain that not one of them was held by the mediaeval theolo-
gians. In the section on property we have shown that Aquinas, follow-
ing the Fathers and the tradition of the early Church, was an uncompro-
mising advocate of private property, and that he drew no distinction
between the means of production and any other kind of wealth; in the
section on just price we have shown that labour was regarded by the
mediaevals as but a single one of the elements which entered into the
determination of value; and in the section on usury we have shown that
many forms of unearned income were not only tolerated, but approved
by the scholastics.
We do not lose sight of the fact that socialism is not a mere eco-
nomic system, but a philosophy, and that it is founded on a philosophi-
cal basis which conflicts with the very foundations of Christianity. We
are only concerned with it here in its character of an economic system,
and all we have attempted to show is that, as an economic system, it
finds no support in the teaching of the scholastic writers. We do notAn Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching/125
pretend to suggest which of these two systems is more likely to bring
salvation to the modern world; we simply wish to emphasise that they
are two systems, and not one. One’s inability to distinguish between
Christ and Barabbas should not lead one to conclude that they are really
the same person.
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